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Abstract
Disinformation is prevalent in the current social media environment and circulated just as
quickly as truthful information. Research has investigated what motivates the spread of
disinformation and how to combat it. However, limited research focuses on how feararousing disinformation during crises affects individuals’ belief in disinformation and to what
extent corrective information can subdue the persuasive effects of fear-arousing
disinformation. To address this gap, this research tests the effects of fear-arousing
disinformation and different types of corrective information (i.e., no corrective information,
simple corrective information, or narrative corrective information) on belief in disinformation
and intentions to spread disinformation on social media, during a crisis—the spread of an
unknown health virus. Furthermore, adapting the important roles of situational fear and threat
appraisal in predicting people’s health behavioral changes, this research examines the
underlying psychological mechanisms of fear and threat appraisal of a crisis in the effects of
fear-arousing disinformation and different types of corrective information on belief in
disinformation and intentions to spread disinformation on social media.
Study 1 tests the interaction between fear-arousing disinformation and the presence of
corrective information. Therefore, a 2 by 2 experiment was conducted in Study 1:
disinformation (fear-neutral disinformation vs. fear-arousing disinformation) × corrective
information (no corrective information vs. simple corrective information). Study 2 advances
Study 1 by testing whether narrative corrective information decreases belief in
disinformation. Study 2 conducted a 2 by 2 experiment (disinformation: fear-neutral
disinformation vs. fear-arousing disinformation × corrective information: simple corrective
information vs. narrative corrective information). A total of 419 data collected between
January and February 2019 from Amazon MTurk were analyzed (205 for Study 1 and 214 for
Study 2).

The current research notes several key findings: 1) Fear-arousing disinformation does
not make people believe the disinformation under risky situations and it can even make
people avoid the disinformation content as a coping strategy when there is no corrective
information presented. 2) Simple corrective information serves as an effective corrective
information strategy when fear-neutral disinformation is shown but can backfire when feararousing disinformation is presented. 3) Corrective information that features individual
narratives does not differ from simple alerts on their abilities to reduce misperceptions,
situational fear, situational threat appraisal, and intentions to spread disinformation on social
media. 4) Across individual differences, social media usage (i.e., social media use for news,
social media use for fact-finding, and social media use for social interaction, health blog
usage) emerges as significant factors that decide disinformation and corrective information
processing.
By testing effects of disinformation in terms of fear-arousal, which reflects a crisis of
the spread of a health virus, this research addressed how fear-arousing disinformation and
different forms of corrective information affect beliefs in disinformation and willingness to
spread disinformation on social media, and how situational fear and situational threat
appraisal may play their roles in the belief in disinformation mechanism.
Keywords: fear-arousing disinformation, corrective information, narrative, threat appraisal,
intentions to spread disinformation, health crisis, social media
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In 2016, the Oxford Dictionary announced that “post-truth” is the word of the year,
defining it as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Oxford
Dictionary, 2016). The term represents a phenomenon that people are more likely to rely on
emotional appeals or their own beliefs than on fact-based information when they form
opinions. In the post-truth era, when the border between truthful information and
disinformation (i.e., information that promotes false information) or misinformation (i.e.,
unverified information) becomes blurred, we often face the dangers of spreading rumors. In
the present social media era, rumor spread widely and quickly (Guille, Hacid, Favre, &
Zighed, 2013) and people rarely verify truth of information circulated on social media (Del
Vicario et al., 2016). Rumor is circulated in the “3 Cs”—conflict, crisis, and catastrophe—
and the main reason for the spread of rumor is anxiety toward uncertain situations (Berger,
2011). For example, a false story circulated just before the 2016 election alleged that 2016
U.S. presidential election candidate Hillary Clinton was involved in sexual abuse ring of
children whom were hidden at the basement of a pizzeria in Washington D.C. The story
sounded so realistic to some people that a man armed with a rifle, went to the restaurant to
probe for abused children.
Health-related disinformation on social media is deeply problematic because people
rely on online media to search health resources and it can directly affect people’s behaviors.
The internet has enabled people to search health-related information such as diseases or
medical issues (Fernández-Luque & Bau, 2015) and people can search information easily via
social media during a health virus outbreak (Chandrasekaran et al., 2017). However, such
online media platforms are conduits for disseminating disinformation that quickly goes viral,

2
sparking public apprehension (Ives, 2016). Health-related rumor tends to go viral as a sensemaking process especially when in the midst of panic by helping people make sense of
unfamiliar and unexpected situations (Wood, 2018) and anxiety is a key facilitator of the
spread of rumor during crises because people spread it to mitigate their uncertainty levels
(Difonzo & Bordia, 2007). Furthermore, rumor is particularly dangerous when it makes
individuals change their attitudes and behaviors, as Thorson noted in a Vox article, (Illing,
2017). For example, a misperception that the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine
causes autism was a factor that lessened people’s willingness to get vaccinated for Zika
(Ophir & Jamieson, 2018). Studying how people react to disinformation and corrective
information during an emergent spread of a health virus is important because they are asked
to take preventative actions such as getting vaccinated and avoiding contact with other people
(Bode & Vraga, 2018; Jolley & Douglas, 2014).
Scholars in communication, psychology, and political science have investigated what
reinforces belief in disinformation to combat the spread of disinformation. Corrective
information strategies such as social media curation that Facebook provides related stories
about misinformation mitigate the public’s misperceptions (Bode & Vraga, 2015). Simple
and brief retractions that use few arguments in refuting false information are effective in
decreasing belief in false content (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). In
addition, corrective information provided by a peer (i.e., social correction) and corrective
information provided by a social media platform (i.e., algorithmic correction) have similar
effects on belief in false information (Bode & Vraga, 2018).
Although scholars have created effective strategies for corrective information,
correcting disinformation is still a complicated process. Motivated reasoning, a biased
decision-making process driven by emotion to decrease discomforts stemming from cognitive
dissonance (Kunda, 1990), is a possible driving force in the failure of corrective information.
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The argument of motivated reasoning that individuals’ biased information processing to
reduce their discomforts provides a reason that fear-arousing disinformation (e.g., “This virus
is deadly!”) is likely to increase beliefs in the content by generating fearful emotions. Such
fearful emotions invite heuristic processing of corrective information. Given this possibility,
this research questions whether the failure of corrective information could be attributed to
fear-arousing disinformation. To date, health communication has studied fear-arousal mainly
in the context of its persuasiveness. Applying fear-arousal to disinformation about crises will
open new discussions on persuasive effects of disinformation and beliefs in it.
Of particular interest to this research is the role of corrective information in decreasing
persuasive effects of fear-arousing disinformation. Although providing corrective information
is more effective in decreasing the public’s belief in disinformation than not, not all
corrective information eliminates the public’s belief that the disinformation they have
encountered is accurate. Studies suggest that simple retraction of disinformation is not
effective to reduce associated beliefs (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011; Ecker,
Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011), and can even cause individuals to further entrench
their beliefs (Nyhan, Reifler, & Ubel, 2013; Seifert, 2002). Repeated mention of
disinformation, even when noting a retraction or correction, can increase the retrievability of
the false statement allowing people to connect the disinformation content with other contexts
and source, thereby backfiring which reinforces belief in the disinformation (Ecker et al.,
2011; Henkel & Mattson, 2011; Verkoeijen, Rikers, & Schmidt, 2004). In this case,
presenting simple corrective information may fail to reduce belief in disinformation.
To address this possible backfire effect of corrective information, this research
investigates narrative corrective information as an “enhanced corrective” strategy. Narratives
are an effective persuasive communication strategy through transportation into stories,
identification with characters (Cappella, Maloney, Ophir & Brennan, 2015; Green & Brock,
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2000; Murphy, Frank, Chatterjee, & Baezconde‐Garbanati, 2013), and feelings such as
sympathy or empathy toward characters in the stories (Escalas & Stern, 2003; Wirtz, Sar, &
Duff, 2016). Using narrative messages as corrective information may reduce the beliefs in
disinformation (Cappella et al., 2015; Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz & Cook, 2012).
Furthermore, the effects of disinformation and corrective information on belief in
disinformation may depend on fear as an emotion and threat appraisal as cognition (i.e.,
severity and susceptibility) during crises; fear is a cognitive shortcut that engages individuals
to automatically respond to in crises. When individuals face crises, their fear is activated
without deliberative thoughts and heuristic information processing is associated with fear. In
addition, threat appraisal is a cognitive response toward crises because it is an evaluation of
the crisis situations, which activates systematic information processing and consists of
perceived severity and susceptibility. When applying these different characteristics of fear
and threat appraisal to the context of disinformation, fear and threat appraisal can result in
different outcomes of the exposure of disinformation and corrective information through
distinct information processing routes. Although little research includes the psychological
fear and threat appraisal when testing the persuasiveness of disinformation and the act of
providing corrective information, they are required to understand why corrective information
fails to reduce belief in disinformation in the crisis context. The need to be addressed by
undertaking research that examines fear and threat appraisal as motivators of belief in
disinformation. This research addresses the limitations of prior work by examining fear in
two dimensions: fear-arousal in the disinformation message, which can increase its
persuasive effects, and fear of the associated crisis (i.e., situational fear), as well as
addressing how fear and threat appraisal of a crisis affect beliefs in disinformation after the
exposure of disinformation and its corrective information are presented.
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Another goal of this research is to examine behavioral intentions to spread
disinformation on social media. Disinformation is prevalent on social media and users can
share it to their networks easily, cost-effectively (Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015), and
inattentively spread disinformation (Ratkiewicz et al., 2010), perpetuating the problem.
People who believe and spread disinformation with others can become “unintended
conspirators” for disinformation-mongering1 (Kwon & Rao, 2017). This research, therefore,
examines how individuals process disinformation type and composition of corrective
information and associate with their intentions to spread disinformation to others on social
media.
In sum, the purpose of this research is three-fold. First, it compares the effects of feararousing disinformation to fear-neutral disinformation on beliefs in disinformation. Second, it
considers how different types of corrective information (i.e., no corrective information,
simple corrective information, and narrative corrective information) impact the effects of
belief in fear-arousing disinformation. Third, it broadens the research on disinformation
research by considering individuals’ responses to disinformation and corrective information
(e.g., belief in disinformation, situational fear, situational threat appraisal, and intentions to
spread disinformation on social media). This research uses the spread of an unknown health
virus as a crisis case in two online experimental studies: Study 1 examines a two (fear-neutral
disinformation vs. fear-arousing disinformation) by two (no corrective information vs. simple
corrective information) design to predict effects of the presence of corrective information on
belief in disinformation, fear of the situation, and threat appraisal. Study 2 investigates the
effect of different types of corrective information through a two (fear-neutral disinformation
vs. fear-arousing disinformation) by two (simple corrective information vs. narrative

1

This research uses “disinformation-mongering” interchangeably with sharing disinformation.
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corrective information) design. In doing so, this research will spawn new insights into
understanding disinformation and corrective information from a psychological perspective.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The first part of this chapter discusses disinformation and corrective information overall
with subsections defining disinformation, disinformation on social media in crisis, belief in
disinformation, effects of corrective information, and narrative corrective information. The
second part provides an explanation of situational threat appraisal as cognition and situational
fear as emotion at two levels: disinformation and situation, as well as an application of feararousal to disinformation. The final part explains the intention to spread disinformation on
social media, and the moderating effect of social media use.
Disinformation and Corrective Information
Defining disinformation. Disinformation refers to deceptive information that has a
deliberate intent (Karlova & Fisher, 2013; Wardle, 2017). Examples of disinformation
include government propaganda, deceptive advertisement, and forged documents (Fallis,
2015). Unlike an unintentional deception, disinformation comes from people who attempt to
mislead others on purpose (Fetzer, 2004). According to philosopher James Fetzer (2004),
disinformation “should be viewed more or less on a par with acts of lying” (p.231). Thus, this
research defines disinformation as information designed to promote false information.
Disinformation is distinct from misinformation, which Lewandowsky et al. (2012) refers to as
“any piece of information that is initially processed as valid but that is subsequently retracted
or corrected” (p.124-125). Habermas (1984) also distinguishes disinformation from
misinformation in that disinformation contains a speaker’s intention to deceive. However,
scholars have discussed misinformation in broad terms and their conceptual explanations of
misinformation seem to include disinformation.
A functioning democracy is formed by well-informed citizens (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit,
Schwieder, & Rich, 2000) and a society in which the majority of people are misinformed is
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opposed to a democratic society’s best interest (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). For example, if
parents believe a false claim that a vaccination causes autism, they will not immunize their
children, provoking negative social consequences including a drastic increase in diseases that
could be prevented by vaccine or even death (Poland & Spier, 2010), which ultimately
damages public health (Poland & Spier, 2010). Disinformation often aims to influence
people’s perception and behaviors and can cause serious harm to society. Recently, the use of
automated social bots or paid trolls on social media has become a common strategy of
disinformation, as recent findings show that bot accounts produced over 50 percent of the
tweets about Russian politics (Stukal, Sanovich, Bonneau, & Tucker, 2017). Such fabricated
social media information manipulates public opinion, confuses understanding of public, and
endangers deliberative discussion (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Ferrara, 2016).
Zhou and Zhang (2007) included concealment, ambivalence, and falsification into the
concept of misinformation. In a similar line, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) defined
misperceptions as “both false and unsubstantiated beliefs about the world” (p.305). Some
scholars have interchangeably used disinformation with misinformation in terms of “wrong
or misleading information” (Stahl, 2006). Scholars have raised concerns over “misinformed”
citizens who believe false information (Kuklinski et al., 2000). According to Kuklinski et al.
(2000), “… if [people] firmly hold beliefs that happen to be wrong, they are misinformed –
not just in the dark, but wrongheaded” (p.793). The current research discusses disinformation
with previous literature on misinformation, rumor, or false information.
Disinformation on social media in crisis. The deluge of content on social media can
surreptitiously expose individuals to disinformation. When faced with a lot of information on
social media, people tend to rely on heuristics because they do not have enough resources to
process much information thoroughly and objectively (Ecker, 2017). Such heuristic
information processing—a mental shortcut that requires little cognitive effort in decision-
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making processes (Gilovich et al., 2002)—can lead people to deploy confirmation biases,
where people seek information to confirm what they already believe as true (Nickerson,
1998). Online media environments, in which internet users have more media options than
ever before, makes it even easier to read information that supports existing viewpoints while
ignoring uncongenial information by relying on heuristics. Selecting favorable information
(i.e., selective exposure in other words) can aggravate problems of disinformation in online
media platforms.
Such concerns surrounding disinformation on social media are evident during crises
when uncertainty about the situation is pervasive, the event has severe consequences, and
individuals are under time pressure for decision-making (Runyan, 2006). In times of crisis,
individuals rely greatly on social media to obtain important information about the uncertain
situation (Sorensen & Sorensen, 2007), fulfill their information needs (Shklovski, Palen, &
Sutton, 2008), and stay connected with others (Shklovski, Burke, Kiesler, & Kraut, 2010).
However, reliance on social media can lead users to spread disinformation because of limited
knowledge on the initial phases of crises (Simon, Goldberg, Aharonson-Daniel, Leykin, &
Adini, 2014). A wealth of inaccurate information was distributed among social media users
during crises such as the outbreak of Ebola in 2014 (Sarmah, 2014) and the Boston Marathon
Bombing in 2013 (Starbird, Maddock, Orand, Achterman, & Mason, 2014). In addition,
vaccination rates have declined in the U.S. due to growing skepticism of vaccination (Mccoy,
2015) that comes from a possible connection between vaccine and autism (Burgess, Burgess,
& Leask, 2006). In the case of the Boston attack, for example, around 90,700 tweets provided
false information, including a story that an eight-year-old girl was killed while running a
marathon. However, only around 2,000 provided corrective information (Starbird et al.,
2014). Such the spread of rumor worsens the crisis. Health rumors affects people’s decision-
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making processes and behaviors making them more vulnerable to disease (Gyenes & Mina,
2018).
Scholars have attributed the spread of rumors to uncertainty and anxiety about crises
(Oh, Agrawal, & Rao, 2013; Rosnow, 1980, 1991, 2001). In real-life incidents such as the
spread of Ebola virus, anxiety was prevalent among the public because people were uncertain
about virus characteristics such as etiology and spread and scope of the disease (Crook,
Glowacki, Suran, Harris, & Bernhardt, 2016). People try to decrease their uncertainties and
make sense of uncertain situations by believing and spreading rumors (Difonzo & Bordia,
2007); therefore, rumor-mongering functions “to make sense of an unclear situation or to deal
with a possible threat” (Difonzo & Bordia, 2007, p.771). In a similar sense, Allport and
Postman (1947) explained that spreading rumor is a justification process that relieves
individuals’ anxiety; people continue spreading rumors until uncertainty and anxiety
disappear (Knapp, 1944; Rosnow & Fine, 1976). In sum, the spread of disinformation during
crises is interlocked with anxiety stemming from the ambiguous situation.
Belief in disinformation and effects of corrective information. In a recent metaanalysis, Walter and Murphy (2018) found that corrective information has a moderate effect
on reducing beliefs in false information and is more successful when it comes to health issues
compared to political issues because people are more resistant to change their beliefs related
to political identity (Walter & Murphy, 2018). Moreover, corrective information regarding
real-world issues (e.g., climate change or terrorism) may not reduce belief in rumors
(Berinsky, 2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2012) and can even increase belief in disinformation.
For example, conservatives who read corrective information that there were no weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq more believed that Iraq possessed those weapons than those who did
not read any corrective information (Prasad et al., 2009). This backfire effect of corrective
information occurs because people tend to rely more on rumors that reinforces their attitudes
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while being resistant to accepting corrective information in real-world scenarios (Nyhan &
Reifler, 2010).
Some studies have attributed the failure of corrective information to message
characteristics. Simple corrective information, which merely replicates false content and says
it is false, is insufficient in reducing misperceptions and even strengthens false beliefs
(Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007) because individuals might have a sense of
familiarity with the disinformation content in that they have “heard something like this
before” (Schwarz et al., 2007, p.152). The role of the increased familiarity with the
disinformation content in discrediting corrective information can be explained by the illusory
truth effect, a tendency that repeated exposure of information increases its believability
(Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992); for example, the corrective information statement, “there
were no oil paints and gas cylinders,” simply repeats disinformation—“paints and gas were
present” (Lewandowsky et al., 2012, p. 115). This type of corrective information enhances
familiarity of the disinformation content, thus increasing beliefs in it (Lewandowsky et al.,
2012).
Such failure of corrective information is dubbed as the continued influence effect:
people hold their beliefs in disinformation despite the exposure of corrective information
(Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Dyer and Kuehl’s (1978) research demonstrated this effect by
examining whether a single corrective advertisement has an effect over time on decreasing
beliefs in a deceptive advertisement which states Listerine is helpful for preventing colds.
Study findings revealed that beliefs in the disinformation were somewhat reduced after the
exposure of the corrective advertising, but this effect did not last. Familiarity with the
disinformation content strengthened the memory, which can then be used as a retrieval cue
later by being connected with other contexts (Allport & Lepkin, 1945; Ecker et al., 2011;
Henkel & Mattson, 2011).
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A theory of mental event models (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow,
1988) provides a way to design effective corrective information in order to decrease a
continued influence effect. According to mental event models, people tend to retain
information already built in their schemas when no alternative is given because they do not
want their mental models to be incomplete. Hence, alternative information helps people build
up their complete mental models and mitigates the continued influence effect (Johnson &
Seifert, 1994). When no plausible alternative is presented, the continued influence effect may
arise because people prefer relying on disinformation (Ecker et al., 2011). Therefore, it is
imperative to present alternative explanations that refutes disinformation to dismiss
misperceptions already embedded in the mental models. In line with this, empirical research
has shown that alternative explanations about why the disinformation is false could
successfully replace misperceptions rather than providing a simple statement that explains
falsehood of the content (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Tenney, Cleary, & Spellman, 2009).
Narrative corrective information. Narrative is one compelling way in which
corrective information can be effectively designed to dismantle misperceptions in mental
models. A narrative is a “cohesive and coherent story with an identifiable beginning, middle,
and end that provides information about scene, characters, and conflict” (Hinyard & Kreuter,
2007, p. 778). Using a narrative format as a corrective information strategy enhances
engagement with fact-based information and many researchers have used a narrative to
increase persuasiveness and demonstrated that a narrative format is more effective than other
types of messages such as providing statistics to emphasize risks (Van Laer, De Ruyter,
Visconti, & Wetzels, 2013). Cappella et al. (2015) referred to this corrective information
strategy as “enhanced correctives” and suggested three specific directions for designing
enhanced correctives: engaging emotional response, narrative forms, and causal reasoning in
narrative accounts.
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In Murphy et al.’s (2013) research, a narrative film about cervical cancer increased
participants’ knowledge about the cancer, attitudes, and behavioral intentions to check for
their health status, compared to non-narrative information. Such power of the narrative was
explained by transportation, identification with characters in the story, and emotional
engagement (Murphy et al., 2013). Transporting into stories, a psychological state in which
individuals leave one’s reality behind and become highly involved in a story, is an important
strategy to reduce resistance to new knowledge and facilitate understanding processes (Green,
2006; Green & Brock, 2000). Transportation, a dimension of presence, explains “the feeling a
person has that they are inside a virtual environment, a sense of being there” (Nowak, 2001,
p.11).
In addition, individuals empathize with the character both cognitively and emotionally
when they identify with a character of a narrative. Individuals imagine themselves to be
characters in narratives (i.e., identification), feel empathy towards that characters, and adopt
the viewpoint of the characters (Green & Brock, 2000; Tal-Or & Cohen, 2010). Emotional
engagement in narratives and identification with narrators make individuals be immersed in
the story and understand situations of narrators. In Oliver, Dillard, Bae and Tamul’s (2012)
research, the authors found that a narrative-formatted news story about health care dilemmas
elicited feelings of empathy and more favorable attitudes toward the subjects of a story than a
non-narrative.
Focusing on persuasive effects of narratives, this research investigates the effects of
narrative-formatted corrective information. A narrative suppresses counter-arguing based on
the argument of the extended elaboration likelihood model (E-ELM) that individuals are
unlikely to counter argue with the message once being absorbed into it (Moyer-Gusé & Nabi,
2010). More recently, Sangalang, Ophir, and Cappella (2018) found that narrative corrective
information lowered false beliefs. In addition to increasing emotional involvement by using
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narratives, a causal reasoning in narrative corrective information adds an influence on
decreasing false beliefs (Cappella et al., 2015). Narrative corrective information describing a
causal reasoning for the falsehood of misinformation generates new causal chains for
individuals who read the corrective information. Individuals then replace their preexisting
mental models with new mental models built by corrective information (Cappella et al.,
2015). Therefore, narrative corrective information will arguably have more persuasive effects
than simple corrective information or not showing any corrective information on reducing
belief in disinformation.
Moderating and Mediating Role of Fear at Disinformation and Situation
Situational threat appraisal and situational fear. The effects of disinformation and
corrective information on belief in disinformation have been extensively examined, but few
studies have discussed these issues in terms of fear and situational threat appraisal. Two
components of risk perception of crises operate with disinformation and corrective
information because they can provide a solution to the failure of corrective information
during crises. Recent work has suggested that two aspects—cognition and emotion—should
be considered in examining “belief echoes,” or the remained attitudinal effects of
disinformation even after corrective information is provided (Cappella et al., 2015; Thorson,
2013, 2016). According to Thorson (2013), a conscious cognitive process generates cognitive
belief echoes, whereas an unconscious process creates affective belief echoes, suggesting that
the continued influence effect of disinformation should be considered from cognitive and
emotional approaches.
In psychology, cognition is “the symbolic [or conceptual] processing of information
that is required for the central representation and organized expression of a response” (Lang,
1984, p.192). The concept of cognition has been noted in the topic of Reason-Based Choice,
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which argues, “Decisions … are often reached by focusing on reasons that justify the
selection of one option over another” (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993, p.34). On the
other hand, emotion (interchangeably used with affect) is “a broad response disposition that
may include measurable language behavior, organized overt acts, and a physiological support
system for these events [somatic and visceral]” (Lang, 1984, p.192). Cognition and emotion
are discussed as distinct concepts in attitudes assessment (Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994).
Knowledge-based cognition is stored independently of emotions in processing information,
according to Cappella and Jamieson (1997).
The dual process model of persuasion also supports the idea that persuasion operates via
two separate paths—emotion and cognition. Heuristic or emotional information processing
tends to occur automatically; as Shafir et al. (1993) note: “People’s choices may occasionally
stem from affective judgments that preclude a thorough evaluation of the options” (p.32),
suggesting the negative roles of emotions in information processing. Information processing
via cognitive routes requires deliberative efforts. In contrast, heuristic or peripheral
processing, which is less analytical compared to deliberation, is likely to occur when
information is being processed by affective cues (Mayer & Tormala, 2010; Schwarz & Clore,
1988).
The linkage between emotions and heuristic information processing is discussed in fear
appeal theories. Traditional fear appeal theories such as the Extended Parallel Process Model
(EPPM, Witte, 1992) argue that two types of coping strategies—fear control and danger
control—occur via different cognitive and emotional processes. Drawing from Leventhal’s
work (Leventhal, 1970; Leventhal & Cameron, 1987), Witte (1995) notes that fear control is
based on emotional arousal and results in a maladaptive response to crises (i.e., rejecting
message recommendations), whereas danger control is based on cognitive threat appraisal
and leads to an adaptive response to crises (i.e., accepting message recommendations) (Witte,
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1995). Therefore, emotion and cognition may result in different responses to crises and
should be considered independently.
Threat appraisal, which is classified as cognitive, includes perceived severity, or
individuals’ perception of a given problem as serious (Janz & Becker, 1984), and perceived
susceptibility, or “one’s subjective perception of the risk of contracting a health condition”
(Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1994, p.8). Questions such as: “How much of an effect do
you think heart disease would make on a person’s life?” could be an example of perceived
susceptibility (Janz & Becker, 1984) and “How likely are you to become infected with the
AIDS virus?” is an example of perceived susceptibility (Rosenstock et al., 1994). These items
are distinguished from questions asking levels of feelings in that threat appraisal is a personal
cognitive evaluation of the chances that threats may occur. Emotions such as fear— “an
internal emotional reaction comprising psychological and physiological dimensions that may
be aroused when a serious and personally relevant threat is perceived” (Witte, 1996, p.320)
—are immediate and automated processes (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). In line with these
discussions, this research defines situational threat appraisal as perceived severity and
susceptibility of crises. The traditional health-related models such as the health belief model
(HBM; Janz & Becker, 1984), protection motivation theory (PMT; Rogers, 1983), and the
EPPM (Witte, 1992, 1994) put a high value on threat appraisal in predicting health behaviors
and argue that threat appraisal is a key influencer of understanding why individuals adopt
health recommendations. The EPPM specifically delineates that fear-arousing messages
increase threat appraisal (Witte, 1992), which ultimately affect information processing and
acceptance of the message (Das, De Wit, & Stroebe, 2003; De Hoog, Stroebe, & De Wit,
2005).
Despite plentiful literature on threat appraisal in health communication, limited research
examines threat appraisal in disinformation. Previous research addressing disinformation
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effects on emotions (Sherman & Kim, 2002; Thorson, 2016) has not focused on threat
appraisal. This research addresses this gap. When applying the links between fear-arousing
information and threat appraisal to the disinformation context, it is likely that people who are
exposed to fear-arousing disinformation will show higher levels of threat appraisal toward the
crisis than those who see fear-neutral disinformation. Additionally, this situational threat
appraisal will be highest for those who see simple corrective information due to its backfire
effect. However, this situational threat appraisal may also decrease belief in disinformation
by activating deliberative thoughts, thereby mediating the relationship between the group (the
exposure of disinformation and corrective information) and belief in disinformation.
On the other hand, fear is categorized under emotion. One limitation of previous studies
on disinformation is that few have documented effects of disinformation and its corrective
information on emotions, while heavily weighing on cognitive effects such as beliefs.
However, as Sherman and Kim (2002) proposed affective perseverance, in which emotions
toward an object remain even after the object is invalidated, effects of disinformation and
corrective information are associated with emotions. In Sherman and Kim’s (2002) research,
participants were provided with Chinese ideographs and their respective English translations.
The given ideographs had both positive and negative valences. After the participants learned
the meanings of Chinese ideographs, they were informed that translation was incorrect, but
they maintained their positive and negative attitudes toward the characters.
In another example in Thorson’s (2016) research, participants were provided negative
information about a political candidate and were informed later that the initial information
was false. Participants, however, did not change their negative attitudes toward the candidate
whose information was falsely identified (Thorson, 2016). Building upon these discussions,
this research acknowledges that inclusion of emotions into effects of disinformation and
corrective information is necessary. This study focuses on fear because disinformation about

18
crisis can be more related to fear than other types of emotions such as anger, enthusiasm, or
hope. This research examines fear at two levels: situation and disinformation. In this research,
situational fear refers to an unpleasant emotion toward crises that is automatically aroused
when facing dangerous situations.
Summing up past research that differentiates emotions from cognition, this study
examines how individuals form their attitudes once they receive disinformation in terms of
both emotion and cognition. The current research investigates situational fear as an emotional
component and situational threat appraisal as a cognitive component of risk perception, and
how these two components are shown independently after disinformation (fear-arousing
disinformation vs. fear-neutral disinformation) and corrective information (no corrective
information vs. simple corrective information vs. narrative corrective information) about a
crisis are presented.
Fear-arousal in disinformation. Fear appeals have been widely used as a persuasive
communication strategy. The fundamental idea of fear appeals scholars is that fearful
emotions can serve as a driver for individuals to take health recommendations and selfprotective action (e.g., Rogers, 1983). In one of the early studies, fear appeals were referred
to as the messages describing the undesirable consequences caused by failure to accept the
recommendations (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). A long history of research has reached a
general finding that fear appeals are more persuasive than other communication types that
have no fear-arousal (de Hoog, Stroebe, & de Wit, 2007; Leventhal & Niles, 1964;
Leventhal, Singer, & Jones, 1965; Witte & Allen, 2000). It is also important to note,
however, that fear appeals are not always effective. In one instance, Muthusamy, Levine and
Weber (2009) tested the effects of fear appeals among people from Namibia who had already
had high levels of fear about HIV/AIDS. The findings indicated that exposure to fear appeals
did not change people’s fear, attitudes and behaviors related to condom use. This
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ineffectiveness of fear appeals was attributed to high preexisting fear of the audience. In a
similar line, scholars have predicted a curvilinear effect of fear arousal on persuasion, such
that moderate levels of fear arousal are the most persuasive (McGuire, 1968; Janis, 1967).
That is, if fear arousal goes beyond optimal levels, the effects of fear arousal may motivate
defensive avoidance (i.e., unfollowing the health recommendations and denying the threat).
In this case, boomerang effects of fear arousal could be observed (Rogers, 1983) because of
feelings of hopelessness.
Despite abundant literature on fear appeals, it has not been discussed in which crisis
situations that fear appeals may work or do not work. Previous research on fear appeals
mainly tested the effects of fear appeals in the context of individual health. However, health
crisis such as the spread of a health virus which was used as a case in the current research has
a uniqueness because two billion people around the world are facing risks of health crisis or
at least potentially exposed to crisis (World Health Organization2). According to WHO,
health crisis is classified as a global health emergency when it meets criteria such as posing a
serious danger to global societies or unexpected occurrence (Mwanamilongo, 2018). A
possible impact of health crisis is invisible, which does not disrupt a physical environment.
This causes the prevalence of fear of being infected by diseases among public. Compared to
health crisis, man-made disasters such as terrorism has a certain subject that caused the
disastrous event. Man-made disasters are defined as “conditions that result from a range of
policies and deliberate state actions” (Harding, 2007, p.296). Anger is associated with these
types of disaster (Pantti & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2011). Fear could be also prevalent when manmade disasters occur, but the fearful emotions tend to last for a short period of time. Fear
diminishes when the terrorism or any other man-made disasters end and move to a recovery

2

See for more information: https://www.who.int/hac/about/threeyearplan_focus/en/
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stage. Although research on fear appeals has not specifically distinguished between health
crisis and other types of disastrous events, the current research considers the uniqueness of
health crisis and focuses on an association between fear and health crisis events.
A motivated reasoning theory (Kunda, 1990), which suggests that individuals are
always goal-oriented, provides a theoretical reason for the power of fear-arousal in
disinformation. According to this theory, individuals have two different motives: accuracyoriented motivated reasoning and goal-oriented motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990).
Accuracy-oriented motivated reasoning motivates people to carefully consider in their
information processing in order to reach an accurate conclusion. On the other hand, goaloriented motivated reasoning promotes individuals to process information in a biased way to
support their desired conclusions (Kunda, 1990). Research focused on this goal-orientated
motivated reasoning demonstrates that individuals arrive at a biased conclusion due to
increased levels of emotion (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Using Abelson’s (1963) hot cognition
hypothesis, which posits that emotion undermines individuals’ abilities to process new
information in an objective, balanced way. Taber and Lodge (2006) explain that motivated
reasoning occurs based on emotional responses. People engage in emotion-driven motivated
reasoning to avoid mental discomfort when faced with contradictory information.
Building on the argument of motivated reasoning, Lodge and Taber (2005) argued that
people tend to establish their attitudes automatically with aroused emotions—either positive
or negative, and automatic emotional processes result in selective information processing.
This “feelings become information” hypothesis (Lodge & Taber, 2005, p.456) is based upon
a premise that people are biased reasoners who have difficulties in evaluating new
information in a balanced way (Redlawsk, 2002). Therefore, heuristic processing results in
disconfirming new information. While Lodge & Taber (2005) did not examine specific
emotions, it is plausible that individuals will be likely to insulate themselves from corrective
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information after receiving fear-arousing disinformation. Because heightened fear induced by
fear-arousing disinformation can color perceptions and be used as a defensive mechanism,
people are unable to process corrective information rationally when confronted by feararousing disinformation.
The heuristic-systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980) also provides an explanation for
how people process fear-arousing disinformation and the possible backfire effects of simple
corrective information by presuming that attention to the information is more important in
persuasive communication than other factors such as message length (Chaiken, 1980, 1987).
The model proposes two types of information processing: heuristic and systematic. Opposed
to heuristic information processing, systematic information processing involves “considerable
cognitive effort” (Chaiken, 1980, p.752). Information with fearful content activates heuristic
information processing, especially when receivers do not have much prior knowledge
(Averbeck, Jones, & Robertson, 2011). In Averbeck et al.’s (2011) research, participants with
lower prior knowledge of spinal meningitis and sleep deprivation exhibited greater levels of
fear when reading fear-arousing information related to the topics, compared to those with
higher prior knowledge. This leads to a conclusion that emotion—particularly fear—activates
heuristic processing (Hale, Lemieuz, & Mongeau, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1988).
However, research addressing disinformation effects in terms of fear-arousal is limited.
To address this gap, this research tests the effects of fear-arousal disinformation on beliefs in
the disinformation and intentions to spread it on social media. Disinformation on social media
has used fear appeal as a persuasive technique, particularly during crises. For example, a
picture went viral on social media that shows South Korean wedding guests wearing
facemasks to avoid Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) (Kirkpatrick, 2015). This
post later turned out to be false, but many continued to perceive it as real (Worland, 2015).
Moreover, this false information amplified fear and confused people (Zastrow, 2015).
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Another example of rumors arousing fear was that Ebola was found in Kansas City in 2014.
This false story received 16,161 shares and heightened anxiety in those exposed to the
messages (Woollacott, 2014). As these real-world examples show, much disinformation
contains fearful content, which causes irrational decision-making (Bakir & McStay, 2018).
Fear may play a key role in understanding belief in disinformation and intentions to spread
disinformation to others on social media in that individuals are likely to retain memory of
emotional content (Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 1999; Levine & Pizarro, 2004) and retell
stories that raise their emotions (Tversky & Marsh, 2000).
Although fear-arousing content appears to increase belief in disinformation (Mulvey,
2015) and go viral3 (Joyce, 2016), little empirical research applies fear-arousal to predicting
belief in disinformation and intentions to share it on social media, and the few studies that
have revealed contradictory effects. Ecker et al. (2011) tested whether negative emotionality
of false information about a plane crash incident discounted the effects of corrective
information. The negative emotion-laden false information in their study was presented as a
report of a plane crash as a result of a terrorist attack while the emotionally neutral false
information was a plane crash incident caused by a bad weather condition. As for the
corrective information, participants were assigned to 1) no corrective information, 2)
corrective information only (i.e., “…it was concluded that bad weather [terrorists] was not to
blame”), or 3) causal-alternative conditions (i.e., “The actual cause was determined to be a
faulty fuel tank.”) (p. 287). Contradictory to their expectations, the authors found no
difference in the continued influence of false information between individuals exposed to the
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Defining the concept of virality, Nahon and Hemsley (2013) explain speed and reach are key aspects of it:
Virality is a social information flow process where many people simultaneously forward a specific
information item, over a short period of time, within their social networks, and where the message
spreads beyond their own [social] networks to different, often distant networks, resulting in a sharp
acceleration in the number of people who are exposed to the message (p.16).
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negative emotion-laden false information and those exposed to the emotionally neutral false
information. They attributed the null findings to the moderate levels of negative emotionality
in the manipulation. Ecker et al.’s (2011) research calls for a further investigation of
integrating fear arousal into the disinformation context, which is a new arena for research.
In summary, these arguments suggest that people will retain the falsehood of the feararousing disinformation even if corrective information is presented during crises. This
research predicts that backfire effects will appear in individuals exposed to fear-arousing
disinformation and simple corrective information because heuristic processing of feararousing disinformation will be activated when corrective information simply refutes the
disinformation content without providing any alternative explanations that can complete
mental models. Applying fear to disinformation is imperative in addressing the reasons for
the continued influence effect. Hence, this research compares the effects of fear-arousing
disinformation and no fear-arousing disinformation on belief in disinformation, situational
fear, situational threat appraisal, and intentions to spread disinformation on social media, as
well as how corrective information influences the mechanism.
Intentions to Spread disinformation on Social Media
Sharing information with others is known to be an innate tendency (Fehr, Bernhard, &
Rocken-bach, 2008; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Information sharing on social media is
defined as “the spread of content from one person to others in their social network through
the Internet and/or mobile technologies” (Cohen, 2014, p.321-322) and is considered to be an
active communicative behavior (Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015). This is also termed as viral
behavioral intentions, which refer to individuals’ intentions to engage in behaviors that would
make a message viral including “liking, sharing, and commenting on messages” (Alhabash,
McAlister, Lou, Hagerstrom, 2015, p.355). The growth of social networking sites has
facilitated information sharing because these technologies have allowed users to easily spread

24
content to their networks (Cohen, 2014). Cohen (2014) argues that individuals who regularly
visit social media websites are likely to have more willingness or to share content on online
media. Sharing information via social media is a cost-efficient way to spread information and
facilitate interactions between users (Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015).
However, sharing disinformation is of growing concern in the era of social media. Prior
research has suggested a possibility that disinformation with fear-arousing content motivates
people’s intentions to share it with others. Berger (2011) found that that individuals who
experienced high emotional arousal (e.g., anxiety or amusement) were more likely to spread
the content than those with low emotion arousal (e.g., sadness or contentment) using
emotional and neutral film clips. In Heath and colleagues’ research, participants showed
willingness to spread stories that were disgusting (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001). Heath and
Heath (2007) also showed that urban legends containing disgusting content were more widely
distributed online. These lines of research argue that emotional selection (i.e., whether stories
evoke emotions such as anger, fear, or disgust) is a criterion of the spread of memes like
urban legends (Heath et al., 2001). This research postulates that fear-arousing disinformation
will be more likely motivate individuals to spread it to others on social media than fearneutral disinformation. Adding to this prediction, simple corrective information will also
backfire on decreasing intentions to spread disinformation when disinformation has fearful
content.
Moderating Role of Social Media Use
The current research also considers individual differences as a moderator of feararousing disinformation and corrective information, including amount of social media usage,
the way people use social media, and other basic demographic information (e.g., age,
gender). The focus on social media uses in this research is based on the uses and
gratifications (U&G) theory, which is an audience-focused approach that analyzes
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individuals’ different uses of media and it argues that media has different effects depending
on individuals’ needs (Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973). Yet, there is no research on the
roles of social media usage as an individual difference in processing disinformation and
corrective information.
Researchers have hypothesized that high users of social media will discern corrective
information from disinformation by learning from social media (Whiting & Williams, 2013).
Such self-education process can cultivate their media literacy; therefore, high social media
users cannot be deceived by disinformation when the disinformation is corrected. Meanwhile,
they also may be impacted by the third-person effect such that they may exhibit selfconfidence that the messages will not affect themselves but rather will affect others (Davison,
1983). In this sense, although they face with disinformation and corrective information, they
can disregard the messages and rely on their own understandings of the content. Such trend is
supported by empirical findings that high social media usage is associated with higher
narcissism (Andreassen, Pallesen, & Griffiths, 2017), which can inhibit social media users
from understanding the purpose of messages. Furthermore, the current research assumes that
high social media users may confuse disinformation with corrective information because of
information bombardment, which can distract users and cause information overload. Social
media characteristics may aggravate the spread of disinformation because of the lack of
disinformation control. Much information flows on social media without being controlled and
one can spread disinformation effortlessly (Chen, Sin, Theng, & Lee, 2015). As social media
is a double-edged sword, it is questionable how social media usage can affect the dependent
variables of interest (i.e., belief in disinformation, situational fear, situational threat appraisal,
intention to spread disinformation on social media) in the current research.
In addition, how people use social media should be considered in the disinformation
and corrective information context. In general, individuals use social media with a variety of
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motivations such as social interaction, which refers to develop and maintain relationship with
others, or information seeking, which indicates finding information to meet informational
needs (Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009; Whiting & Williams, 2013). Given different
motivations of social media usage, the current research particularly considers the roles of
social media motivations (i.e., social media news use, social media fact-finding use, and
social media social interaction use) in examining effects of disinformation and corrective
information.
Summary of Theories and Connection to Current Research
In summary, the main points of the theories explained above that drive the current
research are: 1) motivated reasoning theory and heuristic-systematic information processing
in explaining persuasive effects of fear-arousing disinformation versus fear-neutral
disinformation, 2) illusory truth effect in explaining a potential backfire effect of simple
corrective information that repeats the disinformation content and simply flags the content as
false, 3) mental model in explaining effects of narrative corrective information, and 4) uses
and gratification theory in explaining possible moderating effects of social media usage.
A common argument of motivated reasoning theory and heuristic-systematic
information processing theory is that emotion leads individuals to process information in a
biased way. According to these theories, emotion activates heuristic information processing,
which is driven by mental shortcuts with a goal-orientated perspective. Therefore, heightened
fear caused by fear-arousing disinformation may activate heuristic information processing
and this fearful emotion may lead participants to believe the disinformation, even though
corrective information is presented.
Secondly, illusory truth effect explains that multiple exposure to the content may
increase believability toward the message. When borrowing illusory truth effect to the current
research, it is predictable that simple corrective information that flags the falsehood of
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disinformation by showing the disinformation repeatedly to participants may nullify the
effects of corrective information. Simple corrective information may fail to change the
perceptions of the participants, which were already established by the disinformation content
or it may even increase the persuasive effects of the disinformation.
Mental model provides an insight into predicting the possible effect of narrative
corrective information. According to the mental model theory, a detailed story like narrative
corrective information can replace preexisting thoughts. In this sense, a narrative story as a
corrective information strategy can be effective in decreasing beliefs in disinformation,
fearful emotions and threat perception established in reading disinformation. Furthermore,
narrative corrective information may even affect behavioral aspects by decreasing intentions
to share disinformation on social media.
The last main theory in the current research was uses and gratification theory which
provides a supportive argument of considering social media usage in examining
disinformation and corrective information processing. According to the theory, social media
users use social media platforms in various patterns depending on their needs. Some social
media users may heavily rely on the platforms while others may not use often. High social
media users may understand the purpose of corrective information because of their high
levels of media literacy. On the other hand, they may simply rely on their existing thoughts
on disinformation and reject the simple corrective information content. Therefore, social
media usage may moderate how individuals process disinformation and corrective
information.
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Chapter 3: Current Research
This chapter offers research questions, hypotheses for Study 1 and 2, and overall
strategies for the current research. Focusing on the presence of corrective information, Study
1 examines the effects of different types of disinformation based on fear-arousal (fear-neutral
disinformation vs. fear-arousing disinformation) and the presence of corrective information
(no corrective information vs. simple corrective information) on belief in disinformation,
situational fear, situational threat appraisal, and intentions to spread disinformation on social
media. Study 2 advances Study 1 by comparing different types of narrative information.
Given the limited prior research regarding the variables of interest, the first research question
explores the correlations between the dependent variables.
RQ1. In Study and Study 2, respectively, what is the relationship between belief in
disinformation, situational fear, situational threat appraisal, and intentions to spread
disinformation on social media?
The next research question asks about the relationship between possible control
variables and dependent variables of interest. The following research question will guide this
research to decide which variables should be included as controls in the main analyses.
RQ2. In Study 1 and Study 2, respectively, what is the relationship between individual
differences and the variables of interest?
Research Question and Hypotheses for Study 1
Based on the above discussions of persuasive effects of fear-arousal, there will be main
effects of fear-arousing disinformation on belief in disinformation, situational fear, situational
threat appraisal, and intentions to spread disinformation on social media. Motivated reasoning
theory and heuristic-systematic information processing commonly argue that emotion
activates superficial information processing and leads individuals to have a biased
perspective toward the information. Fear-arousing information has also been widely known
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as an effective strategy to persuade people and change their behaviors. When applying the
argument that fear has a power to persuade people to disinformation, participants who will
read fear-arousing disinformation will report greater belief in the disinformation, fearful
emotions, severity, susceptibility, and disinformation sharing behaviors, compared to
participants who will read fear-neutral disinformation. Related hypotheses are proposed as
follows:
H1. There will be a main effect of fear-arousing disinformation (vs. fear-neutral
disinformation) on dependent variables of interest.
H1-a. Individuals who are exposed to fear-arousing disinformation will report
significantly greater belief in said disinformation than those who are exposed to fearneutral disinformation.
H1-b. Individuals who are exposed to fear-arousing disinformation will report
significantly greater levels of situational fear than those who are exposed to fear-neutral
disinformation.
H1-c. Individuals who are exposed to fear-arousing disinformation will report
significantly greater levels of situational threat appraisal than those who are exposed to
fear-neutral disinformation.
H1-d. Individuals who are exposed to fear-arousing disinformation will report
significantly greater levels of intentions to share said disinformation on social media
than those who are exposed to fear-neutral disinformation.
Regarding corrective information, some research has found that corrective information,
which merely repeats disinformation content and refutes it (Lewandowsky et al., 2012;
Schwarz et al., 2007) has a backfire effect. Simple corrective information in the current
research that states the disinformation is false by showing the disinformation content again
may increase familiarity of the disinformation. In this case, participants may not understand
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the purpose of corrective information and may rely on disinformation even after the
corrective information is shown. Participants may be familiar with the disinformation through
repeated exposure to the disinformation content. With this possible backfiring of simple
corrective information in mind, this study hypothesizes a significant interaction between
different types of disinformation based on fear-arousal (fear-neutral disinformation vs. feararousing disinformation) and the presence of corrective information (no corrective
information vs. simple corrective information) on belief in disinformation. It is also possible
to predict that a simple refutation of disinformation can decrease belief in disinformation, but
simple corrective information will backfire particularly when the disinformation messages
feature fearful cues (i.e., language, images) because simple corrective information will
reinforce heuristic processing of fear-arousing disinformation. The following hypotheses are
proposed:
H2. There will be a significant interaction between disinformation (fear-arousing vs.
fear-neutral) and corrective information (no corrective information vs. simple
corrective information) on belief in said disinformation.
H2-a. In the fear-neutral disinformation condition, participants who see simple
corrective information will show lower belief in said disinformation than those who do
not see any corrective information. However, in the fear-arousing disinformation
condition, participants who see simple corrective information will show higher belief in
said disinformation than those who do not see any corrective information.
This study also investigates the interaction between different types of disinformation
based on fear-arousal and the presence of corrective information on situational fear. Similar
to the logic of H2, simple corrective information can increase levels of situational fear for
individuals who read fear-arousing disinformation by exposing the said disinformation
content to them again with the added phrase that the disinformation is false. Again, following
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the illusory truth effect, simple corrective information can make participants be aware of the
risky situation and further increase fearful emotions, particularly when participants read feararousing disinformation. Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses:
H3. There will be a significant interaction between disinformation (fear-arousing vs.
fear-neutral) and corrective information (no corrective information vs. simple
corrective information) on situational fear.
H3-a. In the fear-neutral disinformation condition, participants who see simple
corrective information will show lower levels of situational fear than those who do not
see any corrective information. However, in the fear-arousing disinformation condition,
participants who see simple corrective information will show higher levels of situational
fear than those who do not see any corrective information.
In the similar line with the above hypotheses, the next hypotheses postulate the
interactive effects of fear-arousing disinformation and the presence of corrective information
on situational threat appraisal (H4) and intentions to spread disinformation on social media
(H5). These hypotheses are also based on the argument of the illusory truth effect such that
the repeated exposure to disinformation content may increase persuasive effects of the
disinformation. A simple refutation to the disinformation content can make again participants
be aware of the risky situation and increase their perceptions on severity and susceptibility
toward the situation. In reading fear-arousing disinformation, participants can show high
levels of threat appraisal and disinformation sharing intentions. Therefore, the hypotheses
are:
H4. There will be a significant interaction between disinformation (fear-arousing vs.
fear-neutral) and corrective information (no corrective information vs. simple
corrective information) on situational threat appraisal (situational severity: H4-1,
situational susceptibility: H4-2).
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H4-a. In the fear-neutral disinformation condition, participants who see simple
corrective information will show lower levels of situational threat appraisal than those
who do not see any corrective information. However, in the fear-arousing
disinformation condition, participants who see simple corrective information will show
higher levels of situational threat appraisal than those who do not see any corrective
information.
H5. There will be a significant interaction between disinformation (fear-arousing vs.
fear-neutral) and corrective information (no corrective information vs. simple
corrective information) on intentions to share said disinformation on social media.
H5-a. In the fear-neutral disinformation condition, participants who see simple
corrective information will show lower intentions to share said disinformation on social
media than those who do not see any corrective information. However, in the feararousing disinformation condition, participants who see simple corrective information
will show higher intentions to share said disinformation on social media than those who
do not see any corrective information.
Related to the proposed interaction hypotheses, the third research question asks how
individual differences that significantly correlate to the dependent variables of interests
moderate the findings. Among various individual differences, this study particularly focuses
on social media usage based on the uses and gratification theory. Social media users may use
social media platforms in a different pattern based on their needs. This suggests that there
will be a difference in understanding the given information between high and low social
media users. High social media users, for example, can have better understanding of
corrective information than low social media users, but they can also rely on their existing
thoughts on the information without considering the purpose of corrective information. High
social media users can have optimistic bias toward themselves by thinking that they have
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abilities in understanding information. In addition to the social media usage, individual
differences include basic demographic factors (e.g., age, income, and education), and selfefficacy. The moderating effects of individual differences will be examined when those
factors show significant correlations with dependent variables of interest (related to RQ2
above). The RQ3-1 is raised as follows:
RQ3-1. How do individual differences moderate an interaction between disinformation
(fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral) and presence of corrective information (no corrective
information vs. simple corrective information) on dependent variables of interest?
This study also examines mediation effects of situational fear and threat appraisal.
Following the above proposed hypotheses that fear-arousing disinformation will increase
situational fear and situational fear will increase belief in disinformation through an
activation of heuristic information processing, situational fear will mediate between the group
(the exposure of fear-arousing disinformation and corrective information) and belief in
disinformation. In a similar sense, when fear-arousing disinformation increases situational
threat appraisal and situational threat appraisal serves to decrease belief in disinformation by
activating heuristic-systematic information processing, it is also possible to predict the
mediating role of situational threat appraisal. The argument of affect heuristic suggests that
fearful emotions result in heuristic information processing while cognitive threat appraisal
activates deliberative thoughts (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007). Hence, the following hypotheses are proposed.
H6. Situational fear will significantly mediate the effect of the interaction between
disinformation (fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral) and the presence of corrective
information (no corrective information vs. simple corrective information) on belief in
said disinformation.
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H7. Situational threat appraisal will significantly mediate the effect of the interaction
between disinformation (fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral) and the presence of corrective
information (no corrective information vs. simple corrective information) on belief in
said disinformation.
Lastly, following the previous argument that belief in information is one of the
preconditions for information sharing behaviors and a potential significant interaction
between disinformation type and presence of corrective information on intentions to spread
disinformation on social media, this study sets up hypotheses as follows:
H8. Belief in disinformation will significantly mediate the effect of the interaction
between disinformation (fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral) and the presence of corrective
information (no corrective information vs. simple corrective information) on intentions
to spread said disinformation on social media.
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Figure 1 displays a theoretical model for Study 1.
Figure 1. Theoretical model for moderation and mediation effects on Study 1
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Research Question and Hypotheses for Study 2
Study 2 aims to further investigate how fear-arousing disinformation and narrative
corrective information affect belief in disinformation, situational fear, situational threat
appraisal, and intentions to spread disinformation on social media. Study 2 assesses the
effects of disinformation based on fear-arousal (fear-arousing disinformation vs. fear-neutral
disinformation) and different types of corrective information (simple corrective information
vs. narrative corrective information).
Before testing the effects of narrative corrective information, Study 2 also examines the
persuasive effects of fear-arousing disinformation. Fear-arousal has been used as a persuasive
message strategy to make people believe the information and further change their behaviors.
Based on motivated reasoning theory and heuristic-systematic information processing, which
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argue the role of emotion in activating superficial information processing and eliciting biased
perception toward the information, Study 2 also postulates that fear-arousing disinformation
may have more persuasive effects than fear-neutral one. When applying the argument that
fear has a power to persuade people to disinformation, participants who will read feararousing disinformation will report greater belief in the disinformation, fearful emotions,
severity, susceptibility, and disinformation sharing behaviors, compared to participants who
will read fear-neutral disinformation. Therefore, the following hypotheses for the main
effects will be tested to replicate the findings from Study 1.
H9. There will be a main effect of fear-arousing disinformation (vs. fear-neutral
disinformation) on dependent variables of interest.
H9-a. Individuals who are exposed to fear-arousing disinformation will report
significantly greater belief in said disinformation than those who are exposed to fearneutral disinformation.
H9-b. Individuals who are exposed to fear-arousing disinformation will report
significantly greater levels of situational fear than those who are exposed to fear-neutral
disinformation.
H9-c. Individuals who are exposed to fear-arousing disinformation will report
significantly greater levels of situational threat appraisal than those who are exposed to
fear-neutral disinformation.
H9-d. Individuals who are exposed to fear-arousing disinformation will report
significantly greater levels of intentions to spread disinformation to others on social
media than those who are exposed to fear-neutral disinformation.
The next hypotheses assess the persuasive effects of narrative corrective information. If
narrative corrective information is an effective corrective information strategy that can
replace preexisting thoughts on disinformation following the argument of mental model,
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narrative corrective information will decrease the influence of disinformation. A narrative
story is persuasive because it can help individuals enter the story through transportation and
identification. Narrative corrective information will show a significant difference from simple
corrective information. In addition, given that fear-arousing disinformation may have more
persuasive effects than fear-arousing disinformation as H9 postulated, the persuasive effect of
narrative corrective information will be more likely to be shown for participants who read
fear-neutral disinformation. This suggests an interaction between disinformation type and
corrective information type. Individuals who are exposed to fear-neutral disinformation and
narrative corrective information will report the lowest levels of belief in disinformation
(H10), situational fear (H11), situational threat appraisal (H12), and intentions to spread
disinformation to others on social media (H13). Hence, the following hypotheses are
proposed.
H10. There will be a significant interaction between disinformation (fear-arousing vs.
fear-neutral) and corrective information (simple corrective information vs. narrative
corrective information) on belief in said disinformation.
H10-a. In the fear-neutral disinformation condition, there will be small difference in
belief in said disinformation between participants who see narrative corrective
information and those who see simple corrective information. However, in the feararousing disinformation condition, there will be large difference in belief in said
disinformation between participants who see narrative corrective information and those
who see simple corrective information.
H11. There will be a significant interaction between disinformation (fear-arousing vs.
fear-neutral) and corrective information (simple corrective information vs. narrative
corrective information) on situational fear.
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H11-a. In the fear-neutral disinformation condition, there will be small difference in
situational fear between participants who see narrative corrective information and those
who see simple corrective information. However, in the fear-arousing disinformation
condition, there will be large difference in situational fear between participants who see
narrative corrective information and those who see simple corrective information.
H12. There will be a significant interaction between disinformation (fear-arousing vs.
fear-neutral) and corrective information (simple corrective information vs. narrative
corrective information) on situational threat appraisal (situational severity: H12-1,
situational susceptibility: H12-2).
H12-a. In the fear-neutral disinformation condition, there will be small difference in
situational threat appraisal between participants who see narrative corrective
information and those who see simple corrective information. However, in the feararousing disinformation condition, there will be large difference in situational threat
appraisal between participants who see narrative corrective information and those who
see simple corrective information.
H13. There will be a significant interaction between disinformation (fear-arousing vs.
fear-neutral) and corrective information (simple corrective information vs. narrative
corrective information) on intentions to share said disinformation on social media.
H13-a. In the fear-neutral disinformation condition, there will be small difference in
intentions to share said disinformation on social media between participants who see
narrative corrective information and those who see simple corrective information, when
controlling for variables that significantly correlated with the dependent variables.
However, in the fear-arousing disinformation condition, there will be large difference in
intentions to share said disinformation on social media between participants who see
narrative corrective information and those who see simple corrective information.
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Related to the proposed interaction hypotheses, the following research question asks
how individual differences that significantly correlate to the dependent variables of interests
moderate the findings. Of the individual differences, Study 2 also put a particular emphasis
on social media usage based on the uses and gratification theory. Social media users may
show different patterns of social media usage. This suggests that a difference will be shown
between high and low social media users in disinformation and corrective information
processing. For example, high social media users can better understand narrative corrective
information than low social media users because of high media literacy, but they also cannot
understand the narrative corrective information because of information overload. They may
have already read much information on social media. In addition to the social media usage,
individual differences include basic demographic factors (e.g., age, income, and education),
and self-efficacy. The moderating effects of individual differences will be examined when
those factors show significant correlations with dependent variables of interest (related to
RQ2 above). The RQ3-2 is raised as follows:
RQ3-2. How do individual differences moderate an interaction between disinformation
(fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral) and corrective information (simple corrective
information vs. narrative corrective information) on dependent variables of interest?
The following hypotheses (H14–H16) are proposed with a similar reasoning of H6–8 in
Study 1. If there is a significant interaction between disinformation type and corrective
information type on situational fear, situational threat appraisal, belief in disinformation and
intentions to spread disinformation on social media, mediation effects will be shown as
follows:
H14. Situational fear will significantly mediate the effect of the interaction between
disinformation (fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral) and corrective information (simple
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corrective information vs. narrative corrective information) on belief in said
disinformation.
H15. Situational threat appraisal will significantly mediate the effect of the relationship
between disinformation (fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral) and corrective information
(simple corrective information vs. narrative corrective information) on belief in said
disinformation.
H16. Belief in disinformation will significantly mediate the effect of the relationship
between disinformation (fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral) and corrective information
(simple corrective information vs. narrative corrective information) on intentions to
share said disinformation on social media.
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Figure 2 displays a theoretical model for Study 2.

Figure 2. Theoretical model for moderation and mediation effects on Study 2
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Overall Strategies
Study 1 and Study 2 were conducted at the same time in order to prevent duplicated
participation. A total of 493 individuals visited the Qualtrics link between January 25 and
February 4, 2019. For the two screening questions (i.e., year of birth and general activity on
Facebook), 14 participants could not be forwarded to the main study (1 participant answered
a year of birth as 2019 and 13 participants answered they do not have a Facebook account).
Other 59 participants did not complete the survey (completion rate: 85.19%). Therefore, data
from 420 participants who completed the survey and agreed their data to be included in the
research were analyzed. Of the 420 data, those in the no corrective information condition
belonged to Study 1 while the others in the narrative corrective information condition
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belonged to Study 2. Participants in the simple corrective information condition were
randomly assigned to Study 1 or Study 2 using a random number generator.
The reason for conducting two separate studies is because the length of narrative
corrective information may inhibit maintaining ceteris paribus of manipulation of corrective
information. The main purpose of Study 1 is to examine whether the presence of corrective
information matters in processing disinformation content. In order to compare the no
corrective information condition with the corrective information condition, corrective
information should be brief, rather than providing detailed stories. In Study 2, the purpose is
to examine whether different outcomes are shown depending on corrective information type.
Hence, narrative corrective information was manipulated in order to be compared with simple
corrective information. By conducting two separate studies, this research can explicitly show
results of effects of corrective information.
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Chapter 4: Study 1
Method
Design. This study received Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. This study
used the spread of an unknown health virus as a case of crisis. The spread of health viruses
such as MERS, Ebola, and Zika have raised serious concern in the public, and the spread of
health disinformation on social media exacerbates these crises. The spread of health
disinformation can affect one’s decision-making processes, behaviors, and threaten public
health (Vogel, 2017).
Study 1 features an online experiment with a 2 (disinformation: fear-neutral vs. fear
arousal) × 2 (corrective information: no corrective information vs. simple corrective
information) between group factorial design resulting in four conditions designed for the
exposure of disinformation and corrective information: 1) fear-arousing disinformation and
no corrective information, 2) fear-arousing disinformation and simple corrective information,
3) fear-neutral disinformation and no corrective information, and 4) fear-neutral
disinformation and simple corrective information.
Participants. Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
MTurk provides access to a distribution of participants in terms of demographics such as age,
gender, and income (Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 2010). Research has
shown that results of MTurk are similar to those of other online or traditional methods (e.g.,
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012). Eligible participants included
United States residents who were over 18 years old (no upper limit) who understand and use
English for everyday conversation with internet access and are active on Facebook.
Participants who were born after 2002 (i.e., under 18 years old) or those who do not have a
Facebook account were excluded from the study. All ethnic and religious backgrounds were
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considered eligible. Additional eligibility criteria included HIT approval rate (97 or greater)
and the number of HITS approved (5,000 or greater).
Study 1 had 205 participants. Their mean age was 43.95 years old (SD = 12.15). Of the
participants, 33.2% were male and 66.8% were female. Regarding their race, 81.5% were
Caucasian, 3.4% were Latino/Hispanic, 5.9% were Black/African American, 0.5% were
South Asian, 6.3% were East Asian, 1.5% were Mixed, 1.0% were Native American Indian,
and 1.0% were Southeast Asian. As for the open-ended question asking about their ethnicity,
participants who marked their race as Caucasian answered their self-identified ethnicity as
follows: Irish/Italian American, German, Italian American, Eastern European,
White/Hispanic, Polish/Mixed, White/Turkish, Norwegian American, American of ScotsPrussian, Irish/Scottish/Polish.
Regarding their annual income, 18.5% of the participants are earning 0 - $24,999
(18.5%), 33.7% were $25,000 - $49,999, 25.9% were $50,000 - $74,999, 12.7% were
$75,000 - $99,999, 6.3% were $100,000 - $149,999, 2.0% were $150,000 - $199,999, 1.0%
were $200,000 and above. Regarding participants’ political orientation, the mean value of
conservatism from 0 (extremely liberal) to 100 (extremely conservative) was 43 (SD =
30.99). One percentage of the participants indicated their education levels as less than high
school, 9.3% were high school graduate, 22.4% were some college levels, 9.3% were 2-year
degree, 42.4% were 4-year degree, 1% had professional degree (e.g., J.D., M.D., D.D.S.),
14.1% were master’s degree, and 5% were doctorate.
Procedure. Participants were directed to a Qualtrics survey link. The experiment took
about 15 minutes to complete (M = 863.93 seconds, SD = 411.35 seconds). Data were
collected between January 25 and February 4, 2019. Participants received $1 as an incentive.
Upon visiting the Qualtrics survey, participants read an informed consent form, which stated
that all responses would be recorded anonymously, and participants’ identifiable data would
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be deleted to protect their privacy. Participants provided their year of birth and general
activity on Facebook. After these screening questions, participants answered a series of
questions including social media usage, self-efficacy, and involvement in the spread of an
unknown health virus.
Next, participants were randomly assigned to see either a fear-neutral disinformation or
fear-arousing disinformation message. In each condition, participants first read the statement:
Consider the following scenario: Someone whom you know reshared the following
Facebook post. Please read the message and answer the questions below.
Participants had three minutes to read disinformation and answer an open-ended
question “Briefly, please enter your immediate thoughts about the above post” in each
condition. A countdown clock was presented to make participants more concentrated on
reading disinformation, but participants could continue reading disinformation after three
minutes were ended. The average time spent reading the disinformation was 93.43 seconds
(SD = 60.72). Around 11.2% of the participants took more than three minutes to read the
disinformation and answer the question. Participants could advance to the next page
whenever they want after they read disinformation and answered the open-ended question.
After the exposure of disinformation, participants answered Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS) items and responded to questions assessing their present fear of
the disinformation, belief in disinformation, intentions to spread disinformation on social
media. They were also asked to indicate the image in the disinformation content they just saw
as a manipulation check.
Participants were then randomly assigned to either no corrective information or simple
corrective information condition. In the no corrective information condition, participants saw
a screen that simply asked them to click next to advance. Participants in the simple corrective
information condition were informed that the original post was “fake” and had three minutes
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to read simple corrective information, which was borrowed from web add-on. They had to
answer an open-ended question “Briefly, please enter your immediate thoughts about the
above post.” They were given three minutes to read simple corrective information and answer
the question, but they could advance to the next page whenever they finished. The average
time spent reading the simple corrective information and answering the question was 36.43
seconds (SD = 54.83). Around 4% of the participants read the corrective information more
than three minutes.
Participants then answered again about the PANAS items and whether they read the
information that refuted the spread of an unknown health virus. Participants who saw simple
corrective information answered items measuring belief in corrective information and
intentions to spread corrective information on social media. Next, participants in all
conditions responded again to their belief in the original disinformation and intentions to
spread the original disinformation on social media, items about heuristic-systematic
information processing, information seeking, sharing and avoidance intentions, situational
threat appraisal, negative emotions of the spread of health viruses including situational fear.
Lastly, they provided demographic information including age, gender, race, education,
income, and political ideology. Participants were then thanked, debriefed, and asked to
confirm their continued participation in the study after the deception was revealed. Table 1
presents the number of participants for each condition.
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Table 1. Number of participants for each condition (Study 1)
Disinformation
Corrective Information
No Corrective
Information
Simple Corrective
Information
Total

Fear-neutral
44

Fear-arousal
58

Total
102

46

57

103

90

115

205

Stimuli. Disinformation content was adapted from an actual Facebook post that factchecking website Snopes refuted (MacGuill, 2018). Fear-neutral and fear-arousing
disinformation had exact same number of words (52).
In the fear-neutral disinformation condition, the following Facebook post was presented
to participants and included an image of a head of lettuce (see Appendix B):
“An unnamed virus is spreading across the U.S. Avoid eating lettuce because it could
carry the virus. People have a mild stomachache due to this virus. But one bite of
lettuce will not cause pain. The U.S. government is working on a cure at this time. Make
your family and friends aware.”
In order to develop the fear-arousing condition, prior research regarding mortality
salience or vividness of videos (Meijnders, Midden, & Wilke, 2001) was consulted. These
strategies include a car crash or holocaust video, a story of a character’s death, a narrative
about a war, or an essay about cancer or the 9/11 terrorist attacks (see meta-analysis of Burke,
Martens, & Faucher, 2009). Given that death reminders increase anxiety (Routledge & Juhl,
2010), this study used mortality salience to activate fear. The Facebook post contained fearful
words written in capital letters to heighten fear and featured a picture of workers who wore
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masks and protective clothing to move dead bodies, which was circulated during the spread
of Ebola virus in 2014 (see Appendix B) 4. The fear-arousing disinformation reads:
“An unnamed, FATAL virus is rapidly spreading across the U.S. Do NOT eat lettuce
because it could carry the virus. Many people have DIED due to this deadly virus. One
bite of lettuce is DEADLY. The U.S. government is working on a cure at this time. Make
your family and friends aware.”
In both conditions, the uploader’s name and picture on the Facebook post were blurred
to prevent participants from being influenced by the source and to gain external validity
(Bode & Vraga, 2018).
Participants in the simple corrective information condition saw the initial
disinformation content with a label marking the information as false, which was adapted from
a web extension (see Appendix C) along with the statement:
Now consider the following scenario: However, a web add-on marked the post you just
read as a "fake story." Please read the following corrective information and answer the
questions below.
Measures.
Individual differences.
Amount of social media usage. Participants were asked to answer a single item for
social media usage: “How often do you use ANY social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, etc.) in your daily life?” This item was measured on a 5-point scale: 1 = Not at all,

The pictures used for fear-neutral and fear-arousing disinformation were chosen based on results of a pilot
study that asked participants to select one picture that matches with the message content among five different
images for each disinformation type. As for fear-neutral disinformation, 12 out of 25 participants (48%) selected
an image of a lettuce head as the most relevant one that matches with the disinformation content. In addition, the
image used for fear-arousing information was chosen by 12 out of 26 participants (46.2%). See Appendix A for
images presented to participants.
4
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2 = A few times a month, 3 = A few times a week, 4 = A few times a day, and 5 = Regularly
throughout the day (M = 4.31, SD = .73).
Social media usage. Adapted from Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe (2007), social media
usage was measured with the following items: (a) Social media is part of my everyday
activity, (b) I am proud to tell people I’m on social media, (c) Social media has become part
of my daily routine, (d) I feel out of touch when I haven’t logged onto social media for a
while, (e) I feel I am part of the social media community, (f) I would be sorry if social media
shut down, (g) I like using social media, (h) I often think about deactivating my social media
accounts (reverse-coded), (i) I am tired of using social media (reverse-coded).
A principal component analysis (PCA) was performed on the items measuring social
media usage in order to test whether the items comprise of an identical component. PCA has
been used as a dimension-reduction tool to find principal components (i.e., common items) of
a concept. The result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure indicated the sampling adequacy
was acceptable (.838) because it was above the value of .50. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was
χ2 (36) = 885.670, p < .001. See Table 2 for the factor loadings after varimax rotation; Items
(1)-(7) were factored together (Cronbach’s α = .87, M = 5.10, SD = 1.04) and items (8)-(9)
were factored (Cronbach’s α = .82, M = 5.10, SD = 1.52). The second component of social
media usage which comprised items (8) and (9) was dropped from further analysis.
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Table 2. Rotated component matrix of social media usage items in Study 1
Component
(1) Social media is part of my everyday activity
(2) I am proud to tell people I’m on social media
(3) Social media has become part of my daily routine
(4) I feel out of touch when I haven’t logged onto social
media for a while
(5) I feel I am part of the social media community
(6) I would be sorry if social media shut down
(7) I like using social media
(8) I often think about deactivating my social media accounts
(reverse-coded)
(9) I am tired of using social media (reverse-coded)

1
.779
.644
.763
.648

2
-.240
.061
-.328
-.393

.772
.760
.809
.569

-.207
-.057
.102
.675

.510

.763

Social media usage for news. Borrowed from Gil de Zúñiga, Jung and Valenzuela
(2012), four items were used for social media usage for news: (a) Social media help me to
stay informed about current events and public affairs, (b) Social media help me to stay
informed about the local community, (c) Social media help me to get news about current
events from mainstream news media, and (d) Social media help me to get news about current
events through friends (Cronbach’s α = .84, M = 5.03, SD = 1.25). The items were rated on a
7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.
Social media usage for fact-finding. This variable was measured with four items
following (Lee & Choi, 2018): (a) Social media help me to find fact-based information, (b)
Social media help me to check accuracy of information, (c) Social media help me to find a
counter-argument, and (d) Social media help me to find additional resources. The items were
rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree
(Cronbach’s α = .85, M = 4.33, SD = 1.29).
Social media usage for social interaction. This research used the following items asking
how participants use social media for social interaction: (a) Social media help me to get ideas
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about how to approach others in important or difficult situations, (b) Social media help me to
have fun with family or friends, (c) Social media help me to have something to do with my
friends, and (d) Social media help me to be a part of social events you enjoy without having
to be there. Adapted from Kim, Shin, Cho, Jung, Shon and Shim (2015), the items were rated
on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree
(Cronbach’s α = .76, M = 4.90, SD = 1.12).
Self-efficacy. Participants asked the following items for self-efficacy, adapted from So,
Kuang, and Cho (2016). Items were ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree):
(a) It is easy for me to get help against the spread of a health virus, (b) Getting help against
the spread of a health virus is no problem for me, (c) I am able to go to get help against the
spread of a health virus easily, and (d) I have the capability to utilize health resources against
the spread of a health virus (Cronbach’s α = .95, M = 5.29, SD = 1.32).
Issue involvement. Issue involvement in this study is defined as the “extent to which the
attitudinal issue under consideration is of personal importance” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979,
p.1915). Adapted from previous studies (Flora & Maibach, 1990, Ryu & Kim, 2015), five
items consisted of the issue involvement variable: (a) I think about health viruses with a great
deal, (b) I consider myself at risk of influences of health viruses, (c) The spread of health
viruses is personally relevant topic for me, (d) The issue of the spread of health viruses is
meaningful for me, (e) I personally feel very interested in judging the issue of the spread of
health viruses. All items ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (Cronbach’s
α = .82, M = 4.16, SD = 1.22).
Health consciousness. Borrowed from Dutta-Bergman (2004), items consisting of health
consciousness include the following: (a) Living life in the best possible health is very
important to me, (b) Eating right, exercising, and taking preventive measures will keep my
healthy for life, (c) My health depends on how well I take care of myself, (d) I actively try to
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prevent disease and illness, and (e) I do everything I can to stay healthy. These items were
measured from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (Cronbach’s α = .82, M = 5.62, SD
= .93).
Health blog usage. Participants answered a single question, “How often do you visit
medical-related websites (e.g., WebMD)?” which had 5-point scale (1 = Not at all, 5 =
Regularly throughout the day). 17.1% reported “not at all,” 71.7% reported “a few times a
month,” 9.3% said “a few times a week,” 1.0% said “a few times a day,” and 1.0% said
“regularly throughout the day” (M = 1.97, SD = .63).
Dependent Variables
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Borrowed from Watson, Clark, and
Tellegen (1998), PANAS was used as a delay strategy after the exposure of the message and
presented twice: between disinformation and corrective information and after the exposure of
corrective information. PANAS comprised of the following 20 items: interested, distressed,
excited, upset, strong, guilty, scared, hostile, enthusiastic, proud, irritable, alert, ashamed,
inspired, nervous, determined, attentive, jittery, active, and afraid. The items were measured
on a 5-point scale (1 = None at all, 5 = A great deal).
A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted for PANAS items measured
between the disinformation and corrective information conditions. The result of the KaiserMeyer-Olkin measure indicated the sampling adequacy was acceptable (.892) because it was
above the value of .50. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was χ2 (190) = 3248.080, p < .001. See
Table 3 for the factor loadings after varimax rotation; Items (1), (3), (5), (9), (10), (14), (16),
and (19) were factored together and termed as “positive PANAS” (Cronbach’s α = .92, M =
2.74, SD = 1.00) and items (2), (4), (6), (7), (8), (11), (13), (15), (18), and (20) were factored
and termed as “negative PANAS” (Cronbach’s α = .94, M = 1.43, SD = .73). Remaining
items (12) and (17) were factored and termed as “attentive PANAS” (Cronbach’s α = .80, M

55
= 3.81, SD = .95). Of the three PANAS factors, negative PANAS was used to see whether
participants in the fear-arousing disinformation condition reported greater negative affect
than those in the fear-neutral disinformation condition.
Table 3. Rotated component matrix of PANAS items measured between disinformation and
corrective information in Study 1

(1) Interested
(2) Distressed
(3) Excited
(4) Upset
(5) Strong
(6) Guilty
(7) Scared
(8) Hostile
(9) Enthusiastic
(10) Proud
(11) Irritable
(12) Alert
(13) Ashamed
(14) Inspired
(15) Nervous
(16) Determined
(17) Attentive
(18) Jittery
(19) Active
(20) Afraid

1
-.132
.904
.055
.844
-.074
.722
.865
.694
-.172
-.123
.683
-.013
.767
.023
.851
.039
-.162
.822
.076
.858

Component
2
.586
-.103
.844
-.072
.784
.163
-.060
.157
.834
.867
-.061
.394
.161
.896
-.177
.518
.315
-.066
.648
-.071

3
.524
.026
.010
.024
.225
-.435
.038
-.463
.125
.127
-.230
.691
-.393
.041
.110
.451
.772
.036
.448
-.023

Fear of disinformation. After viewing the disinformation, participants indicated their
levels of fear using a set of items. Adapted from Dillard and Peck (2000) including: “The
post I just read made me feel nervous,” “The post I just read made me feel fear,” “The post I
just read made me feel scared,” “The post I just read made me anxious,” “The post I just read
made me frustrated,” and “The post I just read made me afraid.” These items were presented
between the disinformation and the corrective information and were measured using a 7-point
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scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). These items were used for a confirmation
of effectiveness of fear-arousing disinformation (Cronbach’s α = .95, M = 2.90, SD = 1.70).
Belief in disinformation. Adapted from Appelman and Sundar (2016), the measure of
belief in disinformation contained four items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly
disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Participants were asked to indicate their agreement levels on
the following items after reading the given disinformation: (a) I think the post is accurate, (b)
I think the post is authentic, (c) I think the post is believable, (d) I think the post is
trustworthy, and (e) I think the post is reasonable. These items were measured twice: between
the disinformation and corrective information and after the corrective information condition.
This research used the items measured after the corrective information condition (Cronbach’s
α = .98, M = 2.98, SD = 1.72).
Intentions to spread disinformation on social media. The measure of intentions to spread
disinformation online was created for this study based on prior research (Alhabash et al.,
2015). Items were assessed on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 =
strongly agree. These items are: (a) I would “LIKE” the post that argued the spread of an
unknown virus if I receive on Facebook, (b) I would “COMMENT” on or "REPLY" to the
post that argued the spread of an unknown virus if I receive on Facebook, (c) I would
“SHARE” the post that argued the spread of an unknown virus if I receive on Facebook, (d)
The post that argued the spread of an unknown virus is worth sharing with others, and (e) I
would recommend the post that argued the spread of an unknown virus to others. These items
were also measured twice: between the disinformation and corrective information and after
the corrective information condition. This research used the items measured after the
corrective information condition (Cronbach’s α = .94, M = 2.54, SD = 1.59).
Heuristic-systematic information processing. The variable heuristic-systematic
information processing was not used in this research but included seven items including the
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following: I approached the spread of the health virus with a cautious stance, I thought about
how the spread of the health virus relates to other things I know, and I found myself making
connections between the spread of the health virus and information I get elsewhere. Items
were measured on a 7-point scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. The
reliability, mean, and standard deviation were not reported because this variable was not used
in the current research.
Information seeking, sharing, and avoidance intentions. The variables of information
seeking, sharing, and avoidance intentions were not used in this research. Sample of items
include the following: I plan to seek information about the virus using online media in the
near future (information seeking), I am willing to initiate conversation in online media about
the spread of the virus (information sharing), and I will refuse to listen to information about
the virus (information avoidance). Items were measured on a 7-point scale from 1 = strongly
disagree to 7 = strongly agree. The reliability, mean, and standard deviation for each variable
were not reported because the variables were not used in the current research.
Situational threat appraisal. Threat appraisal in this study includes perceived severity
and susceptibility. Severity of the unknown virus in this study was measured with four items,
borrowed from past research (Averbeck et al., 2011; Iriyama, Nakahara, Jimba, Ichikawa, &
Wakai, 2007; Witte, 1996): (a) The spread of the unnamed virus would be a very serious
threat to my quality of life, (b) The spread of the unnamed virus would be a very severe threat
to my health, (c) The spread of the unnamed virus would be harmful to my well-being, and
(d) I believe the unnamed virus is probably the worst illness that a person suffers. Using a 7point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), respondents were asked the extent
to which they agree with the statements about the spread of the virus (Cronbach’s α = .87, M
= 3.50, SD = 1.54).
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Susceptibility of the unknown virus was measured with four items borrowed from past
research (Averbeck et al., 2011 & Witte, 1996), including: (a) I believe that I am at risk of
getting the unnamed virus, (b) I believe that I might contract the unnamed virus, (c) I believe
that the chances are high that I can get the unnamed virus, and (d) It is likely that I will
develop the unnamed virus. Participants were asked to indicate their levels of agreement
ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. These items were summed and
calculated as a mean value (Cronbach’s α = .90, M = 2.65, SD = 1.41).
Situational fear. Of the items measuring negative emotions of the situation, fear of the
unknown virus in this study was gauged by asking respondents how much they fear the
spread of the virus. Items derived from prior research (Dillard & Peck, 2000) are: (a) I am
afraid of the spread of the unnamed virus, (b) I am frightened by the spread of the unnamed
virus, (c) I am scared of the spread of the unnamed virus, (d) I am anxious about the spread of
the unnamed virus, (e) I am fearful of the spread of the unnamed virus, (f) I feel tense when I
think about the spread of the unknown virus, and (g) I am worried about the spread of the
unknown virus. Respondents had options to choose their agreement levels ranging from 1 =
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (Cronbach’s α = .97, M = 3.02, SD = 1.65). Items for
other emotions were not used in the current research.
Variable transformations
Before analyzing data for testing hypotheses and research questions, the dependent
variables of interest were explored. The histogram show that distributions of the dependent
variables were right-skewed (i.e., positive skewness distributions) and this was confirmed
through skewness and kurtosis scores. To reduce the skewness and kurtosis, a normalizing
transformation technique was applied. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007),
substantial positive skewness could be solved by computing the original variable to
LG10(DV).
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In Study 1, belief in disinformation, situational susceptibility, and intentions to spread
disinformation on social media were log-transformed because the variables were substantially
skewed; see Table 4.
Table 4. Skewness and Kurtosis results for measured variables in Study 1
Variable (Study 1)
Belief in disinformation
Log Transformed
Situational fear
Situational severity
Situational susceptibility
Log Transformed
Intentions to spread disinformation on social media
Log Transformed

Mean (SD)
2.98 (1.72)
.38 (.28)
3.02 (1.65)
3.50 (1.54)
2.65 (1.41)
.36 (.24)
2.54 (1.59)
.32 (.27)

Skewness Kurtosis
.583
-.779
-.098
-1.343
.403
-1.005
.025
-.838
.754
-.072
-.111
-1.054
.901
-.225
.186
-1.260

Statistical methodologies
Statistical methodologies the current research used were bivariate correlations,
independent t-Test, analysis of variance (ANOVA), analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for
control variables, and regression analyses. Bivariate correlations were used to measure the
relationships between variables. Independent t-Tests were used to compare the mean value of
two independent groups and whether the difference is significant. ANOVA was used to check
significant interactions between disinformation type and the presence of corrective
information on dependent variables of interest. Related, ANCOVA was used to check further
significant interactions between disinformation type and the presence of corrective
information on dependent variables of interest when considering control variables (i.e.,
covariates). Regression analyses were used to find significant effects of an independent
variable on dependent variables of interest when either control variables were considered or
not. Each methodology that this study used is specifically mentioned for each analysis.
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Results
Manipulation check for disinformation. When asked to indicate which photo they
had just seen, all of the participants in the fear-neutral disinformation condition chose the
correct image of a lettuce head. Of the participants in the fear-arousing disinformation
condition, 93% of participants (N = 107) indicated the correct the image (i.e., a picture of
workers who wore masks and protective clothing to move dead bodies). All data was used for
analysis.
There was a significant difference between the fear-arousing disinformation condition
and the fear-neutral disinformation condition on fear of the disinformation such that
participants who saw the fear-neutral message reported significantly lower fear (M = 2.61,
SD = 1.53) than participants who saw the fear-arousing message (M = 3.14, SD = 1.79),
t(201.37) = -2.288, p = .023), according to a t-Test analysis. However, there was no effect of
disinformation condition on negative affect in general. There was a marginally significant
effect of disinformation condition on positive affect such that participants who saw the feararousing message reported greater positive affect (M = 2.86, SD = .98) than participants who
saw the fear-neutral message (M = 2.59, SD = 1.01) (t(203) = -1.925, p = .056), according to
a t-Test analysis.
Manipulation check for corrective information. When asked to indicate whether
participants read the information that refutes the spread of an unknown health virus, 20.6% of
participants (N = 21) in the no corrective information condition said they saw the corrective
information while 76.5% of participants (N = 78) said they did not. Within the no corrective
information condition, 2.9% of data (N = 3) were missing. In the simple corrective
information condition, 87.4% of participants (N = 90) stated they saw the corrective
information but 12.6% of participants (N = 13) said they did not see the correction.
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Correlations. RQ1 addressed the relationship between dependent variables of interest
(i.e., belief in disinformation, situational fear, situational threat appraisal, and intentions to
spread disinformation on social media). Bivariate correlations revealed that all of the main
variables in this study were positively related to each other (see Table 5).
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Table 5. Bivariate correlations of the main variables in Study 1
Study 1

Belief in

Situational

Situational

Situational

Intentions to spread

disinformation

fear

severity

susceptibility

disinformation
online

Belief in disinformation
Situational fear
(p-value)
Situational severity
(p-value)
Situational susceptibility
(p-value)
Intentions to spread disinformation on social
media
(p-value)

.327

-

(.000)
.186

.586

-

(.008)

(.000)

.360

.613

.481

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

.684

.436

.263

.389

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

-

-

63
RQ2 addressed the relationship between individual differences and the dependent
variables of interest. To answer this question, bivariate correlation analyses were conducted
between individual differences and the variables of interest. Individual differences were:
gender, age, education, race (white vs. non-white), income, issue involvement, health
consciousness, health blog usage, self-efficacy, conservatism, amount of social media usage,
social media usage, social media usage for news, social media usage for fact-finding, and
social media usage for social interaction; see Table 6.
Gender, age, education, income, self-efficacy, conservatism, and amount of social
media usage were not related to any dependent variables of interest.
Whiteness was negatively related to belief in disinformation (r = -.234, p = .001),
situational fear (r = -.145, p = .037), situational severity (r = -.208, p = .003), and intentions
to spread disinformation on social media (r = -.167, p = .017). White participants reported
lower belief in disinformation, lower situational fear, lower situational severity, and lower
intentions to spread disinformation on social media, compared to non-white participants.
Participants who thought the issue of health viruses is important to themselves reported
greater situational fear (r = .345, p < .001), greater situational severity (r = .322, p < .001),
and greater situational susceptibility (r = .347, p < .001).
Health consciousness was positively correlated with situational fear (r = .170, p
= .015) and situational severity (r = .185, p = .008), which means participants with higher
health consciousness reported higher situational fear and severity.
Health blog usage was positively correlated with situational severity (r = .139, p
= .047), and intentions to spread disinformation on social media (r = .140, p = .045) such that
participants with greater health blog usage reported greater situational severity, and intentions
to spread said disinformation on social media.
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Social media usage was correlated to situational fear (r = .179, p = .010), situational
severity (r = .193, p = .005), and situational susceptibility (r = .142, p = .043), such that high
social media users reported greater fear, severity, and susceptibility toward the situation.
Social media use for news was related to belief in disinformation (r = .151, p = .030),
situational fear (r = .231, p = .001), situational severity (r = .213, p = .002), and situational
susceptibility (r = .201, p = .004), such that high social media users for news reported greater
belief in said disinformation, situational fear, situational severity, and situational
susceptibility.
Social media use for fact-finding was significantly related to belief in disinformation (r
= .273, p < .001), situational fear (r = .241, p < .001), situational severity (r = .313, p
< .001), situational susceptibility (r = .301, p < .001), and intentions to spread disinformation
on social media (r = .268, p < .001) such that high social media users for fact-finding
reported greater belief in disinformation, situational fear, situational severity, situational
susceptibility, and intentions to spread said disinformation on social media.
Social motivation to use social media also affected all the main variables. High social
media users for social interaction reported greater belief in disinformation (r = .202, p
= .004), greater situational fear (r = .217, p = .002), greater situational severity (r = .253, p
< .001), greater situational susceptibility (r = .225, p = .001), and greater intentions to spread
disinformation on social media (r = .241, p = .001).
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Table 6. Bivariate correlations of the individual differences and main variables in Study 1

Gender

Age

Education

Whiteness

Income

Issue
Involvement

Health
Consciousness

Health Blog
Usage

Self-efficacy

Conservatism

Amount of
SM usage

SM usage

SM news

SM factfinding

SM social
interaction

Study 1

Belief in
Disinformation

.018

-.027

-.001

-.234
**

.023

.093

.046

.023

.032

.082

-.023

.063

.151*

.273
***

.202**

Situational
fear

.070

-.067

.046

-.145*

-.058

.345
***

.170*

.107

-.096

.045

.084

.179**

.231**

.241
***

.217**

Situational
severity

-.066

-.033

.090

-.208
**

.114

.322
***

.185**

.139*

.092

.003

.071

.193**

.213**

.313
***

.253
***

Situational
susceptibility

-.062

-.093

.063

-.125+

-.005

.347
***

.011

.121+

-.035

-.014

.083

.142*

.201**

.301
***

.225**

Intentions to
spread
disinformation
on social
media

.049

-.034

-.131+

-.167*

-.010

.098

-.062

.140*

-.091

.130+

.040

.121+

.114

.268
***

.241**

Notes. Significant correlations were highlighted. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10
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Main effects.
H1: Hypothesis 1 postulated that disinformation type (fear-neutral vs. fear-arousal)
would significantly affect dependent variables (i.e., belief in disinformation, situational fear,
situational threat appraisal, and intentions to spread disinformation on social media).
According to an independent t-Test analysis, participants who saw fear-arousing
disinformation reported greater situational fear (M = 3.26, SD = 1.74) than those who saw
fear-neutral disinformation (M = 2.72, SD = 1.47) (t(201.656) = -2.401, p = .017).
Participants who saw fear-arousing disinformation also reported greater perceived severity
about the situation (M = 3.99, SD = 1.50) than those who saw fear-neutral disinformation (M
= 2.87, SD = 1.36) (t(203) = -5.518, p < .001). In addition, results revealed that participants
who saw fear-arousing disinformation (M = .34, SD = .27) reported lower beliefs in said
disinformation compared to those who saw fear-neutral disinformation (M = .43, SD = .27)
(t(203) = 2.271, p = .024).
No effects of disinformation type were observed on situational susceptibility or
intentions to share said disinformation online (see Table 7).
Table 7. t-Test results on main effects of disinformation type on DVs of interest in Study 1

Belief in disinformation
Situational fear
Situational severity
Situational susceptibility
Intentions to spread
disinformation on social media

Fear-neutral
disinformation
M
SD
.43
.27
2.72
1.47
2.87
1.36
.36
.24

Fear-arousing
disinformation
M
SD
.34
.27
3.26
1.74
3.99
1.50
.36
.24

.33

.32

.27

t-test
2.271*
-2.401*
-5.518***
ns

.27

ns

To further assess the effects of disinformation type, a stepwise linear regression was
also conducted to control for individual differences that were correlated with each dependent
variable of interests. Individual differences that were significant correlated with each
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dependent variable were entered in step 1; disinformation type (fear-neutral disinformation
vs. fear-arousing disinformation) was entered in step 2. All the regression analysis findings
confirmed the independent t-Test results and did not show any differences (see Table 8).
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Table 8. Regression results of the main effects in Study 1
Belief in
disinformation
Model 1
β
--.192**
------.148

Model 2
β
--.203**
------.66

Situational fear

Model 1
β
--.101
-.282***
-.002
-.033
.049

Model 2
β
--.092
-.276***
-.010
-.030
.067

Situational severity

Model 1
β
--.151*
-.211**
.033
.052
.046
-.126

Model 2
β
--.131*
-.196**
.018
.067
.037
-.084

Situational
susceptibility
Model 1
β
--.061
-.268***
-.036
-.030
-.099

Model 2
β
--.063
-.270***
-.035
-.030
-.102

Intentions to spread
disinformation
online
Model 1 Model 2
β
β
-.153*
-.152*
-.157*
-.158*
.143*
.144*
----.065
.064
-.090
-.090
---

Predictor
Education
Whiteness
Conservatism
Issue involvement
Health consciousness
Health blog usage
Social media usage
Social media use for
news
Social media use for
.286**
.312**
.056
.034
.231*
.180+
.235*
.239*
.189*
.191*
fact-finding
Social media use for
.106
.090
.019
.038
.051
.093
.059
.057
.175+
.173
social interaction
Disinformation
-.180**
.153*
.347***
-.023
-.021
(Fear-neutral vs. Feararousal)
R2
.122
.154
.146
.169
.180
.297
.165
.166
.156
.157
R2 change
.122***
.133**
.146***
.023*
.180***
.117***
.165***
.001
.156***
.000
F
6.957*** 7.252*** 4.830*** 4.995*** 5.369*** 9.163*** 5.568*** 4.866*** 5.208*** 4.548***
Notes. Dummy-coded variables: Whiteness (0 = Others, 1 = White), Disinformation (0 = Fear-neutral, 1 = Fear-arousal).
+p < .10, *p < .05. **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Diagnostic plots are included in the Appendix F; the residuals for all of the regression models were roughly normal.
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Interaction effects.
A series of ANOVAs was conducted to assess the interaction of different types of
disinformation (fear-neutral vs. fear-arousal) and presence of corrective information (no
corrective information vs. simple corrective information) on dependent variables of interest
(H2-H5). Table 12 presents overall interaction results.
H2: H2 postulated that there would be a significant interaction between disinformation
(fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral) and corrective information (no corrective information vs.
simple corrective information) on belief in said disinformation. According to a two-way
ANOVA, the interaction between disinformation type and the presence of corrective
information was not a significant predictor of belief in said disinformation. Furthermore, a
two-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) controlling for whiteness, issue involvement,
health consciousness, social media usage, social media use for news, social media use for
fact-finding, and social media use for social interaction also revealed that the interaction was
not significant.
A post-hoc independent t-Test was conducted to examine the effect of disinformation
type on belief in said disinformation by the presence of corrective information. Data were
split up into no corrective information and corrective information. According to Table 9,
there was a significant difference of disinformation type within participants who did not see
corrective information: within the no-corrective information condition, participants who saw
fear-arousing disinformation reported lower beliefs in said disinformation (M = .36, SD
= .29) than those who saw fear-neutral disinformation (M = .47, SD = .26) (t(100) = 1.973, p
= .051). However, within the simple corrective condition, there was no significant difference
of disinformation type on beliefs in said disinformation.
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Table 9. t-Test results on the effect of disinformation type on belief in disinformation by
presence of corrective information in Study 1

Belief in disinformation

Fear-neutral
disinformation
M
SD

Fear-arousing
disinformation
M
SD

No corrective information

.47

.26

.36

.29

1.973
(p = .051)

Simple corrective information

.38

.29

.32

.25

ns

t-test

H3: H3 postulated a significant interaction between disinformation and corrective
information on situational fear. A two-way ANOVA analysis showed that the interaction
between disinformation type and the presence of corrective information did not significantly
predict situational fear.
When whiteness, issue involvement, health consciousness, social media usage, social
media use for news, social media use for fact-finding, and social media use for social
interaction were controlled, the interaction between disinformation type and presence of
corrective information on situational fear was marginally significant (F(1, 194) = 3.593, p
= .060), according to the ANCOVA result. T-test analyses were conducted for a post-hoc
analysis. Among participants in the simple corrective information condition, there was a
significant effect of disinformation type such that those who saw fear-arousing
disinformation reported greater situational fear (M = 3.47, SD = 1.72) compared to those who
saw the fear-neutral disinformation (M = 2.79, SD = 1.56) (see Figure 3, A): t(101) = -2.073,
p = .041), demonstrating a backfire effect of simple corrective information on situational fear
when fear-arousing disinformation is presented (see Table 10 for details). However, there was
no difference of disinformation type on those who saw no corrective information (B) and no
significant effect of corrective information within disinformation conditions (C and D).
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Figure 3. Interaction between disinformation types and presence of corrective information on
situational fear
A*

3.7

3.52

D

Situational Fear

3.5

No corrective information

3.3

Simple corrective information
3.1

B
2.9

3

C

2.9
2.7
2.52

2.5

Fear-neutral

Fear-arousal

Disinformation Type
* p < .05

Table 10. t-Test results on the effect of disinformation type on situational fear by presence of
corrective information in Study 1

Situational fear

Fear-neutral
disinformation
M
SD

Fear-arousing
disinformation
M
SD

No corrective information

2.64

1.39

3.05

1.74

ns

Simple corrective information

2.79

1.56

3.47

1.72

-2.073
(p = .041)

t-test

H4: H4 postulated a significant interaction between disinformation and corrective
information on situational threat appraisal, measured by situational severity (H4-1) and
situational susceptibility (H4-2). Two-way ANOVA multiple analyses showed that there was
no significant interaction of disinformation type and the presence of corrective information
on their subscales.
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Then, individual differences that showed significant correlations with situational
severity and situational susceptibility, respectively, were considered. According to a two-way
ANCOVA controlling for whiteness, issue involvement, health consciousness, health blog
usage, social media usage, social media use for news, social media use for fact-finding, and
social media for social interaction, there was a marginally significant interaction of
disinformation type and presence of corrective information on situational severity (F(1, 193)
= 3.571, p = .060; see Figure 4). However, the interaction on situational susceptibility was
not significant, after controlling for whiteness, issue involvement, health blog usage, social
media usage, social media use for news, social media use for fact-finding, and social media
use for social interaction.
A series of independent t-Tests for post-hoc analysis showed that there was a significant
effect of disinformation type on situational severity among participants who did not see
corrective information (M = 2.81, SD = 1.29 for those saw fear-neutral disinformation and did
not see corrective information, M = 3.85, SD = 1.63 for those who saw fear-arousing
disinformation and did not see corrective information, t(100) = -3.50, p = .001, Figure 4, A).
Among those who saw simple corrective information, there was a significant effect on
situational severity between those who saw fear-neutral disinformation (M = 2.93, SD = 1.43)
and those who saw fear-arousing disinformation (M = 4.12, SD = 1.35) (t(101) = -4.342, p
< .001, Figure 4, B). However, there was no significant effect of presence of corrective
information among those who saw fear-neutral disinformation (C). No significant effect on
situational severity was found between those who saw fear-arousing disinformation and no
corrective information and those who saw fear-arousing disinformation and simple corrective
information (D). See Table 11 for details.
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Figure 4. Interaction between disinformation types and presence of corrective information on
situational severity
B**
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3.3
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information
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Disinformation Type
** p < .001.

Table 11. t-Test results on the effect of disinformation type on situational severity by
presence of corrective information in Study 1

Situational severity

Fear-neutral
disinformation
M
SD

Fear-arousing
disinformation
M
SD

No corrective information

2.81

1.29

3.85

1.63

-3.500
(p = .001)

Simple corrective information

2.93

1.43

4.12

1.35

-4.342
(p = .000)

t-test

H5: Lastly, H5 postulated a significant interaction between disinformation and
corrective information on intentions to share said disinformation on social media. A two-way
ANOVA showed that the interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective
information on intentions to spread disinformation on social media was not significant. A
two-way ANCOVA also showed no significant interaction on intentions to spread
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disinformation on social media when education, whiteness, health blog usage, conservatism,
social media usage, social media use for fact-finding, and social media use for social
interaction were included; therefore, H5 was not supported. An additional analysis using an
independent t-Test did not show any significant results.
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Table 12. Interaction ANCOVA results in Study 1
Belief in
disinformation
Predictor

df

F

p-value

df

F

p-value

df

F

p-value

df

F

p-value

Education
Whiteness
Conservatism
Issue involvement
Health consciousness
Health blog usage
Social media usage
Social media use for news
Social media use for factfinding
Social media use for social
interaction
Disinformation
(Fear-neutral vs. Feararousal)
Corrective Information
(No correction vs. Simple
correction)
Disinformation ×
Corrective Information
Error

-1
-----1
1

-9.634
-----2.036
7.945

-.003
-----.155
.005

-1
-1
1
-1
1
1

-2.611
-14.221
.020
-.115
.353
.018

-.108
-.000
.887
-.735
.553
.894

-1
-1
1
1
1
1
1

-5.449
-8.679
.063
1.588
.178
.568
2.608

-.021
-.004
.803
.209
.674
.452
.108

-1
-1
-1
1
1
1

-1.175
-14.924
-.454
.092
.713
4.241

-.280
-.000
-.501
.762
.399
.041

Intentions to spread
disinformation
online
df
F
pvalue
1
5.653 .018
1
4.591 .033
1
5.770 .017
------1
.986
.322
1
.926
.337
---1
4.817 .029

1

1.830

.178

1

.340

.560

1

1.346

.247

1

.556

.457

1

2.821

.095

1

7.529

.007

1

5.447

.021

1

32.946

.000

1

.122

.727

1

.101

.751

1

3.584

.060

1

.012

.912

1

.033

.856

1

.095

.758

1

2.767

.098

1

1.661

.199

1

3.593

.060

1

3.571

.060

1

2.296

.131

1

.717

.398

197

Situational fear

194

Situational severity

193

Situational
susceptibility

194

194

Notes. Dummy-coded variables: Whiteness (0 = Others, 1 = White), Disinformation (0 = Fear-neutral, 1 = Fear-arousal), Corrective information
(0 = No correction, 1 = Simple correction)
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RQ3-1: RQ3-1 addressed the moderating roles of individual differences (i.e., education,
whiteness, conservatism, issue involvement, health consciousness, health blog usage, social
media usage, social media use for news, social media use for fact-finding, social media use
for social interaction) in interactions between disinformation (fear-arousing vs. fear-neutral)
and presence of corrective information (no corrective information vs. simple corrective
information) on dependent variables of interest. A series of linear regressions were conducted
to see three-way interactions. In step 1, disinformation condition, corrective information
condition, and a variable of individual difference were entered. In step 2, the subsequent twoway interactions (i.e., disinformation condition × corrective information condition,
disinformation condition × a variable of individual difference, and corrective information
condition × a variable of individual difference) were entered. In step 3, the three-way
interaction (i.e., disinformation condition × corrective information condition × a variable of
individual difference) was entered. See Appendix G for diagnostic plots of significant results.
The residuals for all of the regression models were roughly normal.
Three-way interactions between disinformation type, corrective information, and
individual differences that correlated with each dependent variable of interest were not
significant predictors of belief in said disinformation or situational fear.
A three-way interaction between disinformation condition, presence of corrective
information, and social media usage on situational severity was significant (ΔR2 = .017, p
= .040, ß = -.306). To plot this interaction, social media usage was divided into three groups:
low social media usage (below 4.57), medium social media usage (from 4.57 to 5.57), and
high social media usage (above 5.57); see Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Three-way interaction between disinformation type, presence of corrective
information, and social media use on situational severity (Study 1)
5
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Fear-arousing Disinformation

Disinformation Type

Although the interaction between disinformation type and corrective information was
not significant within each level of general social media usage when investigated separately,
the overall graph reveals that for low social media users within the fear-neutral
disinformation condition, participants who saw simple corrective information reported less
situational severity than those who did not see any corrective information (see Figure 5-a).
For high social media users, participants who saw simple corrective information reported
greater situational severity compared to participants who did not see any corrective
information (see Figure 5-c). When facing fear-arousing disinformation, high social media
users reported greater situational severity than middle or low social media users, regardless of
the presence of corrective information (see Figure 5-a, 5-b, and 5-c for comparison). In the
fear-arousing disinformation condition, high social media users reported greater situational
severity when seeing simple corrective information than middle and low social media users.
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High social media users who did not see any corrective information after seeing fear-arousing
disinformation also reported greater situational severity than middle and low social media
users.
The proposed hypothesis that simple corrective information may increase situational
severity when fear-arousing disinformation is presented was only shown among low social
media users. That said, for low social media users in the fear-neutral information condition,
participants who faced with simple corrective information reported less situational severity
compared to participants that did not see corrective information. However, when faced with
fear-arousing disinformation, low social media users reported slightly greater situational
severity when facing with simple corrective information compared to those who did not see
corrective information.
Additionally, the interaction between disinformation type and social media usage was
not significant within each condition of presence of corrective information when investigated
separately. The interaction between corrective information type and social media usage was
also not significant within each condition of disinformation when investigated separately.
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Figure 5-a. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information on
situational severity among low social media users (Study 1)
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t(21) = -3.466, p = .002
2

1.5

Fear-neutral Disinformation

Fear-arousing Disinformation
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Notes. The green line was significant (p < .01).

Figure 5-b. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information
on situational severity among medium social media users (Study 1)
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t(32) = -2.440, p = .020
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No corrective information

t(38) = -1.781, p = .083
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Notes. The green line (p < .05) and red line (p < .10) were significant.

Simple corrective
information
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Figure 5-c. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information on
situational severity among high social media users (Study 1)
5
4.5

Situational Severity

t(44) = -3.219, p = .002
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No corrective information

3.5
3

t(30) = -3.337, p = .002
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Notes. The green line (p < .01) and red line (p < .01) were significant.

A three-way interaction between disinformation condition, presence of corrective
information, and social media use for news on situational severity was also significant at a
marginal level (ΔR2 = .013, p = .080, ß = -.236), according to the regression analysis. To plot
this interaction, social media use for news was divided into three groups: low social media
use for news (below 4.50), medium social media use for news (from 4.50 to 5.75), and high
social media use for news (above 5.75). Figure 6 displays the interaction.
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Figure 6. Three-way interaction between disinformation type, presence of corrective
information, and social media use for news on situational severity (Study 1)
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Although the interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective
information was not significant for each level of social media use for news when investigated
separately, the overall graph reveals that for low social media users for news within the fearneutral disinformation condition, participants who saw simple corrective information reported
less situational severity than those who did not see any corrective information (see Figure 6a). A significant result was found in the green line in Figure 6-a when an independent t-Test
was conducted (t(29) = -3.599, p = .001). For high social media users, participants who saw
simple corrective information reported greater situational severity than those who did not see
any corrective information (see Figure 6-c). When facing fear-arousing disinformation, high
social media users for news reported greater situational severity than middle or low social
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media users for news, regardless of the presence of corrective information; that is to say, in
the fear-arousing disinformation condition, high social media users for news reported greater
situational severity when seeing simple corrective information than middle and low social
media users (see Figure 6-a, 6-b and 6-c for comparison). High social media users for news
who did not see any corrective information after seeing fear-arousing disinformation also
reported greater situational severity than middle and low social media users for news.
The proposed hypothesis that simple corrective information may increase situational
severity when fear-arousing disinformation is presented was only shown among low social
media users for news. That said, of the low social media users for news who faced with fearneutral disinformation, those who faced with simple corrective information reported less
situational severity compared to those that did not see corrective information. However, when
faced with fear-arousing disinformation, low social media users for news reported slightly
greater situational severity after seeing simple corrective information compared to those who
did not see corrective information.
Additionally, the interaction between disinformation type and social media news use
was not significant within each condition of presence of corrective information when
investigated separately. The interaction between corrective information type and social media
news use was also not significant within each condition of disinformation when investigated
separately.
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Figure 6-a. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information
on situational severity among low social media news users (Study 1)
3.8
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Notes. The green line was significant (p < 01).

Figure 6-b. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information
on situational severity among medium social media news users (Study 1)
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Notes. The green line (p < .05) and red line (p < .01) were significant.
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Figure 6-c. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information
on situational severity among high social media news users (Study 1)
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Notes. The green line (p ≤. 01) and red line (p < .05) were significant.

A three-way interaction between disinformation condition, presence of corrective
information, and health blog usage on situational susceptibility was significant at a marginal
level (ΔR2 = .015, p = .078, ß = -.271), according to the regression analysis. To plot this
interaction, health blog usage was divided into three groups: low health blog usage (not at
all), medium health blog usage (a few times a month), and high health blog usage (a few
times a week, a few times a day, and regularly throughout the day). Figure 7 displays the
interaction.
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Figure 7. Three-way interaction between disinformation type, presence of corrective
information, and health blog usage on situational susceptibility (Study 1)
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Although the interaction between disinformation condition and presence of corrective
information was not significant for each level of health blog usage when investigated
separately, the overall graph reveals that the interaction between disinformation type and
presence of corrective information is reversed between low health blog users (see Figure 7-a)
and high health blog users (see Figure 7-c).
The proposed hypothesis that simple corrective information may increase situational
susceptibility when fear-arousing disinformation is presented was only shown among low
health blog users. That said, of the low health blog users in the fear-neutral disinformation
condition, participants who faced with simple corrective information reported less situational
susceptibility compared to participants that did not see corrective information. However,
when faced with fear-arousing disinformation, low health blog users reported greater
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situational susceptibility after seeing simple corrective information than those that did not see
any corrective information.
Conversely, for high health blog users, the simple corrective information increased
situational susceptibility when fear-neutral disinformation is presented. Participants who
faced with fear-neutral disinformation and simple corrective information reported greater
situational susceptibility than those who faced with fear-neutral disinformation and did not
see any corrective information. When faced with fear-arousing disinformation, high health
blog users who read simple corrective information reported less situational severity than
those who did not read corrective information.
Although the interaction between disinformation type and health blog usage was not
significant within the simple corrective information condition, it was significant within the no
corrective information condition (ΔR2 = .045, p = .033, ß = .867) (see Figure 7-d). In the no
corrective information condition, high health blog users reported less situational
susceptibility than low health blog users when faced with fear-neutral disinformation;
however, high health blog users reported greater situational susceptibility than low health
blog users when faced with fear-arousing disinformation.
However, the interaction between corrective information type and health blog usage
was not significant within each condition of disinformation when investigated separately.
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Figure 7-a. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information
on situational susceptibility among low health blog users (Study 1)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines were not significant.

Figure 7-b. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information
on situational susceptibility among medium health blog users (Study 1)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines were not significant.
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Figure 7-c. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information
on situational susceptibility among high health blog users (Study 1)
0.7

Situational Susceptibility

0.6
0.5

No corrective
information

0.4

Simple corrective
information

0.3

t(6) = -3.627, p = .011

0.2
0.1

Fear-neutral Disinformation

Fear-arousing Disinformation
Disinformation Type

Notes. The red line was significant (p < .05).

Figure 7-d. Interaction between disinformation type and health blog usage on situational
susceptibility within no corrective information (Study 1)
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A three-way interaction between disinformation condition, presence of corrective
information, and social media use for fact-finding on intentions to spread disinformation on
social media was significant at a marginal level (ΔR2 = .016, p = .064, ß = -.240), according
to an independent t-Test analysis. To plot this interaction, social media use for fact-finding
was divided into three groups: low social media use for fact-finding (below 3.75), medium
social media use for fact-finding (from 3.75 to 4.75), and high social media use for factfinding (above 4.75). Figure 8 displays the interaction.
Figure 8. Three-way interaction between disinformation type, presence of corrective
information, and social media use for fact-finding on intentions to spread disinformation on
social media (Study 1)
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Then, the interaction was examined in each level of social media use for fact-finding.
For participants with high social media use for fact-finding, the interaction between
disinformation and presence of corrective information was significant (F(1, 73) = 5.456, p
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= .022, see Figure 8-c), according to the ANOVA result. The interaction was not significant
for those with medium (see Figure 8-b) and low social media use for fact-finding (see Figure
8-a). High fact-finding social media users reported greater intentions to spread disinformation
on social media after seeing fear-neutral disinformation and simple corrective information,
compared to participants that saw fear-neutral disinformation and no corrective information.
This relationship reversed in the fear-arousing disinformation condition; that said, high factfinding social media users reported less intentions to spread disinformation when facing feararousing disinformation and simple corrective information than those who saw fear-arousing
disinformation and no corrective information. Interestingly, middle and low fact-finding
social media users did not exhibit an effect of disinformation type or presence of corrective
information.
Although the interaction between disinformation type and social media use for factfinding was not significant within the simple corrective information condition, it was
significant within the no corrective information condition at a marginal level, according to the
regression analysis (ΔR2 = .032, p = .059, ß = .520) (see Figure 8-d). In the no corrective
information condition, high social media users for fact-finding exhibited clear differences
compared to medium and low social media users for fact-finding. When faced with fearneutral disinformation, high social media users for fact-finding reported less intentions to
spread disinformation on social media than medium social media users for fact-finding.
When faced with fear-arousing disinformation, high social media users for fact-finding
reported greater intentions to spread disinformation on social media than medium and low
social media users for fact-finding.
However, the interaction between corrective information type and social media use for
fact-finding was not significant within each condition of disinformation when investigated
separately.
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Figure 8-a. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information
on intentions to spread disinformation on social media among low social media users for factfinding (Study 1)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines were not significant.

Figure 8-b. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information
on intentions to spread disinformation on social media among medium social media users for
fact-finding (Study 1)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines were not significant.
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Figure 8-c. Interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective information on
intentions to spread disinformation on social media among high social media users for factfinding (Study 1)
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Notes. The red line was significant (p < .05). The presence of corrective information showed significant
difference within the fear-arousing disinformation condition (p < .05).

Figure 8-d. Interaction between disinformation type and social media use for fact-finding on
intentions to spread disinformation within no corrective information (Study 1)
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Mediation effects.
H6-H8: Because there were no significant effects of disinformation types × presence of
corrective information on belief in disinformation or on intentions to spread disinformation
on social media, mediation analyses (related to H6 - H8) following Baron and Kenny (1986)
could not be conducted.
Discussion
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine how the impact of disinformation type (i.e.,
fear-neutral disinformation vs. fear-arousing disinformation) is moderated by the presence of
corrective information (i.e., no corrective information vs. simple corrective information) on
belief in said disinformation (a), situational fear (b), situational threat appraisal (c), and
intentions to spread said disinformation on social media (d).
H1 hypothesized a main effect of disinformation type. Participants who saw feararousing disinformation reported lower belief in disinformation than those who saw fearneutral disinformation, which was the opposite direction postulated in H1-a. This unexpected
result could be interpreted by psychological reactance of fear-arousing disinformation. This is
in line with reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) which argues people tend to feel a need to resist
when facing restricted situations in which they lack control. In risky situations like the spread
of an unknown health virus, activating fear may also activate a lack of control. This lack of
control may cause participants to react such that they disagree with the disinformation as a
coping strategy. Again, the result of H1-a suggests that fear-arousing disinformation under
risks discourages belief in said disinformation. This suggests that excessive fear through feararousing disinformation could decrease persuasiveness of the message.
H1-b, which hypothesized a main effect of disinformation type on situational fear, was
supported. In line with H1-b, H1-c, which postulated a main effect of disinformation type on
situational threat appraisal, was partially supported because the main effect was shown on
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situational severity but not on situational susceptibility. These findings suggest that feararousing disinformation is effective in increasing fear of the spread of a health virus and
perception about the seriousness of the risky situation, but participants did not relate the
disinformation content to their personal issues. Although fear-arousing disinformation
resulted in greater situational fear and situational severity than fear-neutral disinformation,
participants did not perceive that they were in danger of the situation. In addition, the lack of
an effect of disinformation type on intentions to spread said disinformation on social media
(H1-d) suggests that fear-arousing disinformation has no difference from fear-neutral
disinformation in changing behaviors to spread disinformation on social media.
H2-H5 postulated interaction effects between disinformation type and presence of
corrective information, and significant interaction effects emerged for situational fear (H3)
and situational severity (H4-1), such that simple corrective information appeared to backfire,
and elicit greater situational fear and situational severity when fear-arousing disinformation
was presented. These findings are in line with previous studies (Schwarz et al., 2007) which
argued that corrective information that simply repeats disinformation with an added statement
“this information is false” is insufficient in decreasing misbeliefs. Based on the illusory truth
effect (Begg et al., 1992), the web-on simple corrective information in this study could have
reminded participants of the disinformation content they saw before. Such repeated exposure
of disinformation content ultimately increased situational fear and situational severity by
enhancing familiarity with the disinformation. Again, it is important to note that this illusory
truth effect of simple corrective information was only shown among the participants who saw
fear-arousing disinformation. From these findings, it could be argued that simple corrective
information can have a backfire effect when emotional disinformation like fear-arousing
disinformation is presented.
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However, the backfiring of simple corrective information with emotional
disinformation should not be generalized, given that several individual differences (i.e., social
media usage, social media use for news, health blog usage, social media use for fact-finding)
appeared to affect interaction between disinformation type and presence of corrective
information on dependent variables of interest. These results suggest that individual
differences play moderating roles of disinformation type and presence of corrective
information such that the interaction is different across social media usage, social media use
for news, health blog usage, and social media use for fact-finding. Specifically, 1) social
media usage moderated the effect of the interaction between disinformation type and
presence of corrective information on situational severity , 2) social media use for news
moderated the effect of the interaction on situational severity , 3) health blog usage
moderated the effect of the interaction on situational susceptibility , and 4) social media use
for fact-finding moderated the effect of the interaction on intentions to spread disinformation
on social media .
Of particular note from the significant three-way interactions is that the backfiring of
simple corrective information for fear-arousing disinformation worked only for low social
media users, low social media users for news, and low health blog users. These participants
would not have been impacted by social media or health blog in processing disinformation
and corrective information, and therefore, showed results as the current research expected.
Low social media or health blog users would not have self-confidence that they have abilities
to discern disinformation or corrective information on social media. This lack of selfconfidence could lead participants to pay attentions to the given message.
For high social media users, high social media users for news, high health blog users,
and high social media users for fact-finding, simple corrective information backfired for fearneutral disinformation, not for fear-arousing disinformation. Particularly, high social media
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users for fact-finding explicitly showed the significant interaction between disinformation
type and presence of corrective information on intentions to spread disinformation on social
media. That said, for high fact-finding social media users, simple corrective information
backfired with fear-neutral disinformation in that it increased intentions to spread
disinformation on social media, but it worked with fear-arousing disinformation. The backfire
effect of simple corrective information with emotional disinformation, therefore, is not the
case for high social media users for fact-finding.
These results could be interpreted by third-person effects of high social media users in
fear-neutral disinformation. Participants who highly use social media, social media for news,
social media for fact-finding, and health blogs could have confidence stemming from
optimism for their abilities to understand information, which could ultimately result in not
thinking deeply about the given information. Therefore, although simple corrective
information was presented, these participants could have ignored the purpose of simple
corrective information that says, “the disinformation is false” and be affected by the repetitive
presentation of disinformation content per se. However, simple corrective information
worked for fear-arousing disinformation to these participants. Again, this finding suggests
that people who highly use social media, social media for news, social media for fact-finding,
and health blogs could accept what the simple corrective information says as a coping
strategy to fear-arousing disinformation. In this sense, excessive fear could be effective to
these individuals in understanding the purpose of simple corrective information. In the
situation where they experienced fearful emotions, they could pay more attentions to the
corrective information content.
Proposed mediation effects (H6-H8) could not be conducted because there was a nonsignificant effect of disinformation type and presence of corrective information on belief in
disinformation. Therefore, although interaction effects on situational fear and situational
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severity were found, it cannot be argued that whether the situational fear and situational
severity ultimately affect beliefs in disinformation and intentions to spread disinformation on
social media.
Overall, the results found in Study 1 raise a need to design alternative message
strategies of corrective information. The findings of Study 1 suggest that simple corrective
information which shows disinformation content repeatedly and simply indicates the
falsehood of disinformation may not be sufficient to impact belief in the said disinformation
and desires to share the disinformation online. Therefore, Study 2 aims to examine narrative
corrective information as an enhanced correction strategy and compare between narrative
corrective information and simple corrective information.
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Chapter 5: Study 2
Method
Design. Study 2 also received IRB approval. Using the case of a spread of an unknown
health virus, Study 2 features an online experiment with a 2 (disinformation: fear-neutral vs.
fear arousal) × 2 (corrective information: simple corrective information vs. narrative
corrective information) between group factorial design resulting in four conditions: 1) feararousing disinformation and simple corrective information, 2) fear-arousing disinformation
and narrative corrective information, 3) fear-neutral disinformation and simple corrective
information, and 4) fear-neutral disinformation and narrative corrective information.
Participants. Participants for Study 2 were also recruited from Amazon MTurk
between January 25 and February 4, 2019 when participants for Study 1 were recruited.
Eligibility criteria for participants were the same as Study 1. Of the 215 data, one outlier who
saw fear-neutral disinformation more than 447 seconds was detected and removed, which
resulted in 214 data for an analysis.
The mean age of participants were 42.76 years old (SD = 12.22) with male (43.9%)
and female (55.6%). Of the participants, 0.5% said they prefer not to respond their gender.
Regarding their race, 73.4% were Caucasian, 6.5% were Latino/Hispanic, 1.4% were Middle
Eastern, 11.7% were Black/African American, 0.5% were Caribbean/West Indian, 0.9% were
South Asian, 4.7% were East Asian, and 0.9% were Mixed. As for the open-ended question
asking about their ethnicity, participants who marked their race as Caucasian answered their
self-identified ethnicity as follows: European American, German American, Northern
European, Eastern European, Swedish, Scandinavian, Italian American,
Portuguese/Irish/English/Greek, Polish/German.
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Regarding their annual income, 21.0% of the participants were earning $0 – 24,999,
30.8% were $25,000 – 49,999, 27.1% were $50,000 – 74,999, 11.7% were $75,000 – 99,999,
5.6% were $100,000 – 149,999, 1.4% were $150,000 – 199,999, and 2.3% were $200,000
and above. From 0 (extremely liberal) to 100 (extremely conservative), the mean value of
conservatism was 42.08 (SD = 28.66). Regarding their education, 0.5% indicated their
education levels as less than high school, 8.9% were high school graduate, 22.0% were some
college levels, 12.1% were 2-year degree, 39.3% were 4-year degree, 2.8% had professional
degree (e.g., J.D., M.D., D.D.S.), 13.6% were master’s degree, and 0.9% had doctoral degree.
Procedure. The procedure of Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1. Study 2 also
took approximately 15 minutes to complete (M = 931.33 seconds, SD = 398.19 seconds) and
participants received $1 as an incentive. Participants first read an informed consent when they
accessed the Qualtrics survey from MTurk. Then they provided their birth year and answered
screening questions about their activity on Facebook; participants who were born after 2002
or were not active on Facebook were forwarded to the end of the study. They then answered
questions regarding their social media usage, self-efficacy, and their interest in the spread of
an unknown health virus.
Participants then saw either fear-neutral disinformation or fear-arousing disinformation
like in Study 1. The average time spent reading the disinformation was 94.02 seconds (SD =
58.81) and 12.6% participants read the disinformation for more than three minutes. After
reading disinformation, participants answered PANAS, and responded to questions assessing
their present fear of the disinformation, belief in the disinformation, and intentions to spread
disinformation on social media. They also indicated which image was featured in the
disinformation content they read.
Then, participants read either simple corrective information or narrative corrective
information. Details of the stimuli are explained in the latter section. Participants in the
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simple corrective information condition had to read the web add-on corrective information,
which was used in Study 1 (see Appendix C). Participants in the narrative corrective
information condition read the following statement:
Now consider the following scenario: However, Facebook user James later found out
that the post you just read is false and wrote the following corrective post. Please read
the following corrective information and answer the questions below.
Participants in both the simple and narrative conditions had three minutes to read the
corrective information and respond to the following open-ended question: “Briefly, please
enter your immediate thoughts about the above post.” Like Study 1, participants could
advance to the next page whenever they finished. The average time spent reading the simple
corrective information and answering the question was 33.17 (SD = 51.91), and 3.7% of the
participants took more than three minutes to accomplish the task. The average time spent
reading the narrative corrective information and answering the question was 40.24 (SD =
64.97). Around 3.3% of the participants read the narrative corrective information and
answered the question more than three minutes.
After reading the corrective information, participants responded to the PANAS items
again, and responded to items measuring how the corrective information elicited narrative
effects, belief in corrective information, and intentions to spread corrective information on
social media. Next, participants again reported their belief in the original disinformation,
intentions to spread the original disinformation, items about heuristic-systematic information
processing, and a manipulating check asking, “from whom did you see the corrective
information?” with the opportunity to choose from a friend, Facebook, and someone else.
They were then directed to questions about information seeking, sharing and avoidance
intentions, situational threat appraisal, and negative emotions of the spread of health viruses
including situational fear. Lastly, participants provided their demographic information. After
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the completion of the survey, participants were debriefed and confirmed that their data could
still be used. Table 13 presents the number of participants for each condition.
Table 13. Number of participants for each condition (Study 2)
Disinformation
Corrective Information
Simple Corrective
Information
Narrative Corrective
Information
Total

Fear-neutral
63

Fear-arousal
42

Total
105

58

51

109

121

93

214

Stimuli. Stimulus for fear-neutral disinformation, fear-arousing disinformation, and
simple corrective information were adapted from the one used in Study 1. To develop the
narrative corrective information condition, emphasis was placed on establishing an individual
whose personal narrative would provide elaboration on an event and an experience of a
narrator (Greene & Brinn, 2003). James, the narrator in the narrative corrective information
condition, explains how he came to understand the story as false and how the story itself
impacts a society. The following post was shown for the participants in the narrative
corrective information condition (see Appendix C):
“One of my friends who owns an agricultural business lost a huge amount of money
due to a lettuce sales drop due to the false rumor that an unnamed virus is spreading
across the U.S. He is now deeply distressed. I searched and read a lot of articles about
the virus and a fact-checking website says the rumor was originally from fake news
website NewsWireforYou.com. Don’t be deceived by this false information. Spreading
the falsehood can directly impact our neighbors and communities.”
Measures.
Individual differences.
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The items for Study 2, including demographics, were identical to the ones used in Study
1. The means, standard deviations, and reliability scores for these measures using the Study 2
dataset is provided below.
Social media usage. The mean value of amount of social media usage was 4.38 (SD
= .80). As for items comprising social media usage, a principal component analysis (PCA)
was conducted. The result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure indicated the sampling
adequacy was acceptable (.844) because it was above the value of .50. Bartlett’s test of
sphericity was χ2 (36) = 1111.980, p < .001. See Table 14 for the factor loadings after
varimax rotation; Items (1)-(7) were factored together (Cronbach’s α = .89, M = 5.06, SD =
1.18) and items (8)-(9) were factored (Cronbach’s α = .80, M = 4.99, SD = 1.59). Like Study
1, the second component of social media usage was dropped out for an analysis.
Table 14. Rotated component matrix of social media usage items in Study 2
Component
(1) Social media is part of my everyday activity
(2) I am proud to tell people I’m on social media
(3) Social media has become part of my daily routine
(4) I feel out of touch when I haven’t logged onto social
media for a while
(5) I feel I am part of the social media community
(6) I would be sorry if social media shut down
(7) I like using social media
(8) I often think about deactivating my social media accounts
(reverse-coded)
(9) I am tired of using social media (reverse-coded)

1
.851
.422
.866
.775

2
.098
.500
.160
.170

.708
.734
.620
.088

.321
.403
.530
.853

.222

.868

Social media usage for news. The mean value of social media usage for news was 5.05
(SD = 1.38, Cronbach’s α = .89).
Social media usage for fact-finding. The mean value of social media usage for factfinding was 4.39 (SD = 1.41, Cronbach’s α = .86).
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Social media usage for social interaction. The mean value of social media usage for
social interaction was 4.88 (SD = 1.61, Cronbach’s α = .76).
Self-efficacy. Regarding items measuring self-efficacy, the mean value was 5.32 (SD =
1.16, Cronbach’s α = .94).
Issue involvement. The mean value of issue involvement was 4.39 (SD = 1.28,
Cronbach’s α = .84).
Health consciousness. The mean value of health consciousness was 5.75 (SD = .87,
Cronbach’s α = .79).
Health blog usage. The mean value of health blog usage was 1.91 (SD = .68).
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). PANAS items used in Study 2 were
identical to those in Study 1. These were used as a delay strategy. The items were measured
on a 5-point scale (1 = None at all, 5 = A great deal).
Similar to Study 1, a principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted for PANAS
items measured between the disinformation and corrective information conditions. The factor
analysis results confirmed the results of Study 1. The result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure indicated the sampling adequacy was acceptable (.899) because it was above the
value of .50. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was χ2 (190) = 3031.492, p < .001. See Table 15 for
the factor loadings after varimax rotation; Items (1), (3), (5), (9), (10), (14), (16), and (19)
were factored together and termed as “positive PANAS” (Cronbach’s α = .91, M = 2.68, SD
= .97) and items (2), (4), (6), (7), (8), (11), (13), (15), (18), and (20) were factored and
termed as “negative PANAS” (Cronbach’s α = .94, M = 1.39, SD = .64). Remaining items
(12) and (17) were factored and termed as “attentive PANAS” (Cronbach’s α = .69, M =
3.71, SD = .99). Of the three PANAS factors, negative PANAS was used to see whether
participants in the fear-arousing disinformation condition reported greater negative affect
than those in the fear-neutral disinformation condition.
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Table 15. Rotated component matrix of PANAS items measured between disinformation and
corrective information in Study 2

(1) Interested
(2) Distressed
(3) Excited
(4) Upset
(5) Strong
(6) Guilty
(7) Scared
(8) Hostile
(9) Enthusiastic
(10) Proud
(11) Irritable
(12) Alert
(13) Ashamed
(14) Inspired
(15) Nervous
(16) Determined
(17) Attentive
(18) Jittery
(19) Active
(20) Afraid

1
-.082
.854
.042
.864
-.106
.716
.880
.715
-.091
-.087
.752
-.003
.699
-.034
.862
-.062
-.202
.711
.095
.855

Component
2
.597
.120
.858
-.112
.796
.170
-.072
.031
.833
.831
-.188
.303
.162
.865
-.110
.576
.351
.127
.657
-.112

3
.472
-.021
-.016
-.006
.158
-.378
.117
-.296
.135
.017
-.075
.748
-.426
.095
.108
.479
.651
-.285
.328
.126

Fear of disinformation. Six items measuring fear of disinformation were used as a
confirmation of effectiveness of fear-arousing disinformation (Cronbach’s α = .96, M = 2.84,
SD = 1.79).
Belief in disinformation. Items measuring belief in disinformation were measured
twice: between the disinformation and corrective information and after the corrective
information condition. This research used the items measured after the corrective information
condition (Cronbach’s α = .98, M = 2.82, SD = 1.73).
Intentions to spread disinformation on social media. Items measuring intentions to
spread disinformation on social media were measured twice: between the disinformation and
corrective information and after the corrective information condition. This research used the
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items measured after the corrective information condition (Cronbach’s α = .96, M = 2.38, SD
= 1.57).
Heuristic-Systematic Information Processing. This variable was not used in the current
analyses. The reliability, mean, and standard deviation were not reported because the current
study did not use this variable.
Information seeking, sharing, and avoidance intentions. This variable was not used in
the current analyses. Items were identical to those in Study 1. The reliability, mean, and
standard deviation for each variable were not reported because the current study did not use
these variables.
Situational threat appraisal. Situational severity was measured (Cronbach’s α = .91, M
= 3.48, SD = 1.78) and situational susceptibility also comprised of items described in Study 1
(Cronbach’s α = .92, M = 2.59, SD = 1.46).
Situational fear. Of the items measuring negative emotions of the situation, fear of the
unknown virus was measured (Cronbach’s α = .97, M = 3.04, SD = 1.74). Items measuring
other emotions (e.g., anger, sadness, hope) were not used in the current research.
Narrative effects. This measure was introduced specifically for Study 2. To confirm
differences in corrective information, participants responded items borrowed from past
research (Green & Brock, 2000; De Graaf, Hoeken, Sanders, & Beentjes, 2012) and were
measured on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree): (a) The corrective
information had an effect on my emotions, (b) I could relate to the situation described in the
corrective information, (c) I feel that the corrective information made its point effectively, (d)
I could identify with the situation that the message provides, (e) I could feel empathy with the
situation that the message provides, (f) I was mentally involved in the message while reading
it, and (g) During reading, I imagined what it would be like to be in the position of the person
in the message (Cronbach’s α = .86, M = 4.74, SD = 1.21).

106
Variable transformations
Normalizing transformations of dependent variables of interest were also conducted to
reduce the skewness and kurtosis. Belief in disinformation, situational fear, and situational
susceptibility were log-transformed because those variables were substantial positive skewed.
The variable of intentions to spread disinformation on social media showed severe positive
skewness; therefore, it was inversely transformed using a formula: 1/DV. This variable was
then multiplied by -1 to hold positive correlations with the original dependent variable; see
Table 16.
Table 16. Skewness and Kurtosis results for measured variables
Variable (Study 2)

Mean (SD)

Skewness Kurtosis

Belief in disinformation

2.82 (1.73)

.736

-.551

.37 (.28)

.020

-1.293

3.04 (1.74)

.528

-.896

.40 (.27)

-.158

-1.240

Situational severity

3.48 (1.78)

.079

-1.244

Situational susceptibility

2.59 (1.46)

.674

-.559

.34 (.25)

-.024

-1.274

2.38 (1.57)

1.119

.178

-.60 (.32)

-.171

-1.520

Log Transformed
Situational fear
Log Transformed

Log Transformed
Intentions to spread disinformation on social media
Inversely Transformed

Statistical methodologies
Statistical methodologies the current research used were bivariate correlations,
independent t-Test, analysis of variance (ANOVA), analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for
control variables, and regression analyses. Bivariate correlations were used to measure the
relationships between variables. Independent t-Tests were used to compare the mean value of
two independent groups and whether the difference is significant. ANOVA was used to check
significant interactions between disinformation type and corrective information type on
dependent variables of interest. Related, ANCOVA was used to check significant interactions
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between disinformation type and corrective information type on dependent variables of
interest when considering control variables (i.e., covariates). Regression analyses were used
to find significant effects of an independent variable on dependent variables of interest when
either control variables were considered or not. Each methodology that this study used is
specifically mentioned for each analysis.
Results
Manipulation check for disinformation. When asked to indicate which image they
had just seen, all of the participants in the fear-neutral disinformation condition chose the
correct image of a lettuce head. Of the participants in the fear-arousing disinformation
condition, 97.8% of the participants (N = 91) indicated the correct image (i.e., a picture of
workers who wore masks and protective clothing to move dead bodies) while two other
participants chose incorrect fear-arousing images.
There was also a significant difference between the fear-arousing disinformation
condition and the fear-neutral disinformation condition on fear of the disinformation such that
participants who saw the fear-neutral disinformation reported significantly lower fear (M =
2.54, SD = 1.70) than those who saw the fear-arousing disinformation (M = 3.23, SD = 1.83)
(t(212) = -2.839, p =.005). However, there was no effect of disinformation condition on
negative affect or positive affect in general.
Manipulation check for corrective information. When asked to answer a question—
“From whom did you see the corrective information?”—, of participants in the simple
corrective information condition, 4.8% (N = 5) said they saw the corrective information from
their friends, 67.6% (N = 71) from Facebook, and 27.6% (N = 29) from someone else. Of the
participants in the narrative corrective information condition, 30.3% (N = 33) said they saw
the corrective information from their friends, 33.0% (N = 36) from Facebook, and 36.7% (N
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= 40) from someone else. These problematic responses will be described in the discussion,
but all data was used for analysis.
There was a significant difference between the simple corrective information and the
narrative corrective information on narrative effects such that participants who saw simple
corrective information reported significantly lower narrative effects (M = 4.42, SD = 1.17)
compared to those who saw the narrative corrective information (M = 5.01, SD = 1.18)
t(200) = -3.545, p < .001).
Correlations. RQ1 addressed the relationship between dependent variables of interest
(i.e., belief in disinformation, situational fear, situational threat appraisal, and intentions to
spread disinformation on social media). Bivariate correlations revealed that all of the main
variables in Study 2 were positively correlated to each other. Table 17 presents the results.
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Table 17. Bivariate correlations of the main variables in Study 2
Study 2

Belief in disinformation
Situational fear
(p-value)
Situational severity
(p-value)
Situational susceptibility
(p-value)
Intentions to spread disinformation on social
media
(p-value)

Belief in
disinformation

Situational
fear

Situational
severity

Situational
susceptibility

Intentions to spread
disinformation
online

.478

-

(.000)
.391

.613

-

(.000)

(.000)

.433

.700

.686

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

.642

.439

.374

.441

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

-
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RQ2 addressed the relationship between individual differences and the variables of
interest. Bivariate correlations were conducted between individual differences and the
variables of interest. Like in Study 1, individual differences included gender, age, education,
race (whiteness), income, issue involvement, health consciousness, health blog usage, selfefficacy, conservatism, amount of social media usage, social media usage, social media usage
for news, social media usage for fact-finding, and social media usage for social interaction;
see Table 18.
Gender, income, health consciousness, and amount of social media usage were not
related to any dependent variables of interest.
Age was correlated to intentions to spread disinformation on social media (r = -.136, p
= .047) such that younger participants reported greater intentions to spread disinformation on
social media.
Education showed a positive correlation with situational susceptibility (r = .164, p
= .016), meaning that participants with higher education reported greater perceived
susceptibility.
Regarding race, white participants reported less belief in disinformation (r = -.219, p
= .001), situational fear (r = -.214, p = .002), situational severity (r = -.225, p = .001), and
intentions to spread disinformation on social media (r = -.177, p = .010) compared to nonwhite participants.
Issue involvement showed significant correlations with situational fear (r = .259, p
< .001), situational severity (r = .290, p < .001), and situational susceptibility (r = .266, p
< .001) such that participants who thought the issue of health viruses is important to
themselves reported greater situational fear, situational severity, and situational susceptibility.
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Health blog usage showed positive correlations with belief in disinformation (r = .166,
p = .015) and situational fear (r = .163, p = .017) such that participants who use health blog
frequently reported greater belief in disinformation and situational fear.
Self-efficacy was negatively correlated to intentions to spread disinformation on social
media (r = -.154, p = .025) such that participants with self-efficacy showed less intentions to
spread disinformation on social media.
Conservatism was positively related to situational severity (r = .160, p = .019),
situational susceptibility (r = .153, p = .025), meaning that participants with conservatism
reported greater situational severity and susceptibility.
Social media usage showed positive correlations with situational fear (r = .161, p
= .018) and intentions to spread disinformation on social media (r = .177, p = .010) such that
participants who use social media frequently reported greater situational fear and intentions to
spread disinformation on social media.
Social media usage for news was positively related with situational fear (r = .235, p
= .001), situational severity (r = .139, p = .042), situational susceptibility (r = .135, p
= .048), and intentions to spread disinformation on social media (r = .303, p < .001). This
means that high social media users for news reported greater situational fear, situational
severity, situational susceptibility, and intentions to spread disinformation on social media.
Social media usage for fact-finding was positively correlated with situational fear (r
= .269, p < .001), situational severity (r = .182, p = .007), situational susceptibility (r = .211,
p = .002), and intentions to spread disinformation on social media (r = .377, p < .001), such
that high social media users for fact-finding reported greater situational fear, situational
severity, situational susceptibility, and intentions to spread disinformation on social media.
Social motivation to use social media presented positive relations with main variables.
High social media users for social interaction reported greater situational fear (r = .253, p
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< .001), situational severity (r = .219, p = .001), situational susceptibility (r = .217, p
= .001), and intentions to spread disinformation on social media (r = .255, p < .001).
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Table 18. Bivariate correlations of the individual differences and main variables in Study 2
Whiteness

Income

Issue
Involvement

Health
Consciousness

Health Blog
Usage

Self-efficacy

Conservatism

Amount of
SM usage

SM usage

-.130+

.052

-.219**

-.074

.023

-.032

.166*

-.056

.039

-.073

-.037

.029

.121+

.035

Situational fear

-.010

-.127+

.102

-.214**

.032

.259***

.049

.163*

-.070

.083

.028

.161*

.235**

.269***

.253***

Situational
severity

-.093

-.026

.119+

-.225**

.034

.290***

.129+

.048

-.002

.160*

-.011

.076

.139*

.182**

.219**

Situational
susceptibility

-.063

-.128+

.164*

-.093

.067

.266***

-.057

.093

-.053

.153*

-.018

.066

.135*

.211**

.217**

Intentions to
spread
disinformation
on social media

-.069

-.136*

-.031

-.177**

-.054

.090

-.124+

.068

-.154*

-.015

.086

.177**

.303***

.377***

.255***

Notes. Significant correlations were highlighted. Gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female). ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10

SM social
interaction

Education

-.060

SM factfinding

Age

Belief in
Disinformation

SM news

Gender

Study 2
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Main effects.
H9: H9 hypothesized that disinformation type (fear-neutral vs. fear-arousal) would
significant affect dependent variables (i.e., belief in disinformation, situational fear,
situational threat appraisal, and intentions to spread disinformation on social media).
According to an independent t-Test analysis, participants who saw fear-arousing
disinformation reported greater situational severity (M = 3.89, SD = 1.78) than those who saw
fear-neutral disinformation (M = 3.17, SD = 1.73) (t(212) = -2.984, p = .003).
No effects of disinformation type were observed on belief in disinformation, situational
fear, situational susceptibility, and intentions to spread disinformation on social media (see
Table 19).
Table 19. t-Test results on main effects of disinformation type on DVs of interest in Study 2

Belief in disinformation
Situational fear
Situational severity
Situational susceptibility
Intentions to spread
disinformation on social media

Fear-neutral
disinformation
M
SD
.39
.28
.40
.28
3.17
1.73
.32
.27

Fear-arousing
disinformation
M
SD
.34
.28
.34
.28
3.89
1.78
.37
.24

-.60

-.61

.32

t-test
ns
ns
-2.984**
ns

.31

ns

To further assess the effects of disinformation type, a stepwise liner regression was
conducted to control for individual differences that were correlated with each dependent
variable of interests. Individual differences that showed significant correlations with each
dependent variable were entered in step 1; disinformation type was entered in step 2. All of
the regression analyses confirmed the results of independent t-Test and did not show any
differences (see Table 20).
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Table 20. Regression results of the main effects in Study 2
Belief in
disinformation
Model 1
β
-.059
--.193**
--.135*
-----

Model 2
β
-.074
--.193**
--.125+
-----

Situational fear

Model 1
β
-.064
--.225**
.213**
-.017
---.036
-.023

Model 2
β
-.060
--.225**
.210**
-.020
---.037
-.022

Situational severity

Model 1
β
-.101
-.278***
.288***
-.025
--.171**
--.109

Model 2
β
-.081
-.269***
.274***
-.009
--.169**
--.112

Situational
susceptibility
Model 1
β
-.168*
.140*
-.234**
---.168**
--.197+

Model 2
β
-.159*
.134*
-.232**
---.167**
--.195+

Predictor
Age
Education
Whiteness
Issue involvement
Health consciousness
Health blog usage
Self-efficacy
Conservatism
Social media usage
Social media use for
news
Social media use for
.082
.079
.130
.131
.065
.077
.184+
.187+
fact-finding
Social media use for
--.162
.161
.183*
.181*
.156+
.154+
social interaction
Disinformation
-.093
.025
.175**
.054
(Fear-neutral vs.
Fear-arousal)
R2
.082
.091
.179
.179
.219
.249
.179
.181
2
R change
.082**
.008
.179***
.000
.219***
.030**
.179***
.003
F
4.684** 4.147** 5.580***
4.956*** 7.182*** 7.499*** 6.400*** 5.679***
Notes. Dummy-coded variables: Whiteness (0 = Others, 1 = White), Disinformation (0 = Fear-neutral, 1 = Fear-arousal).
+p < .10, *p < .05. **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Diagnostic plots are included in the Appendix H; the residuals for all of the regression models were roughly normal.

Intentions to spread
disinformation
online
Model 1 Model 2
β
β
-.023
-.028
---.164*
-.164*
---.158*
-.159*
---.089
-.088
---.007
-.005
.092
.091
.286**

.284**

.062

.062
-.029

.215
.215***
7.039***

.216
.001
6.257***
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Interaction effects.
A series of ANOVAs was conducted to assess the interaction of disinformation
condition (fear-neutral vs. fear-arousal) and corrective information condition (simple
corrective information vs. narrative corrective information) on dependent variables of interest
(H10-H13). Table 22 presents overall interaction results.
H10: H10 postulated a significant interaction between disinformation and corrective
information on belief in the disinformation. According to a two-way ANOVA, the interaction
was not a significant predictor of belief in disinformation. Furthermore, a two-way ANCOVA
did not reveal any significant relationship interaction effect on belief in disinformation was
not a significant predictor even when age, whiteness, health blog usage, and social media use
for fact-finding were entered as covariates. When data were divided into simple corrective
information and narrative corrective information, additional independent t-Tests did not show
any significant effects of disinformation type on beliefs in said disinformation within the
simple corrective information or within the narrative corrective information.
H11: H11 postulated a significant interaction between disinformation and corrective
information on situational fear. A two-way ANOVA revealed that the interaction was not a
significant predictor of situational fear. Furthermore, a two-way ANCOVA did not reveal any
significant relationship after controlling for age, whiteness, issue involvement, health blog
usage, social media usage, social media use for news, social media use for fact-finding, and
social media use for social interaction. When data were divided into simple corrective
information and narrative corrective information, additional independent t-Tests did not show
any significant effects of disinformation type on beliefs in said disinformation within the
simple corrective information or within the narrative corrective information.
H12: H12 postulated a significant interaction between disinformation and corrective
information on situational threat appraisal, measured by situational severity (H12-1) and
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situational susceptibility (H12-2). Two-way ANOVA analyses did not reveal a significant
effect of the interaction on situational severity and situational susceptibility. Furthermore, a
two-way ANCOVA confirmed the lack of significance after education, whiteness, issue
involvement, health consciousness, conservatism, social media use for news, social media use
for fact-finding, and social media use for social interaction were entered as covariates for
situational severity. There was also no significant effect on situational susceptibility when
age, education, issue involvement, conservatism, social media use for news, social media use
for fact-finding, and social media use for social interaction were controlled.
Additional independent t-Tests showed that, within the simple corrective information
condition, participants who read fear-arousing disinformation reported significantly greater
situational severity (M = 3.82, SD = 1.73) than those who read fear-neutral disinformation (M
= 2.99, SD = 1.77) (t(103) = -2.375, p = .019). Among those who saw narrative corrective
information, participants who saw fear-arousing disinformation reported greater situational
severity (M = 3.94, SD = 1.83) than those who saw fear-neutral disinformation (M = 3.36, SD
= 1.67) and this was significant at a marginal level (t(107) = -1.736, p = .085) (see Table 21).
Table 21. t-Test results on the effect of disinformation type on situational severity by
corrective information type in Study 2

Situational severity

Fear-neutral
disinformation
M
SD

Fear-arousing
disinformation
M
SD

Simple corrective information

2.99

1.77

3.82

1.73

-2.375
(p = .019)

Narrative corrective
information

3.36

1.67

3.94

1.83

-1.736
(p = .085)

t-test

H13: Lastly, H13 postulated a significant interaction between disinformation and
corrective information on intentions to spread disinformation on social media. A two-way
ANOVA showed that the interaction between disinformation type and corrective information
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type on intentions to spread disinformation on social media was not significant. A two-way
ANCOVA also showed no significant interaction on intentions to spread disinformation on
social media when age, whiteness, health consciousness, self-efficacy, social media usage,
social media use for news, social media use for fact-finding, and social media use for social
interaction were controlled; therefore, H13 was not supported. An additional analysis using
an independent t-Test did not show any significant results.
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Table 22. Interaction results in Study 2
Belief in
disinformation

Predictor

df

F

pvalue
.284
-.012
--.078
-----

Situational fear

df

F

pvalue
.390
-.004
.006
-.784
--.575
.813

Situational severity

df

F

pvalue
-.178
.000
.000
.868
--.005
-.284

Situational
susceptibility

df

F

pvalue
.019
.029
-.001
---.005
-.065

Intentions to
spread
disinformation
online
df
F
pvalue
1
.163
.687
---1
5.217
.023
---1
4.965
.027
---1
1.532
.217
---1
.016
.898
1
.620
.432

Age
1 1.152
1
.743
--1
5.558
Education
----1
1.828
1
4.863
Whiteness
1 6.438
1
8.728
1 16.904
--Issue involvement
--1
7.811
1 14.231
1 10.701
Health consciousness
----1
.028
--Health blog usage
1 3.132
1
.076
----Self-efficacy
--------Conservatism
----1
7.925
1
7.890
Social media usage
--1
.315
----Social media use for
--1
.056
1
1.155
1
3.446
news
Social media use for
1 1.457 .229
1
1.832
.177
1
.624
.430
1
3.462
.064
1
7.745
.006
fact-finding
Social media use for
---1
2.635
.106
1
3.901
.050
1
2.855
.093
1
.414
.521
social interaction
Disinformation
1 2.093 .149
1
.087
.768
1
7.801
.006
1
.531
.467
1
.267
.606
Corrective Information
1 1.256 .264
1
2.990
.085
1
.400
.528
1
2.746
.099
1
.902
.343
Disinformation ×
1
.053
.818
1
.000
.992
1
.289
.592
1
.042
.838
1
.001
.973
Corrective Information
Error
206
202
202
203
202
Notes. Dummy-coded variables: Whiteness (0 = Others, 1 = White), Disinformation (0 = Fear-neutral, 1 = Fear-arousal), Corrective information
(1 = Simple correction, 2 = Narrative corrective information).
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RQ3-2: RQ3-2 addressed the moderating roles of individual differences (i.e., education,
age, whiteness, issue involvement, health consciousness, conservatism, health blog usage,
social media usage, social media use for news, social media use for fact-finding, and social
media use for social interaction) in interactions between disinformation (fear-arousing vs.
fear-neutral) and corrective information (simple corrective information vs. narrative
corrective information) on dependent variables of interest. A series of linear regressions were
conducted to investigate the three-way interactions. In step 1, disinformation condition,
corrective information condition, and a variable of individual difference were entered. In step
2, the subsequent two-way interactions (i.e., disinformation condition × corrective
information condition, disinformation condition × a variable of individual difference, and
corrective information condition × a variable of individual difference) were entered. In step 3,
the three-way interaction (i.e., disinformation condition × corrective information condition ×
a variable of individual difference) was entered. See Appendix I for diagnostic plots on
significant results. The residuals for all of the regression models were roughly normal.
Three-way interactions between disinformation type, corrective information type, and
individual differences that correlated with each dependent variable of interest were not
significant predictors of beliefs in said disinformation or situational fear.
A three-way interaction between disinformation condition, corrective information
condition, and social media use for news on situational severity was significant (ΔR2 = .025, p
= .018, ß = .705), according to the regression analysis. To plot this three-way interaction,
social media use for news was divided into three groups: low social media use for news
(below 4.50), medium social media use for news (from 4.50 to 5.75) high social media use
for news (above 5.75); see Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Three-way interaction between disinformation type, corrective information type,
and social media use for news on situational severity (Study 2)
4.5
4.3

Situational Severity

4.1

Simple corrective
information

3.9

Narrative corrective
information

3.7
3.5

SM use for news low

3.3

SM use for news medium

3.1

SM use for news high

2.9
2.7
2.5

Fear-neutral Disinformation

Fear-arousing Disinformation

Disinformation Type

According to Figure 9, simple corrective information always backfires with feararousing disinformation because green lines are always increasing in fear-arousing
disinformation when it comes to situational severity.
Although the interaction between disinformation condition and corrective information
condition was not significant within each level of social media use for news when
investigated separately, the overall graph reveals that narrative corrective information
resulted in greater situational severity among high social media news users in the fear-neutral
disinformation condition. For low social media users for news within the fear-neutral
disinformation condition, participants who saw narrative corrective information reported
greater situational severity than those who saw simple corrective information (see Figure 9a). For high social media users within the fear-neutral disinformation condition, participants
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who saw narrative corrective information reported less situational severity than those who
saw simple corrective information (see Figure 9-b).
For low social media users within the fear-arousing disinformation condition,
participants who saw narrative corrective information reported less situational severity than
those who saw simple corrective information. For high social media users within the fearneutral disinformation condition, participants who saw narrative corrective information
reported greater situational severity than those who saw simple corrective information.
The effect of the interaction between disinformation condition and corrective
information condition flipped between low and high social media users for news. For low
social media users for news, narrative corrective information resulted in greater situational
severity after seeing fear-neutral disinformation compared to participants who saw fearneutral disinformation and simple corrective information. Low social media news users who
saw fear-arousing disinformation and simple corrective information reported greater
situational severity than those who saw fear-arousing disinformation and narrative corrective
information. For high social media users for news, this relationship was reversed; high social
media news users who saw fear-neutral disinformation and narrative corrective information
reported less situational severity than those who saw fear-neutral disinformation and simple
corrective information, but high social media news users reported greater situational severity
after viewing fear-arousing disinformation and narrative corrective information compared to
those who saw simple corrective information.
The interaction between disinformation type and social media news usage was not
significant within each condition of corrective information when investigated separately. The
interaction between corrective information type and social media news usage was also not
significant within each condition of disinformation when investigated separately.
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Figure 9-a. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
situational severity among low social media news users (Study 2)
4.5

4.3
4.1

Situational Severity

3.9

Simple corrective
information

3.7

Narrative corrective
information

3.5
3.3

t(38) = -2.189, p = .035
t(30) = -1.792, p = .083

3.1
2.9
2.7
2.5

Fear-neutral Disinformation

Fear-arousing Disinformation

Disinformation Type
Notes. The green line was significant (p < .10). The corrective information type showed significant
difference within the fear-neutral disinformation condition (p < .05).

Figure 9-b. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
situational severity among medium social media news users (Study 2)
4.5
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Situational Severity
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Narrative corrective
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2.9
2.7
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Fear-neutral Disinformation

Fear-arousing Disinformation

Disinformation Type
Notes. All unlabeled lines were not significant.
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Figure 9-c. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
situational severity among high social media news users (Study 2)

4.5
4.3

Situational Severity

4.1

Simple corrective
information

3.9
3.7

Narrative corrective
information

3.5
3.3

t(37) = -2.350, p = .024

3.1
2.9
2.7
2.5

Fear-neutral Disinformation

Fear-arousing Disinformation

Disinformation Type
Notes. The orange line was significant (p < .05).

A three-way interaction between disinformation condition, corrective information
condition, and social media use for news was significant on situational susceptibility at a
marginal level (ΔR2 = .015, p = .067, ß = .561). This interaction was plotted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Three-way interaction between disinformation type, corrective information type,
and social media news use on situational susceptibility (Study 2)
0.45
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Narrative corrective
information
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Fear-neutral Disinformation

Fear-arousing Disinformation

Disinformation Type

Although the interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type
was not significant for each level of social media use for news when investigated separately,
the overall graph reveals that for high social media news users, participants who faced with
fear-neutral disinformation and narrative corrective information reported less situational
susceptibility than participants who saw fear-neutral disinformation and simple corrective
information. However, narrative corrective information increased situational susceptibility
with fear-arousing disinformation for high social media news users (see Figure 10-c). This
relationship reversed for low social media news users; Low social media news users who saw
fear-neutral disinformation and narrative corrective information reported greater situational
susceptibility than those who saw fear-neutral disinformation and simple corrective
information (see Figure 10-a).
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The interaction between disinformation type and social media news usage was not
significant within each condition of corrective information when investigated separately. The
interaction between corrective information type and social media news usage was also not
significant within each condition of disinformation when investigated separately.

Figure 10-a. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
situational susceptibility among low social media news users (Study 2)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines were not significant.
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Figure 10-b. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
situational susceptibility among medium social media news users (Study 2)
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Notes. The green line was significant (p < .10).

Figure 10-c. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
situational susceptibility among high social media news users (Study 2)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines were not significant.
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A three-way interaction between disinformation condition, corrective information
condition, and whiteness was significant (ΔR2 = .023, p = .025, ß = -1.079), according to the
regression analysis. Figure 11 displays the interaction. The interaction was then tested in each
non-whites and whites. For non-white participants, the interaction was significant at a
marginal level, according to the ANOVA result (F(1, 53) = 3.818, p =.056), but the
interaction was not significant among white participants. Hence, for non-white participants,
narrative corrective information backfired with fear-arousing disinformation in that it
increased intentions to spread disinformation on social media, although it worked with fearneutral disinformation.
The interaction between disinformation type and whiteness was significant within the
narrative corrective information condition, according to the regression analysis (ΔR2 = .041, p
= .033, ß = -.386, see Figure 11-a) but not within the simple corrective information condition.
Additionally, the interaction between corrective information type and whiteness was
significant within the fear-arousing disinformation condition, according to the regression
analysis (ΔR2 = .046, p = .034, ß = -.806).
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Figure 11. Three-way interaction between disinformation type, corrective information type,
and whiteness on intention to spread disinformation on social media (Study 2)
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Figure 11-a. Interaction between disinformation type and whiteness on intentions to spread
disinformation on social media within narrative corrective information (Study 2)
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Fear-neutral Disinformation
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Notes. Whiteness showed significant difference within the fear-arousing disinformation and
narrative corrective infromation conditions (p < .05).
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A three-way interaction between disinformation condition, corrective information
condition, and self-efficacy on intention to spread disinformation on social media was also
significant at a marginal level (ΔR2 = .016, p = .063, ß = .579), according to the regression
analysis. To plot this interaction, self-efficacy was divided into three groups: low selfefficacy (below 4.75), medium self-efficacy (from 4.75 to 5.75), and high self-efficacy
(above 5.75); see Figure 12.
Figure 12. Three-way interaction between disinformation type, corrective information type,
and self-efficacy on intentions to spread disinformation on social media (Study 2)
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Although the interaction between disinformation condition and corrective information
condition was not significant for each level of self-efficacy when investigated separately
using regression analyses, the overall graph reveals that narrative corrective information
resulted in greater intentions to spread disinformation on social media among high selfefficacy participants in the fear-arousing disinformation condition. For low self-efficacy
participants within the fear-neutral disinformation condition, participants who saw simple
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corrective information reported less intention to spread disinformation on social media than
those who saw narrative corrective information (see Figure 12-a). For high self-efficacy
participants, participants who saw simple corrective information reported greater intention to
spread disinformation on social media than those who saw narrative corrective information
(see Figure 12-c). When facing fear-arousing disinformation, high self-efficacy participants
reported greater intentions when seeing narrative corrective information than those who saw
simple corrective information.
The effect of the interaction between disinformation condition and corrective
information condition flipped between low and high self-efficacy participants. For low selfefficacy participants, narrative corrective information resulted in greater intentions to spread
disinformation on social media after seeing fear-neutral disinformation compared to
participants who saw fear-neutral disinformation and simple corrective information. This gap
becomes closer in the fear-arousing disinformation condition because intentions to spread
disinformation on social media increased for low self-efficacy participants who faced with
fear-arousing disinformation and simple corrective information. For high self-efficacy
participants, on the other hand, narrative corrective information resulted in greater intentions
to spread disinformation on social media after seeing fear-arousing disinformation, but it
resulted in less intentions to spread disinformation on social media after seeing fear-neutral
disinformation. That said, when high self-efficacy participants faced with narrative corrective
information, they reported greater intention to spread disinformation on social media after
seeing fear-arousing disinformation, but they reported less intention to spread disinformation
on social media after seeing fear-neutral disinformation.
The interaction between disinformation type and self-efficacy was not significant within
each condition of corrective information when investigated separately using regression
analyses. The interaction between corrective information type and self-efficacy was also not
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significant within each condition of disinformation when investigated separately using
regression analyses.

Intentions to Shrae Disinformation

Figure 12-a. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
intentions to spread disinformation on social media among low self-efficacy participants
(Study 2)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines are not significant
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Figure 12-b. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
intentions to spread disinformation on social media among medium self-efficacy participants
(Study 2)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines were not significant.

Figure 12-c. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
intentions to spread disinformation on social media among high self-efficacy participants
(Study 2)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines were not significant.
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A three-way interaction between disinformation condition, corrective information
condition, and social media use for social interaction on intention to spread disinformation on
social media was statistically significant (ΔR2 = .021, p = .031, ß = .693), according to the
regression analysis. To plot this interaction, social media use for social interaction was
divided into three groups: low social media use for social interaction (below 4.50), medium
social media use for social interaction (from 4.50 to 5.25) and high social media use for social
interaction (above 5.25). Figure 13 displays the three-way interaction.

Figure 13. Three-way interaction between disinformation type, corrective information type,
and social media use for social interaction on intention to spread disinformation on social
media (Study 2)
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Although the interaction between disinformation condition and corrective information
condition was not significant for each level of social media use for social interaction when
investigated separately, the overall graph reveals that high social media users for social
interaction showed a different interaction, compared to middle and low social media users for
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social interaction (see Figure 13-a, 13-b, and 13-c for comparison). For high social media
users for social interaction, those who faced with fear-neutral disinformation reported less
intention to spread disinformation on social media after seeing narrative corrective
information, compared to those who faced with simple corrective information. However,
when high social media users for social interaction faced with fear-arousing disinformation,
participants who read narrative corrective information reported greater intention to spread
disinformation on social media than those who read simple corrective information.
For middle and low social media users for social interaction, narrative corrective
information backfired for fear-neutral disinformation, but it worked for fear-arousing
disinformation. That said, when faced with fear-neutral disinformation, middle and low social
media users for social interaction who read narrative corrective information reported greater
intention to spread disinformation on social media than those who read simple corrective
information. In the fear-arousing disinformation condition, however, middle and low social
media users for social interaction reported less intention to spread disinformation on social
media when seeing narrative corrective information.
The interaction between disinformation type and social media use for social interaction
was not significant within each condition of corrective information when investigated
separately. The interaction between corrective information type and social media use for
social interaction was also not significant within each condition of disinformation when
investigated separately.
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Figure 13-a. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
intentions to spread disinformation on social media among low social media users for social
interaction (Study 2)
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Notes. All unlabeled lines are not significant

Figure 13-b. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
intentions to spread disinformation on social media among medium social media users for
social interaction (Study 2)
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Notes. The corrective information type showed significant difference within the fear-neutral
disinformation condition (p < .10).
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Figure 13-c. Interaction between disinformation type and corrective information type on
intentions to spread disinformation on social media among high social media users for social
interaction (Study 2)
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Mediation effects.
H14-H16: Analyses for proposed mediation effects could not be conducted because
there was no effect of the interaction on belief in disinformation, situational fear, situational
threat appraisal, and intentions to spread disinformation on social media. Therefore, H14-H16
were not supported.
Discussion
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine how the impact of disinformation type (i.e.,
fear-neutral disinformation vs. fear-arousing disinformation) is moderated by corrective
information type (i.e., simple corrective information vs. narrative corrective information) on
belief in said disinformation (a), situational fear (b), situational threat appraisal (c), and
intentions to spread said disinformation on social media (d).
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H9 postulated a main effect of disinformation type. Analyses revealed a significant
effect only on situational severity such that participants who read fear-arousing
disinformation reported greater situational severity than those who read fear-neutral
disinformation. This finding replicates the significant main effect of disinformation type on
situational severity found in Study 1. This suggests that fear-arousing disinformation is more
effective in raising perception of seriousness of the risky situation than fear-neutral
disinformation, regardless of corrective information type.
However, no significant main effects of disinformation type on belief in disinformation
and situational fear in Study 2 were inconsistent with the findings of Study 1. A possible
reason is that belief in disinformation and situational fear could be affected by corrective
information type. The dependent variables of interest were measured after the corrective
information was shown; therefore, corrective information type (i.e., no corrective
information, simple corrective information vs. narrative corrective information) could affect
the direct effects of disinformation type on belief in disinformation and situational fear.
There were no significant effects of the two-way interaction between disinformation
type and corrective information type on any of the dependent variables of interest (H10-13),
which were counter to the hypotheses. This lack of significant findings implies that the
effects of narrative corrective information on decreasing belief in said disinformation,
situational fear, situational susceptibility, and intentions to spread disinformation on social
media were not significantly different compared to simple corrective information. This is also
counter to prior literature, which suggested that narrative corrective information could be
used as an enhanced corrective information strategy by increasing engagement with
corrective information content and replacing one’s preexisting mental model (Cappella et al.,
2015). Simply engaging with the narrative story may not be sufficient to decrease effects of
disinformation in either fear-arousing or fear-neutral disinformation conditions. A possible

139
explanation of this finding is that while reading the narrative corrective information,
participants could not perceive the content as their own stories under risky situations.
Narrative corrective information could be of high interest and emotionally engage readers in
the story. However, it could also free up cognitive processing, allowing flexible processing of
the content (McDaniel, Waddill, Finstad, & Bourg, 2000). This flexible cognitive processing
might cause participants not to be persuaded by the narrative corrective information content.
It is important to note, however, the effect of disinformation type on situational severity
was significant in both the simple corrective information and the narrative corrective
information condition. Specifically, participants who saw fear-arousing disinformation and
simple corrective information reported greater situational severity than those who saw fearneutral disinformation and simple corrective information. Also, participants who saw feararousing disinformation and narrative corrective information reported greater situational
severity than those who saw fear-neutral disinformation and narrative corrective information.
These results suggest that regardless of corrective information type, fear-arousing
disinformation plays a key role in increasing situational severity. This could be also
interpreted again by the backfire effect of corrective information on situational severity when
fear-arousing disinformation is presented. Corrective information might remind participants
of disinformation content and this reminder could increase situational severity in the feararousing disinformation condition. Participants who saw fear-arousing disinformation could
recall the fearful disinformation content by reading corrective information and perceive the
seriousness of the situation.
Interestingly, there were significant findings of moderating roles of several individual
differences. Social media use for news significantly moderated the interaction between
disinformation type and corrective information type on situational severity and situational
susceptibility, which implies that the interaction could be different across the frequency of
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social media use for news. Whiteness, self-efficacy, and social media use for social
interaction significantly moderated the interaction on intentions to spread disinformation on
social media. These results add to the non-significant interaction between disinformation and
corrective information on intentions to spread disinformation on social media such that the
interaction could be differed by whiteness, self-efficacy, and social media use for social
interaction.
Of particular note is that for high social media users for news, for high social media
users for social interaction, and for high self-efficacy participants, narrative corrective
information backfired with fear-arousing disinformation, but it worked for fear-neutral
disinformation. For these participants, simple corrective information backfired for fearneutral disinformation while it worked for fear-arousing disinformation.
First, high social media news users and social interaction users might have confidence
in themselves that they have abilities to discern disinformation from corrective information,
based on their frequent usage of social media. They could believe that they themselves are
well-informed because of the information they receive from news outlets or their friends on
social media. They might have perceived abilities to distinguish real from fake news. Such
high self-confidence on media literacy could distort their perceptions on the disinformation
and corrective information in the current research. In addition, their fearful emotions could
cause information overload, which led them to reject the complicated content in the narrative
corrective information. The findings shown among participants with high self-efficacy again
suggest that self-confidence that these participants might have could lead them not to pay
attentions to simple corrective information after seeing fear-neutral disinformation. Raising
fear might be a key for these participants to pay attentions to simple corrective information.
However, for them, narrative corrective information could result in backfiring when they
experience fear of the disinformation. Instead of being used as an enhanced corrective
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strategy, narrative corrective information in the fear-arousing disinformation condition could
remind these participants of disinformation content. In sum, fearful emotions could determine
an effective corrective information type depending on levels of social media usage for news
social media usage for social interaction, and self-efficacy.
Particularly for non-white participants, narrative corrective information backfired with
fear-arousing disinformation in that it increased intentions to share the disinformation on
social media; however, narrative corrective information worked with fear-neutral
disinformation because it resulted in lower intentions to spread the disinformation. Such
finding could be not validated in the current research given the low number of non-white
participants.
The inability to assess mediation effects given the lack of significant findings again
suggest that narrative corrective information does not serve as an effective corrective strategy
to decrease belief in disinformation or intention to spread disinformation on social media
when fear-arousing disinformation or fear-neutral disinformation is presented. The findings
of Study 1 raised the need to design complicated corrective information strategies, but
narrative corrective information did not show a difference from simple corrective
information.
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Chapter 6: General Discussion
The prevalence of disinformation has increased since the emergence of social media
(Joyce, 2016). Particularly, fear-mongering disinformation circulates under risky situations.
Effects of fear under risky situations are problematic because it aggravates the situation by
paralyzing our decision-making processes. To counter the spread of disinformation,
communication scholars have suggested effective corrective information strategies
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Tenney et al., 2009). However, past research on disinformation
and corrective information did not tackle several important issues including context of
disinformation, features of disinformation, emotional responses, and underlying
psychological mechanisms in processing disinformation and corrective information. This
research is the first to explore how the presence and composition of corrective information
affects emotional responses, situational assessment, and behavioral intentions, when fearneutral or fear-arousing disinformation is presented in the spread of an unknown health virus.
The key implications from Study 1 and Study 2 are three-fold: 1) Fear-arousing
disinformation does not increase belief in disinformation under risky situations and it may
even result in lower beliefs in the disinformation content as a coping strategy in the absence
of corrective information. 2) Simple alerts that state the falsehood of information can serve as
an effective corrective strategy when fear-neutral disinformation is shown but can backfire
when fear-arousing disinformation is presented. 3) Although differences between simple
corrective information and narrative corrective information were minimal, differences
emerged mainly for the effects of high and low social media users.
When taken together, fear-arousing disinformation resulted in lower beliefs when the
disinformation is not corrected. Study 2 did not validate the Study 1 finding that fear-neutral
disinformation resulted in greater belief in disinformation compared to fear-arousing
disinformation. However, given that only those in the no corrective information condition
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reported a significant difference in belief in disinformation contrary to the hypothesized
direction, the result from Study 1 suggests a possibility of psychological reactance of feararousing disinformation in the no corrective information condition. This is counter to prior
research that emphasizes the persuasiveness of fear appeals (Das et al., 2003; De Hoog et al.,
2005) and that argues anxiety and uncertainty increase credibility to disinformation (Oh et al.,
2013; Rosnow, 1980, 1991, 2001); the current research builds on extant theoretical
discussions on persuasive effects of fear-arousing messages. As explained earlier, individuals
may be willing to avoid the fearful situation in which they have lack of control. From the
conclusion of the current research, future research should measure levels of feelings of
control to systematically test whether the psychological reactance theory for fear-arousing
disinformation is supported. By investigating persuasive effects of fear-arousing
disinformation and fear-neutral disinformation, this research expands features of
disinformation in terms of fear under risk. Excessive fear can discourage belief in the
disinformation only when corrective information is not presented. The finding suggests a
possibility that individuals who face fear-arousing disinformation may deny the
disinformation content as a coping strategy in the absence of corrective information.
When fear-arousing disinformation is presented, simple corrective information
increased situational fear and situational severity across both studies. This backfiring of
simple corrective information in the fear-arousing disinformation condition across all studies
suggests that repeated exposure of disinformation content can raise fearful emotions and
perceptions of threat, even if the corrective information states the falsehood of
disinformation. The theory of the illusory truth effect and motivated reasoning explain this.
Based on the illusory truth effect (Begg et al., 1992), multiple exposure to fear-arousing
disinformation content can increase familiarity. Therefore, their fearful emotions and
perceptions of the severity of the risky situation increased when reading simple corrective
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information. In this case, a corrective information statement (e.g., “This story has been
debunked!”) that flags disinformation did not reduce situational fear and threat appraisal for
those who saw fear-arousing disinformation but did reduce situational fear and threat
appraisal for those who saw fear-neutral disinformation. Interestingly, simple corrective
information decreased situational fear and situational threat appraisal for participants who
read fear-neutral disinformation. Fear activates biased information processing, according to
motivated reasoning, which argues that emotions lead people to process the given
information in a biased way such that emotions color perceptions and inhibit people from
understanding information rationally (Taber & Lodge, 2006). From the current research, it
appears that simple corrective information results in superficial processing because it can
simply remind of the disinformation content. Fear plays an important role in eliciting illusory
truth effect of simple corrective information. Therefore, the negative effect of simple
corrective information cannot be generalized because it can backfire when people see feararousing disinformation.
Unexpectedly, there was no general effect of corrective information type: Increasing
complexity of corrective information did not reduce emotional responses, beliefs in
disinformation, and disinformation sharing behaviors, compared to simple corrective
information because there was no difference between narrative corrective information and
simple corrective information. While prior research has suggested a possibility that narrative
corrective information can serve as an enhanced correction strategy by replacing one’s mental
model (Cappella et al., 2015; Lewandowsky et al., 2012), the empirical findings from this
research do not support the effectiveness of narrative corrective information. This raises a
careful need to employ complicated corrective information to corrective information. The
backfire of simple corrective information in fear-arousing disinformation, and particularly,
the failure of narrative corrective information is in line with feeling-as-information theory,
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which argues that people tend to rely upon their emotions in decision-making (Schwarz &
Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 2002). According to this theory, humans evaluate a target positively
when they are in a positive mood, but they evaluate the target negatively when they have
negative emotions (Schwarz, 2002). When applying this theory to the current research,
participants who read fear-arousing disinformation could evaluate the situation as risky. This
fear-as-information phenomenon could be still shown even after the exposure of corrective
information. In this sense, regardless of corrective information type, corrective information
per se is not sufficient to subdue fearful emotions and perceived severity, which were already
established when reading fear-arousing disinformation. In the fear-arousing disinformation
condition, presenting corrective information can even increase fearful emotions and
perceived severity through disinformation retrieval. Counter-disinformation messages may
not work when emotion is prevalent but may work in the absence of emotion.
In the social media sphere, publics often face personal stories from their friends or
stories manipulated by social media algorithms. However, given the findings in this research,
these stories may be inappropriate for correction strategies under risks. In order to mitigate
the prevalence of emotions during risky situations, posting unrelated stories or corrective
information that uses facts or numbers to explain the truth, instead of simply debunking the
disinformation, could help publics subdue their fears and ultimately, forget about the
disinformation content. A deeper consideration of the multitude of ways in correcting
disinformation is needed. These may include add-on correction including blogs or articles
that refutes disinformation.
There is also a possibility that James’ story used as narrative corrective information
could not have replaced preexisting mental models of participants that were established by
the disinformation content. The narrative corrective information in the current research have
simply introduced new information about the disinformation content to participants and
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added another information to their existing mental models. Given this possibility, it is
important to consider in future research that how to replace mental models established by
disinformation with corrective information. Corrective information with explanations of
experts or numbers, for example, could be an effective strategy as a substitute for narrative
corrective information to replace existing mental model. Individuals could have higher levels
of credibility toward experts or messages containing scientific data than the James’ personal
story, and this credibility could be helpful in replacing mental model established by
disinformation.
However, social media usage moderated the effect of corrective information (presence
and type) in both studies. Although the backfire effect of simple corrective information
emerged in the fear-arousing disinformation condition overall, when investigated separately,
simple corrective information backfired for low social media users and narrative corrective
information backfired for high social media users. The expected results were shown low
social media users and this might result from their lack of opportunities to receive
information on social media or lack of self-confidence in their abilities to discern
disinformation from corrective information. Low social media users could have unbiased
views on information. Alternatively, the presence of corrective information may work with
fear-arousing disinformation for high social media users as a way to make them pay attention
to the corrective information content. Simple alerts that state disinformation is false may be
effective for high social media users when fear is prevalent by pulling out of their preexisting
thoughts on information. However, alternative information as a correction can cause
information overload when high social media users experience excessive fear, distracting
them from understanding the purpose of correction. Therefore, it is important to note that not
all corrective information may not work for high social media users because providing textheavy correction could distract their understandings of the correction when experiencing fear.
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These results suggest that fear, complexity of corrective information, and social media usage
are intermingled with each other in combatting disinformation. Hence, it should not be
generalized that narrative corrective information works and simple corrective information
backfires.
The spread of an unknown health virus in the current research is unique crisis that
generates fear continuously. Such situation could be termed as diffuse crisis events, which are
invisible and not affecting a physical environment. Compared to health crisis, other crisis
such as natural disasters, man-made disasters (e.g., terrorism, war), or financial crisis could
be termed as discrete crisis events. Fear in these discrete crisis events could also emerge but
may not continue in the aftermath of the crisis. Such types of crisis could affect a physical
environment but the prevalence of fear surrounding the crisis may be temporary. Particularly,
man-made disasters could raise anger among publics because anger needs an object who is
responsible for disasters (Pantti & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2011). Given these differences between
crisis types, the spread of an unknown health virus which belongs to health crisis should be
paid attention by scholars, particularly being associated with fear.
Limitations
There are several limitations in the current research, which might have impacted the
findings. First, in the case of the manipulation check, the current research might not have
phrased the question clearly or the manipulation of messages was not clear. In Study 2,
participants responded at random to the source of the corrective information but this question
might have sounded unclear. James Smith, a narrator of the narrative corrective information
might have been seen as Facebook or as a friend to participants. The questions can also ask
participants to recall and write about what they read before. Future work can examine
whether different results are shown between participants who chose James, Facebook, or a
friend as a corrective information source. Related to the stimulus, the current research did not
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consider PANAS as a main outcome because its main focus was to test whether fear-arousing
disinformation actually raised fear of the disinformation compared to fear-neutral
disinformation. Since diverse types of emotion can be considered in using PANAS items,
future research can further investigate whether disinformation raises other types of emotion
and how those emotions affect disinformation and corrective information processing.
The dependent variables of interest used in the current research (i.e., belief in
disinformation, situational fear, situational severity, and intentions to spread disinformation
on social media) were measured after the exposure of disinformation and corrective
information. Corrective information type in this research included no corrective information,
simple corrective information, and narrative corrective information. This raised a concern
that different corrective information conditions prevented us from examining a pure effect of
disinformation type on dependent variables of interest. The main effects of disinformation
type on dependent variables of interests did not show same results across Study 1 and Study
2.
Adding to the measured variables, self-efficacy in the current research is about health,
not about self-confidence for media literacy, because the items comprising of self-efficacy
asked participants to mark their abilities to utilize health resources against the spread of a
health virus. It should be acknowledged that there is a distinction between self-efficacy in
general, self-efficacy about health, and self-efficacy about media literacy. Therefore, selfefficacy cannot be used as a proxy for self-confidence in this research. This gives an idea for
future research to examine a linkage between self-efficacy about media literacy and social
media usage and test whether self-efficacy mediates the backfire effect caused by social
media usage.
In relation to the sample, the current research might have demographic biases in
general. All of the participants in this research were United States residents. Although the
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current research did not specifically ask the national identity of the participants, it should be
acknowledged that cultural differences may be another influencer of processing
disinformation and corrective information. Participants in this research who are in an
individualistic country with a for-profit media industry could have various levels of belief in
social media platforms. Moreover, most of the participants were heavy social media users
who use social media a few times day or regularly throughout the day, and this could inhibit
the current research from comparing between low and high social media users. As for
whiteness, most of the participants (82%) in the current research were white and this
unevenly distributed race could have affected the results. The image of the fear-arousing
disinformation contained non-white workers moving dead bodies; therefore, compared to
non-whites, whites could not be identified by the image. In addition, using MTurk as a source
of participants could contain some bias and limited external validity. These MTurk workers
could be younger, of lower income, and less diverse in terms of race, compared to the
national samples (Walters, Christakis, & Wright, 2018). Although the current research is
conducted by an online experiment that the representativeness of the national population is
less important than a survey, it is important to acknowledge any potential biases that this
research could have. In addition to that, participants who have experienced the spread of a
health virus could be more prone to feel fearful emotions and perceive severity and
susceptibility from the crisis. On the other hand, these participants could have built more
efficacy on themselves based on their past experiences. Future scholars can consider
characteristics of specific individuals when testing the effects of disinformation and
corrective information in the context of crisis.
There is also a limitation of an online experiment. Online participants can be easily
distracted by other external factors because of the absence of researchers during the
experiment. In addition to that, participants could have confused with the items about
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dependent variables of interest. Although the items specifically indicated which ones are
about disinformation or corrective information, it is possible that confounding effects could
occur. With regard to the limitation of an online experiment, future research can conduct an
offline experiment and examine whether the offline experiment produces the similar results to
the current research. Future researchers also need to go through the whole questions with a
third-person in advance of a main study.
Another point that needs to be discussed is that the findings of the current research may
not be limited to disinformation but be generalizable to information processing. This research
showed disinformation to participants as a first step and then showed corrective information.
For participants, the only way of knowing it was disinformation was the explanation that the
story was false. The similar outcomes can be possibly shown when participants received
factual information as a first step and read the false information later. In this sense, the
current research can be generalizable to any situation where information is contested.
Overall Implications and Recommendations
Taken together, this research yields important theoretical and practical ramifications.
Theoretically, this research demonstrated trends in how disinformation and corrective
information is processed in terms of fear as emotion and threat appraisal as cognition,
particularly focusing on the spread of a health virus. This research also expands online
deception research by focusing on features of disinformation and corrective information.
Different types of disinformation and corrective information can be shown depending on
situations—for example, fear-arousing disinformation is prevalent in risky situations. With a
focus on fear-arousing disinformation, web add-on corrective information, and narrative
corrective information, this research discusses features of disinformation and corrective
information under risks such that simple corrective information may backfire for fear-
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arousing disinformation, and this trend can be changed depending on levels of social media
usage.
When relating to the theories specifically, the major contributions of the current
research to a theoretical field are as follows. First, fear does not always lead individuals to
process information in a biased way, which revisits motivated reasoning theory and heuristicsystematic information processing. In interpreting the result that fear-arousing disinformation
did not increase belief in the disinformation when compared to fear-neutral disinformation,
fear may not always activate the biased information processing that makes people believe the
given disinformation. As psychological reactance theory for fearful emotions argues,
individuals may be willing to avoid the situation in which excessive fear is prevalent. With a
focus on the role of fear in information processing, the current research could build on
motivated reasoning, heuristic-systematic information processing, and psychological
reactance theory in the context of disinformation.
Second, the current research expanded the illusory truth effect in terms of emotional
and cognitive responses. Simple corrective information increased fearful emotions and threat
perceptions when fear-arousing disinformation is presented. This backfire effect of simple
corrective information is in line with the illusory truth effect that presenting disinformation
repeatedly can increase its effects in terms of emotion and cognition. Although it was not
found that simple corrective information increases belief in disinformation and
disinformation sharing intentions, the current research expands the illusory truth effects to
emotional and cognitive aspects.
Furthermore, the findings of the failure of narrative corrective information revisit the
theory of mental model. Narrative corrective information in the current research could not
have replaced the participants’ existing mental model. Then, the next question that future
research should ask will be: How should narrative corrective information be designed to
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entirely replace one’s existing mental model? The failure of narrative corrective information
in the current research could be attributed to the risky situation. Fear in the risky situation
might be prevalent among participants and narrative corrective information might have
limited power to subdue their fearful feelings. The current research suggests that research
should consider the situation in order to design narrative corrective information that can
replace existing mental models.
The current research also expands the uses and gratification theory in terms of
disinformation and corrective information on social media by showing that high and low
social media users processed disinformation and corrective information differently. More
research is needed to interpret the characters of high and low social media user such that
whether high social media users have self-confidence and optimism on their abilities in
understanding information. Beyond this limitation, the current research supports the argument
of the uses and gratification theory that social media usage emerges as a key factor in
moderating the interaction of disinformation and corrective information type.
As for practical implications, social media users should also be mindful of information
they may face on social media and be critical of what they read. When seeing disinformation
that contains fear, social media users need to view the disinformation content critically and
pay attentions to corrective information, even if the correction simply alerts that the
disinformation is false. Social media users should develop their abilities to discern
disinformation from corrective information and not to be easily swayed by disinformation.
The current research can be helpful for social media users to understand various types of
disinformation and corrective information and what results may occur according to the
different message types.
Media practitioners should design different corrective information strategies depending
on features of disinformation and individual characteristics. They need to consider using
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alternative corrective information to counter fear-arousing disinformation, rather than
presenting simple alerts that refute the disinformation content. Social media platforms such as
Facebook should particularly consider not presenting succinct corrective information (i.e.,
corrective information enabled a simple warning) to low social media users, and should avoid
exposing complex corrective information with one’s stories to high social media users when
fearful emotions are prevalent in the society. They should be careful of using simple
corrective information, which simply marks the falsehood of disinformation, particularly
during the fearful situation. They need to consider features of disinformation and social
media use of individuals in designing corrective information.
Future Directions
There are other remaining ideas for future work, aside from the limitations of the
current research. Future directions will address effects of sources, effects of actual platform
experiences, emotional diversification as construct as well as crisis diversification, and
diversified types of complex correction. Each direction is elaborated as follows.
Future work can investigate differences between individuals who perceive the
disinformation or corrective information they read either from their friends, from a social
media platform, or from other people. This research acknowledges that a source of corrective
information may have an effect on disinformation and corrective information processing, but
has not considered sources in analyzing the data. In addressing this gap, future research can
contribute to our understanding about when does fear-arousing disinformation actually arouse
fear in terms of sources. Individuals who perceive the source of corrective information as
their friends could have less beliefs in the disinformation, and this may be depending on
source credibility. Related to sources, future research should consider measuring levels of
credibility toward sources of disinformation and corrective information, which was the out of
focus of the current research. This research attempted to hold constant trust (i.e., ceteris
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paribus) by creating a generic individual who was delivering the disinformation and
corrective information. The manipulations of disinformation provided by an anonymous
source and corrective information provided by James Smith with a faceless profile image
were purposefully done. However, this approach can disregard the levels of credibility toward
disinformation and corrective information. Future research should consider from whom the
disinformation and corrective information are received.
When thinking about our real lives, we face a mixture of disinformation, corrective
information, and unrelated posts on social media. Future research can examine how unrelated
posts in the no corrective information condition can result in debunking effects. This
approach will provide insights that are more realistic to scholars and professionals given the
prevalence of disinformation on social media in our current society. If future work would find
that the exposure to unrelated posts work as a correction, this would add to the current
literature in that distracting social media users from their thoughts on disinformation content
needs to be considered as an effective strategy to mitigate the problems of disinformation and
disinformation sharing behaviors. In addition to that, future research can include unrelated
posts to each condition of disinformation (i.e., fear-neutral disinformation or fear-arousing
disinformation) and corrective information (i.e., no corrective information, simple corrective
information or complex corrective information) and explore longitudinal effects. When
facing unrelated posts between the disinformation and corrective information conditions,
individuals may forget the disinformation content and pay more attentions to corrective
information with a fresh insight. Related to this, the quantity of unrelated posts between
disinformation and corrective information conditions can moderate the effects of corrective
information. For example, there may be different results between participants who do not see
any unrelated posts, those who see one unrelated post, those who see three unrelated posts,
and those who see seven different posts of unrelated stories. A possible outcome may be that
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as more unrelated posts participants read, the influence of disinformation may decrease.
Participants who read seven different unrelated posts can be much more distracted and put the
disinformation content behind. Future research can also consider features of unrelated posts.
Positive unrelated posts with a picture of happiness could show different outcomes when
compared to negative posts with a picture of other crisis or neutral posts about weather
conditions. There is much more room to investigate unrelated posts as to disinformation and
corrective information processing. A social value of disinformation and corrective
information is another consideration for future research. High levels of virality metrics of
posts such as the number of likes, comments, or reshares) can increase message sharing
behaviors and believability of messages because people may easily rely on those.
In terms of emotion, this research focused on fear, but future research can consider
distinct emotions such as positive moods (e.g., hope) and other negative emotions (e.g.,
anger, sadness) in examining awareness of disinformation and corrective information.
Emotion research has suggested that negative emotions elicit a more vigilant information
processing than positive emotions (Cohen, Pham, & Andrade, 2008), which may offer an
insight to the roles of emotion type in processing disinformation and corrective information.
An expectation might be that individuals experiencing hopeful emotions would not pay
attentions to disinformation or corrective information because of their optimism about the
situation. Research comparing between positive emotions and negative emotions can
highlight the importance of emotion type in perceiving disinformation and corrective
information. Furthermore, people may perceive the spread of a health virus differently
depending on their social salience. In the situation in which the Ebola virus actually spreads,
publics could perceive the health virus issue more seriously. The results of the current
research may show different outcomes when it comes to a financial crisis. People may
perceive the financial crisis as more severe and serious when the recession actually occurs.
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Therefore, future scholars need to apply the idea of the current research to various crisis
types.
Lastly, from the failure of narrative corrective information in the current research,
future research can test the effect of corrective information with numbers, figures, or other
details and compare between statistic-based corrective information and narrative corrective
information. Although past research has noted that narrative has more persuasive effects than
other messages using statistics in risky situations (Van Laer et al., 2013), statistical data such
as numbers can be effective in reducing misperceptions because it can deliver corrective
information with details about the situation. The current research concluded that complex
corrective information (i.e., narrative corrective information) might not work, but the
question remains about the extent of complexity of corrective information. Corrective
information with statistical data can also be perceived as complex corrective information, so
it is the role of future research in examining which complex corrective information type may
be effective in decreasing disinformation effects. In so doing, future work can build on
current literature in terms of features of alternative corrective information.
Final Thoughts
The current research adds to the discussions among communication scholars and
practitioners who have raised concerns over the spread of disinformation on social media and
tried to find ways to decrease this problem. This research addresses important questions: How
does emotion play role in disinformation in risky situations? When does corrective
information work or backfire? In answering these questions, the current work ensured that
disinformation and corrective information type matters in health crisis, particularly for low
and high social media users. From this research, it is important to note that corrective
information strategies should reflect situational characteristics and individual differences.
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Social media platforms have attempted to develop disinformation detection methods,
but this research provided important findings that designing effective correction is not a
simple task. It may be not enough to state simply that the disinformation is false. One’s
narrative story may not be the absolute way for alleviate the spread of disinformation. On the
heels of the development of personalization in social media algorithms in the current media
environment, scholars and practitioners need to take efforts to understand diversified
situational and individual characteristics and employ personalized corrective information
strategies.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Samples of images used for the selection of the most relevant one to the given
disinformation content
1. Fear-neutral

2. Fear-arousal
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Appendix B. Stimulus of fear-neutral and fear-arousing disinformation
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Appendix C. Stimulus of simple corrective information (first row) and narrative corrective
information (second row)
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Appendix D. Informed Consent and Debriefing
Informed Consent
The role of emotion in processing information on social media
S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications 215 University Place, Syracuse, NY 13244
Our names are Jiyoung Lee, a doctoral student at Syracuse University, and Charisse L'Pree
Corsbie-Massay, an assistant professor at Syracuse University. We are inviting you to
participate in a research study about how emotion affects processing of information and
actions on social media.
Involvement in the survey is completely voluntary, so you may choose to participate or not.
The survey questions will ask for some demographic information, your social media use, and
your thoughts and attitudes regarding social media in general and regarding a specific
post(s).
This study is being conducted for research purposes. Completing this study will take
approximately 20 minutes of your time. Your participation in this study is completely
voluntary, and your answers will be confidential, and your name will not be reported or
associated with the answers you provide. Whenever one works with e-mail or the internet,
there is always the risk of compromising privacy, confidentiality, and/or anonymity. Your
confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology being used.
It is important for you to understand that no guarantees can be made regarding the
interception of data sent via the internet by third parties. If you have any questions contact us
at jlee08@syr.edu. We will do our best to keep your information confidential. All data is in a
password-protected electronic format. To help protect your confidentiality, the survey does
not contain questions requiring information that will personally identify you.
The results of this study will be used for scholarly purposes only. The findings of this study
are exploratory in nature and seek to better understand the public's perception of information
under risky situations.

Compensation: Respondents completing this survey will be compensated in the amount of
$1. To receive compensation respondents MUST enter the randomly assigned code provided.
Be advised that this code is randomly selected and no personal information will be received
in the processing of the payment through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Respondents who fail to
enter the code will not be compensated.
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this research, contact Jiyoung Lee,
Newhouse School of Public Communications, at 315-436-2751. If you have any questions
about your rights as a research participant; have questions, concerns, or complaints that you
wish to address to someone other than the researchers; or if you cannot reach either of us,
contact the Syracuse University Institutional Review Board at 315-443-3013.
Be advised: You may withdraw your participation in this study at anytime without penalty.
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Thank you for your participation.
Clicking to the next screen indicates that:
- You have read the above information;
- You voluntarily agree to participate in this study;
- You are a Facebook user;
- You are at least 18 years of age; and
- You understand you may withdraw your participation at any time
Debriefing
Thank you for your participation in this survey experiment. The goal of this study was to
examine the effects of false information and corrective information under risky situations.
We were interested in how you would process the information in the spread of an unknown
health virus.
Your participation is greatly appreciated by the researchers involved, and the data collected
could possibly aid people working with viral information and designing corrective
information. The nature of the phenomenon we are investigating required showing
unconfirmed information before the correction was shown.
If you have any questions about this study, please contact us:
Jiyoung Lee; Ph.D. student at S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications, Syracuse
University; jlee08@syr.edu
Charisse L'Pree Corsbie Massay; Assistant Professor at S.I. Newhouse School of Public
Communications, Syracuse University; clcorsbi@syr.edu
Finally, we urge you not to discuss this study with anyone else who is currently participating
or might participate at a future point in time.
Thank you for your participation!
Are you still willing to have your data included in this research after the debriefing?
1 = Yes, 2 = No
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Appendix E. Measurement Items and Citations
(*The items without citations are developed by the author)
Birthyear (Screening Question)
Please enter the year you were born (open-ended question)
*Respondents who indicated above 2002 were opted-out of participating the experiment.
Active Social Media (Screening Question)
On which of the following social media sites do you have an account?
( ) Facebook
( ) Flickr
( ) Google
( ) Instagram
( ) Linkedin
( ) Pinterest
( ) Reddit
( ) Snapchat
( ) Tumblr
( ) Twitter
( ) Youtube
( ) Other (Please specify)
*Respondents who did not mark Facebook were opted-out of participating the experiment.
Amount of Social Media Usage
The following questions ask about your social media usage. Social media sites are websites
or platforms that are designed to allow individuals to share information and express their
opinions efficiently (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.).
How often do you use ANY social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) in your
daily life?
1 = Not at all, 2 = A few times a month, 3 = A few times a week, 4 = A few times a day, 5 =
Regularly throughout the day
Social Media Usage
The following statements ask how you think about social media in general including any and
all platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, etc. Please read each statement
carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. Social media is part of my everyday activity (Ellison et al., 2007)
2. I am proud to tell people I’m on social media (Ellison et al., 2007)
3. Social media has become part of my daily routine (Ellison et al., 2007)
4. I feel out of touch when I haven’t logged onto social media for a while (Ellison et al.,
2007)
5. I feel I am part of the social media community (Ellison et al., 2007)
6. I would be sorry if social media shut down (Ellison et al., 2007)
7. I like using social media
8. I often think about deactivating my social media accounts (reverse-coded)
9. I am tired of using social media (reverse-coded)
Citation:
Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007). The benefits of Facebook “friends:” Social
capital and college students’ use of online social network sites. Journal of Computer‐
Mediated Communication, 12(4), 1143-1168.
Social Media Usage for News
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
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1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. Social media help me to stay informed about current events and public affairs (Gil de
Zúñiga et al., 2012)
2. Social media help me to stay informed about the local community (Gil de Zúñiga et
al., 2012)
3. Social media help me to get news about current events from mainstream news media
(Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012)
4. Social media help me to get news about current events through friends (Gil de Zúñiga
et al., 2012)
Citation:
Gil de Zúñiga, H., Jung, N., & Valenzuela, S. (2012). Social media use for news and
individuals' social capital, civic engagement and political participation. Journal of ComputerMediated Communication, 17(3), 319-336.
Social Media Usage for Fact-Finding
1. Social media help me to find fact-based information
2. Social media help me to check accuracy of information (Lee & Choi, 2018)
3. Social media help me to find a counter-argument
4. Social media help me to find additional resources
Citation:
Lee, J., & Choi, Y. (2018). Informed public against false rumor in the social media era:
Focusing on social media dependency. Telematics and Informatics, 35(5), 1071-1081.
Social Media Usage for Social Interaction
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
5. Social media help me to get ideas about how to approach others in important or
difficult situations (Kim et al., 2015)
6. Social media help me to have fun with family or friends (Kim et al., 2015)
7. Social media help me to have something to do with my friends (Kim et al., 2015)
8. Social media help me to be a part of social events you enjoy without having to be
there (Kim et al., 2015)
Citation:
Kim, Y. C., Shin, E., Cho, A., Jung, E., Shon, K., & Shim, H. (2015). SNS dependency and
community engagement in urban neighborhoods: The moderating role of integrated
connectedness to a community storytelling network. Communication Research, 46(1), 7-32.
Self-efficacy
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. It is easy for me to get help against the spread of a health virus (So, Kuang, & Cho,
2016)
2. Getting help against the spread of a health virus is no problem for me (So, Kuang, &
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Cho, 2016)
3. I am able to go to get help against the spread of a health virus easily (So, Kuang, &
Cho, 2016)
4. I have the capability to utilize health resources against the spread of a health virus
Citation:
So, J., Kuang, K., & Cho, H. (2016). Reexamining fear appeal models from cognitive
appraisal theory and functional emotion theory perspectives. Communication
Monographs, 83(1), 120-144.
Issue Involvement
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. I think about health viruses with a great deal (Flora & Maibach, 1990)
2. I consider myself at risk of influences of health viruses (Flora & Maibach, 1990)
3. The spread of health viruses is personally relevant topic for me (Ryu & Kim, 2015)
4. The issue of the spread of health viruses is meaningful for me (Ryu & Kim, 2015)
5. I personally feel very interested in judging the issue of the spread of health viruses
(Ryu & Kim, 2015)
Citation:
Flora, J. A., & Maibach, E. W. (1990). Cognitive responses to AIDS information: The effects
of issue involvement and message appeal. Communication Research, 17(6), 759-774.
Ryu, Y., & Kim, S. (2015). Testing the heuristic/systematic information-processing model
(HSM) on the perception of risk after the Fukushima nuclear accidents. Journal of Risk
Research, 18(7), 840-859.
Health Consciousness
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. Living life in the best possible health is very important to me (Dutta-Bergman, 2004)
2. Eating right, exercising, and taking preventive measures will keep my healthy for life
(Dutta-Bergman, 2004)
3. My health depends on how well I take care of myself (Dutta-Bergman, 2004)
4. I actively try to prevent disease and illness (Dutta-Bergman, 2004)
5. I do everything I can to stay healthy (Dutta-Bergman, 2004)
Citation:
Dutta-Bergman, M. J. (2004). Primary sources of health information: Comparisons in the
domain of health attitudes, health cognitions, and health behaviors. Health Communication,
16, 273–288.
Health Blog usage
How often do you visit medical-related websites (e.g., WebMD)?
1 = Not at all
2 = A few times a month
3 = A few times a week
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4 = A few times a day
5 = Regularly throughout the day
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present
moment.
1 = None at all, 2 = A little, 3 = A moderate amount, 4 = A lot, 5 = A great deal
1. Interested
2. Distressed
3. Excited
4. Upset
5. Strong
6. Guilty
7. Scared
8. Hostile
9. Enthusiastic
10. Proud
11. Irritable
12. Alert
13. Ashamed
14. Inspired
15. Nervous
16. Determined
17. Attentive
18. Jittery
19. Active
20. Afraid
Citation:
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief
measures of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070.
Fear of Disinformation
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. The post I just read made me feel nervous
2. The post I just read made me feel fear (Dillard & Peck, 2000)
3. The post I just read made me feel scared (Dillard & Peck, 2000)
4. The post I just read made me anxious
5. The post I just read made me frustrated
6. The post I just read made me afraid (Dillard & Peck, 2000)
Citation:
Dillard, J. P., & Peck, E. (2000). Affect and persuasion: Emotional responses to public
service announcements. Communication Research, 27(4), 461-495.
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Narrative Effect of Narrative Corrective Information
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement. "LIKE" is to
click a thumbs-up or otherwise response without comments.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. The corrective information had an effect on my emotions (Green & Brock, 2000)
2. I could relate to the situation described in the corrective information (Green & Brock,
2000)
3. I feel that the corrective information made its point effectively (Developed by the
author based on Green & Brock, 2000)
4. I could identify with the situation that the message provides (De Graaf et al., 2012)
5. I could feel empathy with the situation that the message provides (De Graaf et al.,
2012)
6. I was mentally involved in the message while reading it (Green & Brock, 2000)
7. During reading, I imagined what it would be like to be in the position of the person in
the message (De Graaf et al., 2012)
Citation:
Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2000). The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of
public narratives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 701-721.
De Graaf, A., Hoeken, H., Sanders, J., & Beentjes, J. W. (2012). Identification as a
mechanism of narrative persuasion. Communication Research, 39(6), 802-823.
Belief in Disinformation (Corrective Information)
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. I think the post I just read (the corrective post) is accurate (Appelman & Sundar,
2016)
2. I think the post I just read (the corrective post) is authentic (Appelman & Sundar,
2016)
3. I think the post I just read (the corrective post) is believable (Appelman & Sundar,
2016)
4. I think the post I just read (the corrective post) is trustworthy (Appelman & Sundar,
2016)
5. I think the post I just read (the corrective post) is reasonable
Citation:
Appelman, A., & Sundar, S. S. (2016). Measuring message credibility: Construction and
validation of an exclusive scale. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 93(1), 59-79.
Intention to Spread Disinformation (Corrective Information)
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement. "LIKE" is to
click a thumbs-up or otherwise response without comments.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. I would "LIKE" the post that argued the spread of the unknown virus (the corrective
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post) if I receive on Facebook (Alhabash et al., 2015)
2. I would "COMMENT" on or "REPLY" to the post that argued the spread of the
unknown virus (the corrective post) if I receive on Facebook (Alhabash et al., 2015)
3. I would "SHARE" the post that argued the spread of the unknown virus (the
corrective post) if I receive on Facebook (Alhabash et al., 2015)
4. The post that argued the spread of the unknown virus (the corrective post) is worth
sharing with others (Alhabash et al., 2013)
5. I would recommend the post that argued the spread of the unknown virus (the
corrective post) to others (Alhabash et al., 2013)
Citation:
Alhabash, S., McAlister, A. R., Hagerstrom, A., Quilliam, E. T., Rifon, N. J., & Richards, J.
I. (2013). Between likes and shares: Effects of emotional appeal and virality on the
persuasiveness of anticyberbullying messages on Facebook. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and
Social Networking, 16(3), 175-182.
Alhabash, S., McAlister, A. R., Lou, C., & Hagerstrom, A. (2015). From clicks to behaviors:
The mediating effect of intentions to like, share, and comment on the relationship between
message evaluations and offline behavioral intentions. Journal of Interactive Advertising,
15(2), 82-96.
Heuristic-Systematic Information Processing
Reflecting on the social media posts from earlier, please read each statement carefully and
rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. [Systematic] I approached the spread of the health virus with a cautious stance (Ryu
& Kim, 2015)
2. [Systematic] I thought about how the spread of the health virus relates to other things
I know (Kahlor et al., 2003)
3. [Systematic] I found myself making connections between the spread of the health
virus and information I get elsewhere (Kahlor et al., 2003)
4. [Systematic] It took a lot of mental effort to understand about the spread of the health
virus issue (Neuwirth et al., 2002)
5. [Heuristic] When I read stories about the spread of the health virus, I only paid
attention to the portion that seemed interesting (Neuwirth et al., 2002)
6. [Heuristic] I skimmed through stories about the spread of the health virus (Kahlor et
al., 2003)
7. [Heuristic] When I read stories about the spread of the health virus, I didn't spend
much time thinking about the information (Kahlor et al., 2003)
Citation:
Kahlor, L., Dunwoody, S., Griffin, R. J., Neuwirth, K., & Giese, J. (2003). Studying
heuristic‐systematic processing of risk communication. Risk Analysis, 23(2), 355-368.
Neuwirth, K., Frederick, E., & Mayo, C. (2002). Person-effects and heuristic-systematic
processing. Communication Research, 29(3), 320-359.
Ryu, Y., & Kim, S. (2015). Testing the heuristic/systematic information-processing model
(HSM) on the perception of risk after the Fukushima nuclear accidents. Journal of Risk
Research, 18(7), 840-859.
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Information Seeking, Sharing, and Avoidance Intentions
Please reflect on future actions you may take with respect to potential health viruses rate your
agreement or disagreement on the following statements.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. I plan to seek information about the virus using online media in the near future
(Griffin et al., 2008; Yang & Kahlor, 2013)
2. I will try to seek information about the virus using online media in the near future
(Griffin et al., 2008; Yang & Kahlor, 2013)
3. I intend to find more information about the virus using online media (Griffin et al.,
2008; Yang & Kahlor, 2013)
4. I will look for information related to the virus using online media in the near future
(Griffin et al., 2008, Yang & Kahlor, 2013)
5. I am willing to initiate conversation in online media about the spread of the virus
(Kim & Grunig, 2011)
6. I am willing to talk about the spread of the virus on online media (Kim & Grunig,
2011)
7. I am willing to share information on online media about the spread of the virus (Kim
& Grunig, 2011)
8. I will avoid information about the virus (Kahlor et al., 2006; Yang & Kahlor, 2013)
9. I will refuse to listen to information about the virus (Kahlor et al., 2006; Yang &
Kahlor, 2013)
10. I will ignore information about the virus (Kahlor et al., 2006; Yang & Kahlor, 2013)
11. I will tune out information about the virus (Kahlor et al., 2006; Yang & Kahlor, 2013)
Citation:
Griffin, R. J., Yang, Z., ter Huurne, E., Boerner, F., Ortiz, S., & Dunwoody, S. (2008). After
the flood: Anger, attribution, and the seeking of information. Science Communication, 29,
285-315.
Kahlor, L., Dunwoody, S., Griffin, R. J., & Neuwirth, K. (2006). Seeking and processing
information about impersonal risk. Science Communication, 28, 163-194.
doi:10.1177/1075547006293916
Kim, J. N., & Grunig, J. E. (2011). Problem solving and communicative action: A situational
theory of problem solving. Journal of Communication, 61(1), 120-149.
Yang, Z. J., & Kahlor, L. (2013). What, me worry? The role of affect in information seeking
and avoidance. Science Communication, 35(2), 189-212.
Situational Threat Appraisal (Severity and Susceptibility)
The following questions ask about your thoughts regarding the spread of health viruses.
Please read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. [Severity] The spread of the unknown virus would be a very serious threat to my
quality of life (Averbeck et al., 2011)
2. [Severity] The spread of the unknown virus would be a very severe threat to my
health (Averbeck et al., 2011)
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3. [Severity] The spread of the unknown virus would be harmful to my well-being
(Developed by the author based on Witte, 1996)
4. [Severity] I believe the unknown virus is probably the worst illness that a person
suffers (Iriyama et al., 2011)
5. [Susceptibility] I believe that I am at risk of getting the unknown virus (Averbeck et
al., 2011; Witte, 1996)
6. [Susceptibility] I believe that I might contract the unknown virus (Iriyama et al.,
2007; Witte, 1996)
7. [Susceptibility] I believe that the chances are high that I can get the unknown virus
(Iriyama et al., 2007)
8. [Susceptibility] It is likely that I will develop the unknown virus (Averbeck et al.,
2011)
Citation:
Averbeck, J. M., Jones, A., & Robertson, K. (2011). Prior knowledge and health messages:
An examination of affect as heuristics and information as systematic processing for fear
appeals. Southern Communication Journal, 76(1), 35-54.
Iriyama, S., Nakahara, S., Jimba, M., Ichikawa, M., & Wakai, S. (2007). AIDS health beliefs
and intention for sexual abstinence among male adolescent students in Kathmandu, Nepal: a
test of perceived severity and susceptibility. Public Health, 121(1), 64-72.
Witte, K. (1996). Predicting risk behaviors: Development and validation of a diagnostic scale.
Journal of Health Communication, 1(4), 317-342.
Negative Emotions including Situational Fear
The following questions ask about how you feel about the spread of health viruses. Please
read each statement carefully and rate your agreement or disagreement.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree
1. [Situational fear] I am afraid of the spread of the unknown virus (Dillard & Peck,
2000)
2. [Situational fear] I am frightened by the spread of the unknown virus
3. [Situational fear] I am scared of the spread of the unknown virus (Dillard & Peck,
2000)
4. [Situational fear] I am anxious about the spread of the unknown virus
5. [Situational fear] I am fearful of the spread of the unknown virus (Dillard & Peck,
2000)
6. [Situational fear] I feel tense when I think about the spread of the unknown virus
7. [Situational fear] I am worried about the spread of the unknown virus
8. [Situational sadness] I feel depressed about the spread of the unknown virus (Leach et
al., 2007)
9. [Situational sadness] I feel sad about the spread of the unknown virus (Leach et al.,
2007)
10. [Situational sadness] I feel hopeless about the spread of the unknown virus (Leach et
al., 2007)
11. [Situational anger] I am angry with the spread of the unknown virus (Butt et al., 2005)
12. [Situational anger] I am annoyed at the spread of the unknown virus (Butt et al., 2005)
13. [Situational anger] I am irritated by the spread of the unknown virus (Butt et al.,
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2005)
14. [Situational hope] I feel hopeful about the situation of the spread of the unknown
virus (Chadwick, 2015)
15. [Situational hope] I am optimistic about the situation of the spread of the unknown
virus (Chadwick, 2015)
16. [Situational hope] I am feeling positive about the situation of the spread of the
unknown virus (Chadwick, 2015)
Citation:
Butt, A. N., Choi, J. N., & Jaeger, A. M. (2005). The effects of self-emotion, counterpart
emotion, and counterpart behavior on negotiator behavior: A comparison of individual-level
and dyad-level dynamics. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26, 681–704.
doi:10.1002/job.328.
Chadwick, A. E. (2015). Toward a theory of persuasive hope: Effects of cognitive appraisals,
hope appeals, and hope in the context of climate change. Health Communication, 30, 598611.
Dillard, J. P., & Peck, E. (2000). Affect and persuasion: Emotional responses to public
service announcements. Communication Research, 27, 461-495.
Leach, C. W., Iyer, A., & Pedersen, A. (2007). Angry opposition to government redress:
When the structurally advantaged perceive themselves as relatively deprived. British Journal
of Social Psychology, 46, 191-204.
Gender
Please indicate your gender: 1 = Male, 2 = Female, 3 = Prefer not to respond
US Born
Where were you born?: 1 = United States, 2 = Other (Please enter)
US State
In which state do you currently reside?
Race
What racial/ethnic group do you most identify with? Please select from the following
categories.
1 = White/Caucasian, 2 = Latino/Hispanic, 3 = Middle Eastern, 4 = Black/African American,
5 = Caribbean/West Indian, 6 = South Asian, 7 = East Asian, 8 = Mixed, 9 = Others (Please
specify)
Ethnicity
In your own words, what racial/ethnic group do you most identify with. You do not have to
use the categories above, you are encouraged to self-identify with any terms you choose.
Education
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, the
highest degree received.
1 = Less than high school, 2 = High school graduate, 3 = Some college, 4 = 2-year degree, 5
= 4-year degree, 6 = Professional degree (e.g., J.D., M.D., D.D.S.), 7 = Master’s degree, 8 =
Doctoral degree
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Income
What is your annual income?
1 = 0 - $24,999, 2 = $25,000 - $49,999, 3 = $50,000 - $74,999, 4 = $75,000 - $99,999, 5 =
$100,000 - $149,999, 6 = $150,000 - $199,999, 7 = $200,000 and above
Political Identity
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself politically as a Republican, a Democrat,
an Independent, or something else?
1 = Republican, 2 = Democrat, 3 = Independent, 4 = Other, 5 = No preference
Conservatism
Below is a scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from
extremely liberal (0 on the left) to extremely conservative (100 on the right). Where would
you place yourself on this scale?
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Appendix F. Diagnostic plots of regression models of main effects of disinformation type
(Study 1)
1. Main effect of disinformation type on belief in disinformation

2. Main effect of disinformation type on situational fear

3. Main effect of disinformation type on situational severity

4. Main effect of disinformation type on situational susceptibility
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5. Main effect of disinformation type on intentions to spread disinformation on social media
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Appendix G. Diagnostic plots of regression models of three-way interaction effects of
disinformation type, presence of corrective information, and individual differences; Plots for
the significant effects only (Study 1)
1. Disinformation type × Presence of corrective information × Social media usage ➔
Situational severity (ΔR2 = .017, p = .040, ß = -.306).

2. Disinformation type × Presence of corrective information × Social media news use ➔
Situational severity (ΔR2 = .013, p = .080, ß = -.236).

3. Disinformation type × Presence of corrective information × Health blog usage ➔
Situational susceptibility (ΔR2 = .015, p = .078, ß = -.271).
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4. Disinformation type × Presence of corrective information × Social media use for factfinding ➔ Intentions to spread disinformation on social media (ΔR2 = .016, p = .064, ß =
-.240).

Notes. Variables of individual differences were all mean-centered for multicollinearity. A
series of VIF tests showed that multicollinearity for regression models was acceptable. The
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is a best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) for the original
results.
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Appendix H. Diagnostic plots of regression models of main effects of disinformation type
(Study 2)
1. Main effect of disinformation type on belief in disinformation

2. Main effect of disinformation type on situational fear

3. Main effect of disinformation type on situational severity

4. Main effect of disinformation type on situational susceptibility
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5. Main effect of disinformation type on intentions to spread disinformation on social media
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Appendix I. Diagnostic plots of regression models of three-way interaction effects of
disinformation type, corrective information type, and individual differences; Plots for the
significant effects only (Study 2)
1. Disinformation type × Corrective information type × Social media news use ➔ Situational
severity (ΔR2 = .025, p = .018, ß = .705).

2. Disinformation type × Corrective information type × Social media news use ➔ Situational
susceptibility (ΔR2 = .015, p = .067, ß = .561).
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3. Disinformation type × Corrective information type × Whiteness ➔ Intentions to spread
disinformation on social media (ΔR2 = .023, p = .025, ß = -1.079).

4. Disinformation type × Corrective information type × Self-efficacy ➔ Intentions to spread
disinformation on social media (ΔR2 = .016, p = .063, ß = .579).

5. Disinformation type × Corrective information type × Social media use for social
interaction ➔ Intentions to spread disinformation on social media (ΔR2 = .021, p = .031, ß
= .693).
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Notes. Variables of individual differences were all mean-centered for multicollinearity. A
series of VIF tests showed that multicollinearity for regression models were high when
corrective information type was coded as: 1 = simple corrective information and 2 = narrative
corrective information). However, even after the corrective information type was recoded as
0 = simple corrective information and 1 = narrative corrective information and rerunning the
analyses to decrease multicollinearity, the p-levels for significance were same as the original
results. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is still a best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) for
the original results.
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Adjunct Instructor
Spring, 2019

PRL 215: Advanced Public Relations Writing in Digital Media Era
▪ Currently teaching 12 undergraduates. Students will be taught
how to use a variety of social media analysis tools and apply those
to analyze audiences. They will learn how to respond to crisis
situations within the social sphere effectively using new media.

Fall, 2018

PRL 215: Advanced Public Relations Writing in Digital Media Era
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Spring, 2018

Taught 15 undergraduates. Focused on how to use and develop
content for online public relations tools and how to leverage
technology platforms to monitor conversations on the internet,
engage online communities, identify influencers, and establish
thought leadership.

COM 107: Communication and Society
▪ Co-taught approximately 50 undergraduate students. Defined and
differentiated the roles of advertising, public relations, news,
social media, and entertainment media in American society
(Student Evaluation: 4.26/5.00)

Teaching Assistant
Fall, 2017

COM 107: Communication and Society (Dr. Makana Chock)
▪ Guest lectured for approximately 75 undergraduate students about
imaged audiences, misinformation in digital media; Graded
papers, made up current event quizzes per week, and mentored
students

Summer, 2017

COM 107: Communication and Society (Dr. Brad Gorham)
▪ Syracuse University Summer College for high school students to
explore college majors and experience college life
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CONFERENCE PRESENTATION
Conference Talks
Lee, J.-Y. (October 2018). Fear-arousing Disinformation and Narrative Corrective
Information on Social Media in the Spread of a Health Virus
: A Focus on Situational Fear, Situational Threat Appraisal, and Belief in
Disinformation. 2018 Locked out of Social Platforms: An iCS (Information,
Communication, & Society) Symposium on Challenges to Studying Disinformation.
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Lee, J.-Y. & Choi, Y. (May 2018). Understanding social viewing through discussion network
and emotion: A focus on South Korean presidential debates. 2018 International
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Republic.
Kim, Y. & Lee, J.-Y. (May 2018). The power of fear in pictorial tobacco warnings:
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Kim, S., Buntain, N., Wirzburger, A., Park. K., Morntountak, A., Lee, J.-Y., Hu, J., Gayle,
G., Gaggin, K., Domenico, I., Canuelas, L., Rao, H., & Ri, S. (May 2018). Eyewitness:
Stereotype priming, memory, and attitude change in a virtual reality environment. 2018
International Communication Association (ICA), Information Systems Division.
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Gaggin, K., Park, K., Lee, J.-Y., Kim, S., Buntain, N., Domenico, I., Canuelas, L., Gayle, G.,
Hu, J., Morntountak, A., Rao, H., Wirzburger, A., & Zhang, J. (May 2018). The bag
stands alone: Stereotype processing in virtual reality. 2018 International
Communication Association (ICA), Information Systems Division. Prague, Czech
Republic.
Dosono, B., Lee, J.-Y., Britton, L., Dobreski, B., Bratt, S., Peterman, G., Bova, K., Sharma,
K., Semaan, B. (September 2017). Regaining normalcy after war: ICT-enabled
‘transition resilience’ among military veterans. Wisconsin Warrior Summit 2017,
Wisconsin, US.
Lee, J.-Y. & Jiang, H. (August 2017). Risk as anxiety in mental illness: Negative emotions,
coping responses, and campaign engagement intention. 2017 Association for Education
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Environment, and Risk Division (ComSHER). Chicago, Illinois, US.
Lee, J.-Y., Powless, N., & Liebler, C. (August 2017). “Locker room talk” as “small
potatoes”: Women of the GOP and the 2016 presidential election. 2017 Association for
Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC), Commission on the
Status of Women. Chicago, Illinois, US.
Kim, Y. & Lee, J.-Y. (August 2017). How do health messages and self-stigma operate in
extended parallel process model? 2017 Association for Education in Journalism and
Mass Communication (AEJMC), Korean American Communication Association
(KACA) Division. Chicago, Illinois, US.
*Second place faculty paper award
Lim, J., Lee, J.-Y., & Lim, S. (August 2017). The effects of message desirability and firstperson perception of anti-panhandling campaigns on prosocial behaviors. 2017
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC), Mass
Communication and Society Division. Chicago, Illinois, US.
Lee, J.-Y. (May 2017). Informed public against false rumor in the social media era: Focusing
on social media dependency. 2017 International Communication Association (ICA),
Information Systems Division. San Diego, California, US.
Lee, J.-Y. (May 2017). Hasty discussion, cross-cutting exposure, and tolerance: A
comparative study of South Korean and American online Discussants. 2017
International Communication Association (ICA), Intercultural Communication
Division. San Diego, California, US.
Lee, J.-Y. (May 2017). Shifting from audience to active public in social viewing: Focusing
on interpersonal relationships. 2017 International Communication Association (ICA),
Korean American Communication Association (KACA) Division. San Diego,
California, US.
Kim. Y. & Lee, J.-Y. (April 2017). Television news formats and constructing public sphere
in disaster: A case study on the Sewol ferry. 2017 The Broadcast Education
Association (BEA), News Division. Las Vegas, US.
Lee, J.-Y. & Powless, N. (March 2017). Republican women’s perceptions of media portrayal
of female politician’s unethical issues. 2017 Association for Education in Journalism
and Mass Communication (AEJMC) Midwinter Conference, Commission
on the
Status of Women. Oklahoma, US.
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Lee, J.-Y. (November 2016). Network heterogeneity on SNS and opinion polarization under
threatening situation: Focusing on North Korea’s threats. 2016 The National
Communication Association (NCA), Korean American Communication Association
(KACA) Division. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. US.
Lee, J.-Y. (April 2016). How is an informed public constructed in rumor communication?:
Understanding the effects of rumor credibility and SNS dependency. 2016 Korean
Women’s Association for Communication Studies. Seoul, South Korea.
Lee, J.-Y. & Kim, M. (February 2015). An analysis based on briefings of the South Korean
government for cooperative communication: Focusing on the remarks of Dokdo Island
issue. 2015 Social Science Korea Forum. Seoul, South Korea.
Poster Presentations
Lee, J.-Y. & Kim, Y. (August 2018). Revisiting the effects of threat appraisal and selfefficacy on protection motivation from a terror management theory perspective. 2018
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC),
Communicating Science, Health, Environment, and Risk Division (ComSHER).
Washington, District of Columbia, US.
Hemsley, J., Jackson, S., Lee, J.-Y., & Espinosa, D. (March 2018). The viral diffusion of
campaign messages about political issues during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
iConference 2018, Sheffield, UK.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
January 2015 –
May 2016

English News Editor
YTN (a 24-hour news broadcasting channel operating from Seoul,
Korea)
Duties: Covered domestic news in South Korea and international
news; Wrote top daily news regarding South Korea issues;
Produced news program and edited news video clips; In charge of
news anchoring; Monitored domestic events & updated breaking
news in a timely manner

March 2016 –
July 2016

Prime Time News Reporter
TBS efm (a 24-hour foreign language radio channel operating from
Seoul, Korea)
Duties: Reported news on political, international, and societal
issues
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February 2014 –
December 2014

Assistant Reporter
Thomson Reuters Seoul Bureau, Korean Language News Service
Duties: Covered global financial news; Edited and translated
global financial news; Wrote about market conditions of U.S. and
Asia; Analyzed financial data related to Asia market with fast pace
and accurate manner

June 2013 –
September 2013

Associated Press Television News Intern
Associated Press Seoul Bureau
Duties: Wrote broadcasting news reports on a regular basis;
Covered diverse news issues related to South Korea including
North Korea Issues, especially regarding crimes against the
humanity, diplomatic, and social news

March 2013 –
June 2013

Student Radio producer
Mapo FM (a radio channel operating from Mapo-gu, Seoul, South
Korea)

July 2012 –
August 2012

Summer Student Internship in Financial Division
Hankook Ilbo (a Korean language daily newspaper published by the
Hankook Ilbo Media Group in Seoul, South Korea)

SERVICE
To Syracuse University
2019
Teaching Mentor Selection Committee
Graduate School, Syracuse University
2018 – current

Teaching Mentor
Graduate School, Syracuse University
Duties: Assisting TA orientation program and mentoring of all
incoming teaching assistants; Leadership role with the TA
Orientation Program
Sessions Presented: Dealing with Challenges in the Classroom,
Humanities & Social Sciences, Using Kahoot! And Other Online
Technologies in the Classroom
(Student Evaluation: 5.00/5.00)

2018 – current

International Student Advisory Board (ISAB)
Slutzker Center for International Services, Syracuse University
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Duties: Informing and advising the Slutzker Center for International
Services on intercultural programs, services and issues that concern
undergraduate and graduate international students at Syracuse
University
2017 – 2018

Peer Consultant
Slutzker Center for International Services, Syracuse University
Duties: Planning, scheduling, conducting and coordinating
orientation programs for new international undergraduate students;
Analyzing post-event data, balancing budgets, preparing documents
and presentations

To the Profession or To the Academy
2017 – current International Communication Association (ICA) Korean American
Communication Association (KACA) subcommittee
Duties: Paper reviewer recruitment, paper/panel session design,
business meeting participation, award/grant selection, and social
events design (social dinner and graduate student social gathering)
2018 – current

Membership Chair
Communicating Science, Health, Environment and Risk (ComSHER)
Division, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Communication (AEJMC)
Duties: Organizing social events for AEJMC 2019

2018

International Communication Association (ICA) Student Volunteer Work

2018

International Communication Association (ICA) Health Communication
Division, "Effects of Social Media on Health Risk Perceptions and
Healthy Behavior" Session Chair

2017 – 2018

Graduate Student Representative Ambassador
Communicating Science, Health, Environment and Risk (ComSHER)
Division, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Communication (AEJMC)
Duties: Connecting with and supporting graduate students who
specializes in the ComSHER field

2017 – 2018

Student News Editor
Korean Communication Association (KACA)
Duties: Assisting in reporting news of KACA member
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2017 – 2018

Foreign Correspondent
Korean Press Arbitration Commission
Duties: Writing biannual reports on media trends in South Korea and
the United States

Referee/Reviewer
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking
Journal of Health Communication
Computers in Human Behavior
Chinese Journal of Communication
International Communication Association (ICA) Mass Communication Division
International Communication Association (ICA) Health Communication Division
International Communication Association (ICA) Information Systems Division
International Communication Association (ICA) Communication and Technology Division
Professional Memberships
International Communication Association (2016 – Current)
National Communication Association (2016 – Current)
The Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC) (2016 –
Current)

PROFESSIONAL TRAINING
May 29 – June 3, 2018

4th International Summer School
“Trusted in Mediated Communication”
University of Münster, Germany

2017 – 2018

Future Professoriate Program (FPP)
Graduate School, S.I. Newhouse School of Public
Communications, Syracuse University

2016

City U Summer School 2016 Advances in Computational
Social Science Research
Department of Media and Communication, City University of
Hong Kong

Certifications and Software
Certification 2018

Certificate in University Teaching

Syracuse University
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November
2014

Social Analyst Certification

Human Resources
Development Service
of Korea

Software

SPSS, Mplus, AMOS, R, STATA, NVIVO, EDIUS 6

Language

Korea, English

GRANTS
Dissertation Grant
2018 — 2019

Dissertation funded by S.I. Newhouse School of Public
Communications, Syracuse University ($2,000)

Conference Travel Grant
2017 — 2018

Student Travel Grant, International Communication Association (ICA)
▪ Health Communication Division (2018)
▪ Communication and Technology Division (2018)
▪ Main Registration (2018)
▪ Korean American Communication Association (KACA) Division
(2017)

2017 — 2018

Student Travel Grant, Graduate Student Organization, Syracuse
University

2017

Student Travel Grant, 2017 Association for Education in Journalism and
Mass Communication (AEJMC), Mass Communication & Society
(MC&S) Division

2016

Student Travel Grant, 2016 Advances in Computational Social Science
Research, Department of Media and Communication, City University of
Hong Kong

2014

Student Travel Grant, The Internet & Television Association (NCTA)
Conference, Los Angeles, California. Supported by GSSHOP and Korean
Association for Broadcasting & Telecommunication Studies

